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STELLINGEN 
1. The legalisation process shows the complex relationship between State law and 
Andean law within a local space. 
2. The first studies of Andean reality showed that a ingenuous and benelovent 
phantasy has no solid support (Castro Pozo 1973). 
3. Obtaining legal recognition influences the strengthening of communal 
organisation and authority among the comuneros themselves and towards 
outsiders (this thesis). 
4. The Dutch winter is favourable for working at home during the evenings. But 
one misses the summer! 
5. The idea of a homogeneous reality very strongly prejudices intellectual discourse 
about communities (this thesis). 
6. For some scholars, a legal system can be found in State institutions as well as in 
non-State ones. Factories, corporations, universities, popular organisations, 
peasant communities, are all involved in creating law (Griffiths 1986; Santos 
1977; K. von Benda-Beckmann 1991; Merry 1988). 
7. The idea that law is an instrument to overpower Indian groups in Latin America 
is a generalization which not always has an empirical basis. 
8. A legal system can be found in State institutions as well as in non-state ones. 
Nevertheless, State law has a great strength in influencing the semi-autonomous 
social fields of a given society (Moore 1973). 
9. With respect to law peasants identify themselves, with their Andean rules, 
procedures, sanctions and decisions. When one of their institutions becomes old 
fashioned, they just change it. 
10. The term "community" denotes different realities, and is used by various social 
protagonists with different meanings. 
11. Legal pluralism is a process of adaptation between legal systems in a complex 
process in which their boundaries are continuously redrawn. 
12. I think that the outcome of my research will become a tool for the analysis in the 
relationship between the State and the peasant community in Peni. 
German Nunez 
Lima, September 1995 
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PREFACE 
In Peru, along the coast and throughout the Andes, there are more than five thousand 
peasant communities, of which only about 50% are formally recognized by the State. 
Currently, despite this partial recognition, they are the main form of social 
organisation in the country, and this may well have been the case throughout Peruvian 
history. Due to their social significance, peasant communities have been the subject of 
extensive debates between Peruvian law- and policy-makers and social scientists, who 
have engaged in a long-standing debate, especially since the official recognition of 
some in 1920. 
The discussion on the nature, origins, significance and future of the peasant 
communities has been monopolized by two different perspectives. On the one hand 
there are those who think rural communities are obsolete institutions, lone survivors of 
the Inca or Spanish colonial past, and therefore obstacles to the real development of 
the country. This position is best described as the "disintegrative" view. It calls for the 
dissolution of the communities and for setting up the peasantry along different lines of 
social organization. On the other hand, there are those who argue that communities 
are, or should be, the real foundation of Peruvian society, the guardians of the cultural 
-and recently, ecological- heritage of the nation, and hence the fundamental backbone 
of national development. This might be labelled as the "protective" position, although 
in many instances it has served only as an excuse for integrationist State policies. 
Both conceptions have been the basis of the constantly changing set of State 
normative precepts. But not only the Peruvian Constitution and the special legislation 
enacted during the present century were inspired by these positions. A wide range of 
political projects, development models, and grass-roots programs implemented by 
State agencies seeking rural development have also been, and still are, nurtured by 
both concepts. However, for the peasant communities, projects "from the desks of 
Lima officers" -in the peasants' own words-, have caused more harm than good. In 
fact, policy-makers have been largely ignorant of the social reality of the peasantry, 
including their forms of organisation, their legal systems, their modes of production, 
their access to natural and economic resources and their cultural environment. 
In this regard, a key ideological discussion took place in 1968, when intellectuals 
and politicians discussed the role of the "indigenous" communities in the design of a 
new normative structure for the State, especially with regard to agrarian lands. Some 
considered that the peasant community should return to a more collective form of 
organization and production. This idea clashed with those of others who tried to obtain 
greater recognition for the plurality of the land tenure systems that actually exist in 
peasant communities. The outcome of this debate was the Agrarian Reform legislation, 
the basis of one of the most significant social processes in Peru during the last thirty 
years. 
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The present study purports to deal with and explain the terms of the debate regarding 
peasant communities, to determine its relationship with long—standing views about the 
peasantry,' to analyse the impact of the debate on State legislation and, last but not 
least, to look at the consequences of its implementation in two highland communities 
in Cusco, Paroccan and Ccachabamba. In this way, my research attempts to 
contribute, from a legal and anthropological perspective, to the understanding of the 
diverse, difficult and changing relationships between the Peruvian State and peasant 
communities in recent years. 
The legalization problem 
One of these relationships has been the legalisation of peasant communities; in other 
words, the opportunity for a community to obtain recognition -legal capacity-, 
registration, and title deeds from the State. Moreover, the community's legalisation is 
a vehicle to obtain benefits from public and private agencies, such as loans, financial 
aid, public services, etc. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that State recognition is 
not an indispensable requirement for the existence of peasant communities or 
communal lands. They have managed to survive in political contexts in which national 
governments have tried by all possible means to abolish them. 
The legalization process is an important field for analysing the differences and 
changes in the State's attitudes towards peasant communities. For example, laws 
usually contain the State's definition of a "peasant community" and, therefore, show 
how communities are perceived by lawmakers. The laws also refer to an 
organisational model, to the requirements for being recognized by the State, to the 
rights and duties of the comumros, to the land tenure system, and to the state agency 
that will be in charge of them. All in all, analysis of these aspects of a given law 
provides the opportunity to discover the type of policy the State is formulating and 
implementing. The State may or may not be interested in recognizing more 
communities, for example, by increasing or decreasing the legal requirements for 
doing so. Or the State might also be willing to recognize and grant more autonomy to 
the communities and, therefore, allow or promote "weak legal pluralism" (Griffiths 
1986). 
In the period dealt with in this study, I have found both of these State attitudes. I came 
across the different meanings of the legalisation process for the State and for the 
comuneros, too. The most important period in terms of this clear breach was the one 
defined during the Agrarian Reform bill enacted by Velasco's military government 
(1968-1975), when the government tried to impose a cooperative model on the rural 
areas, flatly ignoring the communities' customary land tenure and agrarian productive 
systems. The peasant communities' struggle for legal recognition was part of a wider 
political conflict. Legalisation to many communities was an important mechanism for 
confronting the cooperative model imposed by the military government, in order to 
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maintain their autonomy and social organization. 
However, in the current democratic context (1980- ), new laws concerning peasant 
communities -enacted by Alan Garcia's government (1985-1990)- showed wider 
recognition of communal autonomy and the communities' own organization, opening 
up some ways for legal pluralism, albeit within the framework of State law. Thus, for 
the comuneros, the search for formal recognition and title to their lands was not so 
much a response to a State imposition, which had already been tried, but was rather a 
way of asking for access to State public services or loans (i.e. subsidised credit) as 
well as to several development agencies. 
One of the main objectives in this thesis is to provide a case-study on how the 
legalization process took place in a specific social field. In order to go beyond the 
generalizations and abstract statements so commonly made about this process, my 
research has focused on two peasant communities in the district of Quispicanchis, 
department of Cusco, in southwestern Peru: Paroccan and Ccachabamba. The first is a 
community that has finally obtained both its legal recognition and its title deeds, but 
only after a process lasting almost fifteen years. The second is a community that has 
suffered through the experiments of the military government. The deep scars caused 
by the latter's policies have prevented its legalization until now. However, its 
members have struggled to obtain some non-legal recognition at their local level. 
Paroccan and Ccachabamba, therefore, constitute two different realities, with 
different problems. But both are also the product of the same social process in the 
same regional space. Where can we find differences between the two communities 
under study? What are the reasons for this situation? To answer these questions I have 
focused on their particular histories, forms of organisation, and relationships with the 
State and private agencies, before and after the land reform. I have also paid attention 
to the various conditions that permitted or prevented their legalisation, and to the 
present day consequences of this process. 
During this quest I discovered that, unlike envisaged in an instrumentalist approach 
to law, State law is applied in different ways in the same localities, even in similar 
cases. Its consequences depend on the features of the social space in which the State 
law is enforced. However, in all cases it depends on the characteristics of the social 
individuals who apply and use the norms. Therefore, on the one hand, both Paroccan 
and Ccachabamba struggle with a regional or local version of State law, which turns 
out to be different, in practice, from the commands and expected goals of the 
lawmakers. On the other hand, their own historical and social features finally 
determine which one achieves official recognition -and subsequently profits- and which 
does not. 
The study of these or similar processes in a social space shows the complex 
relationships between different social actors, the ever changing role of law, the 
presence and behaviour of the State at a regional and local level, the contradictory 
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attitudes and motivations of the comuneros, and, finally, the complex relationship 
between State law and Andean law. 
There is an awareness among lawyers and judges that a great sector of the 
Peruvian population regulates its daily life outside State norms. There is also a 
common belief that customary law is a definite corpus, earlier than and autonomous 
from State law. Many authors who demand recognition of customary law seriously 
believe that it has similar institutions and procedures to those of Western law. A 
first-hand approach to Andean reality can show that this ingenuous and benevolent 
phantasy has no solid support (Castro Pozo 1973). 
On the other hand, law has been seen as an instrument to overpower Indian groups 
in Latin America. This statement shows a paradoxical positivist approach to law, as 
this is thought to be exclusively a State privilege. This view is also a groundless 
generalization and not empirically based. 
A few scholars in Peru try to understand the legal phenomenon as something alive, 
as more than a bill or a certain procedure. They see it is as a complex phenomenon 
(Bustamante 1993; Guevara Gil 1992). Peasants can adjust to foreign law and give it a 
new meaning, according to their own interests and standards. This adjustment can 
even help the peasants turn State law against the very same interests State officials are 
supporting. There are historical examples of this since the beginning of Spanish 
colonial rule. Regardless of the fact that Peruvian legislation forbids all parallel justice 
systems, peasants are not worried by the "illegal" situation they are in. Since the first 
years of colonial rule, Indian authorities assumed other functions than those legally 
proclaimed. 
Conflicts can appear when the state stresses its presence in society (i.e. education, 
land distribution, authority system, development programs). Sometimes, people accept 
these interventions without realizing (or even wanting) the scope of the changes being 
introduced in the traditional legal system. Sometimes, the change is considered an 
open aggression and, consequently, people show their resistance and dislike. A more 
advanced step, very common among Amazon people, is the demand for an equal share 
in the benefits of the development policies. Eventually, the term "ethno-development" 
shows this desire to maintain an identity and, at the same time, to have a fair share in 
the profits of development projects. 
The human rights issue has recently been emphasized by some scholars. To an 
important sector of legal activists, communal law is an alternative way of solving 
conflicts, without the misunderstandings and delays of the State system. An idealistic 
perception avoids studying how strongly some people in the community can have a 
hold on power and scarce resources, using traditional devices to maintain this 
situation. On the other hand, in Peruvian public opinion, peasants are seen as having 
the tendency to act violently. Thus, it could be very dangerous to recognize their right 
to solve their conflicts autonomously. This debate has to be placed in an 
anthropological perspective: comuneros usually know and share the values embodied 
in state law. They understand most of the Criminal Code articles. Despite their lack of 
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formality, they follow, in their daily lives, many Civil Code rules. Most of the cases 
of "barbarian" procedures and verdicts have therefore been exaggerated by the mass 
media. 
Particular research has been done on the strategies developed by the peasants to 
achieve their objectives, and how they relate to the bureaucratic agencies in charge of 
dealing with them (Urquieta 1993). From this interaction, I have selected the 
following issues: 
- the evolution of the communal land tenure system, 
- the origin of, legal context and non-legal factors for legalizing communal lands, 
- the main variables that determine the decision of peasant communities to have 
access to the legalization process, 
- the problems and consequences of achieving community legalization, and its 
significance in Peruvian society, 
- the levels of coexistence between State and local law, 
- the historical, economic, social and regional context in which peasant communities 
create their space and their own systems, and 
- the ways the State intervenes, especially regarding the behavior of state agencies. 
After dealing with these issues it will become clear that Andean and State law have a 
contradictory but creative relationship. Such has been my task. I trust the outcome of 
my research will eventually become a tool in the search for a new and more balanced 
relationship between two of the most significant protagonists in my country. I feel that 
this is a key condition for the accomplishment of balanced and sound development, not 
only in Peru but also in the rest of Latin America. 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 aims at exploring key theoretical 
issues. It starts with a discussion of the concept of community. It then deals with the 
problem of conceptualizing law and the role law plays in society. Finally, it elaborates 
a definition of local Andean law. Chapter 2 gives the legal history of the relationships 
between communities and the State. Chapter 3 then gives an account of regional and 
micro-regional context of the communities of Paroccan and Ccachabamba. This is 
followed by looking more in detail at these two communities, describing and analyzing 
the social and legal developments, the recognition and titling processes in Paroccan 
(Chapter 4) and the failed attempt to obtain recognition in Ccachabamba (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 adopts a comparative perspective, looking at the changes and continuities in 
these two communities. Chapter 7 finally sums up the principal conclusions of my 
research. 
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A note on the research 
Various methods were used to collect the data necessary for this study. In the 
communities, most information was acquired through interviews and observation. Oral 
history was elicited from the eldest people in the communities. Many data on the 
ecological and social environment were collected from NGO's such as Bartolomé de 
las Casas and CCAIJO (Centro de Capacitación Agro-industrial Jesús Obrero). Much 
information was found in official records of the Ministry of Agriculture, Justices of 
the Peace, and the Agrarian Court. But it was mainly the help which I received from 
the people of the two communities which allowed me to learn about their realities and 
thus enabled me to continue my research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Law and Peasant Communities: 
A conceptual framework 
The peasant community in Peru has been studied from many disciplinary perspectives, 
especially from sociological, economic and anthropological points of view (Fuenzalida 
1970; Gonzales de Olarte 1986; Golte 1987; Figueroa 1987; Kervyn 1988; Long and 
Roberts 1978). However, only very few studies and research have been made from a 
legal scientific position (Galvez 1987; Villavivencio 1988; Ambfa 1988; Figallo 1988). 
In this area, the studies have taken different State laws as the basis for defining and 
analysing the peasant community. In most cases, customary law has not been taken 
into account in this research, and when it has, it has been studied inconsistently. 
Moreover, the State is usually shown as an entity composed of different bureaucratic 
agencies, very remote from peasant communities. By removing the State from the 
picture, most of these studies present an idealized and prejudiced view of the peasants' 
communal life. 
Here, I try to present law as a link between the State and the peasant communities. 
I will analyse the role of law from a pluralistic point of view, stressing the interactions 
of those involved in the relation between the State and rural communities. Even 
though my analysis is concentrated on the State's legal procedures, I will also attempt 
to demonstrate the existence of different concepts of law among Andean peasants. 
For my purposes, the legal link established between the State and the community 
will be represented by the processes of obtaining recognition and land titles of the two 
peasant groups under study -Paroccan and Ccachabamba. These processes involve not 
only the formal procedures established by State law, but also the socio-legal inter-
actions between peasants and peasants, peasants and bureaucrats, and bureaucrats 
themselves at the different levels of administration. Taking the law as the main 
variable in the research will have important consequences in highlighting the internal 
relations of the two peasant groups, their social and economic organizations, and the 
way in which the State will create or interpret its own legality and policies. 
This chapter will explore some of the key theoretical issues, beginning by dealing 
with the ideas of what peasant communities have meant to Peruvian scholars and how 
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I understand them. This is followed by an analysis of the role of law in society and, 
finally, the interaction between State and Andean law in Peruvian society. 
1.1 Andean Communities 
There is a wide range of interpretations on the nature and significance of the peasant 
or Andean communities. As Yambert says, communities have been seen indifferently 
as "close compassion and cooperation groups"; as microcosms of a 
class-exploitation-and-struggle world; and as reservoirs of untapped energy for 
development projects (1980:77). 
Historically, we find two predecessors of the contemporary peasant community: 
the Andean ayllu and the Spanish comuna (Arguedas 1968). The way in which these 
institutions are intertwined in different configurations is not yet sufficiently explained 
and needs further systematic analysis. From what is currently known, the ayllu 
appears as the original nucleus of the community structure, and the comuna as the 
model which made possible its consolidation throughout the Colonial change in the 
ayllusl). This complex articulation of Andean and Colonial elements led some 
authors, like Fuenzalida (1970) to define the internal structure of the community as 
"an artificial association of corporate units, with kinfolk bases, not necessarily related 
to each other"2'. 
However, this is not the only misleading definition that we have found of the 
peasant community. Indigenistas (urban intellectuals who vindicated and supported the 
community and the Indians' way of life between 1880 and 1940, approximately), 
social scientists and development activists have used the expression "community" in a 
way similar to "tribe" or "ethnic group". For them, communities meant "natural" units 
of organization, embodying primordial sentiments and solidarity. So, the communities' 
boundaries are seen to be fixed and definite (see Castro Pozo 1973), not as historically 
determined. For these scholars, the unity and cohesion of the community is based on 
the adherence of individuals to a shared set of customary values and beliefs. But 
things are not always that easy: individuals are often capable of claiming or 
disclaiming their membership -that is, their adherence to or freedom from those beliefs 
and values- in their "primordial" groups, without losing their communal links3'. 
In a similar way, other scholars and political activists have opined that peasant 
communities should be the basis for the establishment of a new, solidary and fair 
See the following chapter for historical approach to this process. 
a Unquestionably, colonial changes in Andean human geography broke up previous kin—groups, and 
disturbed the Andean pattern for access to land and resources based on the vertical control of different 
ecological levels (Murra 1975:59-115). 
3 ) An example are the links with comuneros who migrated to urban settlements, through the "migrant 
associations" (Altamirano 1984). Through these asociations, many comuneros preserve their identity 
although they acquire urban values. 
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society. In this perspective, communal arrangements are seen as being the peasants' 
main organizing principle for fighting the historically dominant regime in the Peruvian 
rural areas. This led them to believe that glorious social and cultural remains of the 
Inca society were kept alive in Andean communities. As Urrutia says, 
Grounded in this indigenista vision, later strengthened by some social scientists, 
ayllu and comunidad became, in our collective imaginary synonyms of a 
glorious heritage that in this institution [the Andean community] had one of the 
last strongholds of our autochthonic culture (1992:4). 
Leftists inherited a similar ideological approach, insofar as communal organization 
was construed as an alternative model to State oppression. In this, they paid particular 
attention to the community, and defined it as the germ needed for a complete social 
transformation. Overall, both Indigenistas and leftists shared a biased vision of the 
Andean communities, representing them as social fields where men live harmoniously 
and in a socialist-like mode of production, directly inspired by the Inca Empire. 
It is clear that the idea of a homogeneous reality very strongly prejudices 
intellectual discourses about indigenous people. For example, State law usually denies 
a specifically communal identity since it formally establishes that all Peruvians are 
equal as individual citizens. Similarly, this prejudice also appears in the activists who 
support special laws for indigenous people: all communities are similar. The 
lawmaker, when using the word comunidad, and even when assisted by 
well-intentioned and progressive intellectuals, does not see the differences between 
communities, and among comuneros. 
In my view, the peasant community should not be conceived only on the basis of 
ancient cultural and social traits. In order to have a more coherent idea of 
communities, we need to take into account the organisational factors that define 
peasants not as individuals, but as a part of social institutions. Andean cultural 
elements cannot be taken as the main factors for determining the existence of a 
peasant community, because many communities belong to completely different cultural 
environments. They can feel and enact a strong identity, not necessarily expressed in 
cultural practices, but in the assertion of their group potential and autonomy. 
In my understanding, a peasant community exists when an internal organization, 
reproduced by a peasant group, administers the group's resources (land, water, 
livestock, etc.). In relation to external institutions, like the State or non-governmental 
institutions, this peasant group is represented by its authorities. Moreover, other 
elements give a particular character to the Andean peasant community. I have defined 
three main features: 
a) Communal control and usufruct of a physical space (land and water). 
b) The maintenance of communal organization and collective work, based on 
reciprocity, cooperation and solidarity. 
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c) The conservation of its cultural and social characteristics. 
These features should be analysed from a dynamic perspective, not from a static one. 
The communal structure has endured a permanent external influence. Its patterns of 
production have survived Spanish colonial rule despite violent changes in the form of 
managing resources and, in general, in Andean culture. Later, in the Republican 
period (XLX-XX centuries), several private groups kept exploiting the peasant labor 
force: merchants, landholders, State officials and sometimes even peasants within the 
same community. Thus, the communal structure was never fixed but constantly 
negotiated through a permanent struggle between external and internal forces. 
Haciendas, later State agencies, and finally NGOs and religious projects provided new 
social, cultural and economic parameters for communal life. The definition and 
redefinition process is, therefore, ceaseless in the cultural, organizational and 
productive structures of the community (see Yambert 1980:78). 
Regarding the first characteristic -communal control and usufruct- it must be stressed 
that although legally the community owns all the lands, in many cases each family 
holds parcels in private possession. Thus, the communal property of farming lands 
progressively vanishes. However, in most cases, the communal organization keeps 
controlling the size, distribution, inheritance and access to land and other resources. 
The community structure keeps working because it is invested with communal 
jurisdiction over the free disposal of land. In this sense, I wish to emphasize the 
function of representation towards individual interests in and outside the community. 
Peasants tend to join together in communities: they need a corporate institution that 
organizes its production and represents them in relation to the external world. 
Social control is stronger in societies possessing common land and having specific 
distributive mechanisms governing its members. Even in cases where each peasant 
privately owns his own plot of land -quite frequent nowadays- the communal taboo 
against land sale to strangers rigorously limits external agents' influence on the 
property structure, and tends to limit class differences within the community. 
In this sense, I share the view that many communal restrictions are mechanisms 
used to isolate its members from the society as a whole and from the market which is 
usually considered dangerous and threatening. The communal leaders struggle to 
establish limitations on the ability of its members to communicate with the outer world 
(Wolf 1977:69). Of course, this larger society has many strong mechanisms, capable 
of penetrating the minds of the comuneros, but the communities believe that this 
formal isolation can permit them to manage foreign influence more resourcefully. In 
many cases, comuneros try to distinguish and incorporate foreign technical advances 
and useful new products, while defending their capacity to make these distinctions and 
final decisions about themselves. 
Regarding other features -communal organization, collective work, cultural 
conservatism-, it can be seen that they are only present in various degrees but, 
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nonetheless, contribute to legitimising the existence of the community. This ideological 
function is based on the identification of its members with their territory, usually but 
not always owned since ancient times, and with the communal traits mentioned above. 
In the community, the relationships and links created by the interaction of its members 
are precisely the bonds that define them as comuneros, as members of a social unit. 
Without this identity, the comuneros would not be more than small independent 
producers linked by legal means. Families within a community, for example, are 
linked by productive relations but these are not necessarily equal. On the contrary, 
they are established on the basis of each family's endowment. Despite these 
differences, the peasant community maintains certain "collective representations" that 
legitimize its social system, setting out its members' rights and obligations, and 
determining their behavior. Thus, peasant communities play important roles in identity 
and cohesion since they shelter the traditional Andean culture. Authors like Mishkin 
(1960) see the community as an institution which affirms a group feeling. This "group 
feeling" arises from kin relationships, and from other relationships that emerge during 
daily cooperation. 
In my view, there is an important variation in the degree to which communal 
features are present in each peasant group. There is heterogeneity, but not only in one 
community. There are also substantial differences between communities at a 
sub-regional level. There can be different forms of social organization in the 
communities, as well as divergent sets of social, economic and political concepts. 
Regardless of these heterogeneities in the rules and premises for structuring 
communal relations, the common ground is that communities have their own rules and 
sanction mechanisms, and that these are part of their identity and reproduction as 
such. Based on this, the community's boundaries, and its internal and external 
relations create and modify these rules and sanctions, acting as a "semi-autonomous 
field" in Moore's sense; that is, social fields that create their own rules, customs, 
procedures, sanctions and symbols for its members, although being vulnerable to 
rules, decisions and other forces emanating from the surrounding world (1973:720). 
To develop these ideas further, however, it is important to introduce ideas about the 
relation between law and society, giving special attention to the debate between law 
and legal pluralism. 
1.2 Law and Society 
Created by man to satisfy his gregarious needs, law becomes inherent to society. Law 
is always a social product. This "living law", as Ehrlich said, "dominates life itself 
even though it has not been posited in legal propositions" (1936:493; quoted by 
Griffiths 1986:26). Moreover, law is a historical and cultural expression: it is a part of 
that modus Vivendi created by concrete men, in a concrete time and space. Therefore, 
law does not merely exist in texts or in men's ideas; it is also produced and fed by 
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daily human life, affecting human conduct in various ways. As Benda-Beckmann says, 
law consists of the cognitive and normative conceptions by which a certain society 
recognizes and restricts the autonomy of its members. Law sets limits to the 
independence or autonomy of a society's members to act and make their own cognitive 
and normative conceptions (F. von Benda Beckmann 1989). 
Using a realistic approach, several normative social orders can be found inside any 
society. The problem is whether any system of rules can be considered as "legal". 
This question demands theoretical consideration of what is considered as "law" within 
each society. Obviously, not all social precepts and values will be considered "legal". 
There are various kinds of norms: rules involving morality, religion, law, ethical 
customs, honour, decorum, tact, etiquette, fashion. 
From a restrictive positivist approach, legal norms are just the rules created by the 
State. From this point of view, social institutions like the peasant communities cannot 
create legal rules, because these can only be promulgated or incorporated by the State. 
However, it is evident that peasant communities regulate some aspects of the 
comuneros' behavior (i.e. communal work, relations or conflicts regarding resources, 
etc.). Therefore, we need to adopt a different perspective, that permits us to define as 
"legal", norms other than those produced by the State. 
Following Stavenhagen (1989: 227), we can say that what constitutes the legal or 
juridical in a certain society should be established by looking at the character of the 
society concerned. Thus, in states where positive law governs, all that falls under the 
support of the law -the means by which it seeks to regulate the different spheres of 
human activity- is legal, while in societies where legal custom prevails, the legal must 
be the object of additional investigation, because there a clear separation between 
(state) law and its social and cultural context does not exist. Stavenhagen proposes that 
the "legal" in such societies is related to: 
a) general public rules of conduct. 
b) internal maintenance of order. 
c) a member's rights and duties. 
d) access to and distribution of scarce resources. 
e) regulating transfer and interchange of goods and services (inheritance, work, etc.), 
description of crimes against other people and against society. 
f) sanctions. 
g) procedures to resolve conflicts. 
h) description of functions of authorities. 
Although, as Stavenhagen mentions, this list does not exhaust the possible elements of 
legal order, it is useful to define the law for our investigation. In this way, these 
elements will permit us to determine what, within the Andean communities being 
studied, can be classified as "legal" without having to derive this character from a 
state law. 
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However, due to the difficulties of defining law plurally, it is not easy to adopt such a 
position. To describe a group of elements, and to define what is legal, does not help 
us at all if we cannot distinguish the different elements in a plural system and find 
ways to look at the relations which the elements have with one another in a specific 
legal order, and what kinds of interactions might exist between State law and other 
legal orders in a certain social space. Some authors (Griffiths 1986; Santos 1977; K. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Merry 1988) have developed the concept of "legal 
pluralism" to analyse these problems. For them, a legal system can be found in State 
institutions as well as in non-state ones: Factories, corporations, universities, popular 
organizations, peasant communities, can all be involved in creating law. 
Legal pluralism is particularly evident in countries with ethnic minorities or 
marked cultural differences. In spite of some romantic approaches, directly translating 
cultural or ethnic marginalities into a separate legal field, the legal (sub)systems in 
these countries are not isolated. Quite the contrary, their interrelationships may be 
show different degrees of isolation or contact, or of mutual incorporation. Non-state 
orders may incorporate many elements of the State's system, but at the same time 
keep their separate identity. Moore therefore strongly suggest that we should not talk 
about "isolated legal systems", but about "semi-autonomous" social fields (1973, 
1978). 
In Moore's conception, a semi-autonomous social field is defined by two central 
elements: its rule-making capacity and its capability to induce or coerce norm 
conforming behavior of its members. But the most important characteristic that Moore 
points out is that the semi-autonomous social field should not necessarily be defined by 
certain formal elements (whether or not it forms a corporate group), but by the legal 
processes that develop within it (1973:722). This characteristic is relevant, no matter 
whether one defines a legal order with respect to State law, or whether a legal order 
operates in a semi-autonomous way with respect to the State law. Moore feels that it is 
more important that a semi-autonomous field could be effective in regulating the 
relations of those within its jurisdiction, even if, in order to do so, the actors in the 
social field use norms, values and symbols of another (the State's) legal order. 
Nevertheless, Moore recognized the great strength State law can have in 
influencing the semi-autonomous social fields of a given society. For her, State law is 
well above the rest of regulatory systems. It has effective coercive and conditioning 
means for seeking social compliance. From this it is deduced that the State legal 
system has the greatest chance of influencing, if not imposing itself, on other 
regulatory systems. But State law is not always the most powerful one, even though 
this has been a common Western legal dogma4'. As Griffiths says about Moore: 
4 ) In Western legal theory, the sovereign power, the ultimate legal authority in a polity, can legislate on 
any matter, and can exercise control over any behavior within the State... classical task of legal 
anthropology has been to understand the relationship between law and society. The main goal in the past has 
been to identify the type of societies in which certain legal institutions appear, and to examine the kind of 
legal procedures, norm principles, rules and concepts found under certain social conditions (Moore 
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"her central point is that external legislation has not had, and could not be 
expected to have, the apparently intended effects, precisely because of the 
semi-autonomy of the social field in which it operates -the fact that the ties of 
'mutual obligation' there are frequently stronger than, and in any case deflect, 
the operation of external law" (1986:30). 
Despite this, Moore's theory is important because it emphasises two central aspects for 
studying situations of legal pluralism, and above all the relations that might arise 
between different legal systems and the effectivity and spatiality of law. In this 
respect, I agree with the Benda-Beckmanns' statement that law in society cannot be 
fully understood without taking into account its spatiality. Space is a structure, not 
pure physical space. Within a social space there can be differences between one group 
and another, since external influences do not reach everybody in the same way. 
Indeed, normative boundaries can be reinterpreted and shifted, and in the group ideas 
of what is external or internal may change. 
"Normative macro-structures do not subsume, they coexist (Knorr-Cetina, 
quoted in F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1991). What is different is the 
degree of interdependence between social practices of law making, 
interpretation and maintenance in different localities, the degrees from which 
they actually subordinate, to which they are invaded and influenced by external 
law." (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1991). 
Following these ideas, it is quite relevant to my research to determine to what extent 
Peruvian State law -the legal policies formulated for regulating peasant communities-
has conditioned or determined the legal norms and conceptions of these communities. 
The first step in attempting to solve this question is to define what "State law" and 
"legal policy" are.We must say, first of all, that attempts to develop a descriptive 
theory of "State law" are still recent within the anthropology of law. For many 
decades, definitions of State law and its effectivity were pervaded by either "legal 
centralism" (Griffiths 1986:3) or by "false comparisons" (Van Velsen 1969). These 
approaches did not take into account the specific differences that do exist between 
State legal orders. For other scholars, State law is merely taken as something given, 
without explaining its main characteristics. 
In my opinion, State law is a particular way of expressing power relationships. A 
large part of the political activity is carried out through the State's legal system. The 
legal system is a catalyst of social interaction and a carrier of power relations within a 
given society. Therefore, it is more than an instrument of the prevailing social forces, 
since it includes different and specific trends in society. As Brandt says about Latin 
American countries: 
1978:225). 
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"Quite often it is forgotten that in developing countries [State] law is also a 
form of political expression, and that in many countries, 'politics' is 
increasingly practiced through legal means (1987:33)". 
At the same time as Benda-Beckmann (1989:207) and others point out, the issue of 
legal policy is related to the field of the "implementation" and "efficiency" of the law. 
Thus, legal policy can be understood as the organized activity of the State aimed at 
accomplishing a desired impact or a change in part or in society at large. Legal norms 
are used as means for sending commands of action to different State officials and 
bureaucrats, and to the general public, in order to make them direct their actions to 
the end sought by the State. As Benda-Beckmann states: 
"Not all policy, of course, is law, but in all contemporary societies salient 
elements of State policy have to be framed and legitimized in terms of 
law...And most of law, particularly law originating in government institutions 
can be seen as policy (1987:207)". 
Thus, from the dogma that only State law is real law, the dogma can be deduced that 
this law (shaped in a multiplicity of legal policies) is efficient in achieving social 
changes in any sphere of activity. The consequences of misunderstanding the social 
limitations of State law can be very serious, even for well-intentioned legal activists5', 
because in most cases they cannot achieve the end-results they sought. 
One reason for this is that the lawmaker is usually outside the group that creates 
the rules. He also pretends to understand it and thinks he is capable of enforcing his 
norms, according to an abstract and idealized vision of the social context and legal 
structures in which these must be enacted. This has been a common belief among the 
legal elites in developing countries, where the gap between State law and real social 
practices have become more evident as the years have passed. Usually, local legal 
systems and values are ignored by State officials in charge of development projects. 
A process in which only one way of thinking is accepted tends to fail, although the 
power relations are not unaltered. 
Some studies (Trazegnies 1979; Bustamante 1993), have shown that even State 
officials have their own particular ideas and interests when dealing with State norms. 
In a descriptive sense, the State is not an homogenous body with only one objective 
and one will expressed in its legal policies. On the contrary, the State consists of 
multiple interests, levels and organizations. It is interlaced by internal struggles and by 
' In Peru, some authors (Castro Pozo 1973; Delran 1981) have seriously considered the possibility of 
respecting traditional rules and making traditional codes. A shared problem is that those codes are not 
written considering the cultural and social environments. 
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different relationships within society6', depending on the specific social settings in 
which it operates. 
1.3 Andean Law 
Now I will try to apply the above-mentioned concepts to the concrete reality of 
Andean peasant communities. I am particularly interested in these three questions: a) 
Are peasant communities semi-autonomous social fields or not? b) What are the 
features of the legal rules created and recreated in the communal social space? And c) 
What influence does State law have on these processes? 
A first element for characterising the peasant communities as semi-autonomous 
social fields is that they are not isolated settings. There are many ways in which the 
modern sector penetrates them: the capitalist economy, essentially expansive; the 
increasing connection of communities to the national market; the Agrarian Reform 
process; State intervention through education and conscription; the presence of 
religious institutions and NGOs; the mass media; the migration of peasants to urban 
and industrialized areas on the coast and to the Amazon basin, and the action of 
political parties. New patterns of behavior, attitudes, beliefs and values are constantly 
being introduced, and they give a changing shape to the peasant communities. This 
influence can be of different degrees, depending on the geographical location of the 
communities. Those closer to markets, mining camps or roads will tend to be more 
influenced than those located in impoverished areas with little outside communication. 
Thus, the legal values and rules found in a certain peasant community, can have 
different origins, but at the same time do not create rigid legal repertoires. It is a 
second central element of this contradiction between communal land property and 
individual possession of plots. It is the external observer in the local arena who 
perceives the presence of two or more mutually influenced and sometimes 
contradictory legal systems. The total is not always harmonious nor structured. What 
surges from this dynamic is going to make up local law, a term that might be useful 
for research, but is not necessarily shared or understood by peasants. 
In the same sense, there are different disputing institutions in the communal space. 
Some of them derive their legitimacy from indigenous rules and uses, others from 
national -sometimes former colonial- legal systems. Some institutions function at the 
local level; others, like State institutions, usually work at local, provincial and national 
levels. Moreover, the police and other officials without specific legal jurisdiction, are 
a Lipsky's insight is important to give a concrete meaning of different bureaucratic levels. "Street-level 
practices ration service, organize a client's passage through bureaucracy, and keep scarce organizational and 
personal resources...cases that deviate from routine processing are not exempt from routinization, however. 
Street level bureaucracies, instead, call on additional practices to manage the first-round costs of processing 
people in routine ways. These practices absorb dissatisfaction with common procedures, thereby permitting 
agencies to continue processing the majority of cases routinely" (1980:133). 
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also usually asked to deal with disputes. 
These institutions' fields of jurisdiction tend to overlap. Disputants can therefore 
choose between several of them. Parallel to private international law, "forum 
shopping" is also practiced (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981), based on what they hope 
to achieve. In these situations, protagonists are usually identified with the legal system 
they use in their argumentation (see also Moore 1973; Santos 1977). 
In short, peasant communities can be understood as social spaces of 
semi-autonomous location and the creation of law. The processes resulting from the 
combination of these characteristics is what I call "Andean law". Thus, Andean law is 
something quite different from "customary law", as it has been conceived by some 
scholars in Peru (Brandt 1987; Ambia 1988; Tamayo 1992). They consider custom as 
related to ancient times, and many rules and customs in Andean society are 
continuously changing. Customary law also leads us to think about one sole Andean 
law, but Andean society has always been fragmented and divided. The "customary 
law" concept has another danger: it is opposed to positive law and has no meaning 
without it. Roman classical law placed custom as a secondary source of law, and tried 
to give it a subsidiary role. 
When I refer to Andean law, I am not talking about rigid forms, institutions, rules or 
values. Quite the contrary. I am stressing the dynamic modus Vivendi for solving 
different conflicts. This process is influenced by the communal background, the 
symbolic and material resources peasants manage, the way these have been created or 
established, the local culture and the regional and national environments. Therefore, 
Andean law is not a structure or an abstraction, but a living process which occurs 
within the social dynamism of the group. Andean law is a social product in which the 
actors' interaction modifies or consolidates certain historical institutions. It also gives 
concrete meanings to the State's regulations, and to the cooperation systems, 
settlements of dispute, or social arrangements molded by those involved in the 
process. 
A main element of this dynamism is the mutual conditioning between State and 
Andean legal systems. Andean law is influenced by the different levels in which State 
law operates. This depends on the type of social process involved (i.e. migration, 
market relations). At the same time, State law can also borrow some elements from 
Andean law, without open acknowledgement. The attribution of special powers to 
communal authorities, the acceptance of traditional sanctions, respect for "customary" 
marriage or land distribution are some recent examples of this trend. State officials are 
probably not conscious of this concession to legal pluralism, but their decisions are 
very useful for understanding the dynamics of Andean law. 
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1.3.1 Elements of Andean Law 
Before giving an overview of Andean legal rules and procedures, mention must be 
made of problems that arise when one tries to study them. First, only a few systematic 
and worthy field studies have been made on this issue in Peru, unlike other countries, 
such as Bolivia, where greater importance has been given to the subject. Secondly, 
inter community variability is such that grasping what Andean law is and what it 
means in different communities becomes difficult. There is not a definite body of laws 
common to and evenly enacted in all inter-Andean valleys. Thirdly, there has been in 
the country no dialogue between lawyers and anthropologists, necessary in the light of 
both disciplines for identifiying the central elements of Andean law in Peru. 
Therefore, the characteristics given here to what we understand by "Andean Law", are 
only preliminary, subject to greater reflection on the matter, but useful for giving the 
study a proper framework. 
A first characteristic of Andean law is that this is combined, both written and oral. 
Until some decades ago, it could be sustained that communal law was created and 
transmitted in a predominantly oral way, but the same cannot be said today. This is 
due to both greater formal education of the comuneros and the greater presence of the 
State, that requires a written type of communication. Still, in thoses communities 
where the majority of peasants cannot read or write, the majority of agreements and 
rules are registered in writing by communal authorities, who are increasingly 
frequently required to have a formal education in order to accede to their positions. 
Thus, almost all the communities have an internal statute that regulates daily activities 
like communal work, fines, election procedures and communal authorities' duties. 
Also registered in this way are some agreements reached in general assemblies, called 
"Minutes" (actas). 
This does not mean, however, that oral methods have lost their importance in 
Andean law. There are some traditional principles and values that cannot be translated 
into written text, but which exist on the basis of many norms and written agreements. 
The importance of oral ways in Andean law can also be seen in the fact that through 
this method many agreements can be made between comuneros in the various 
communal spaces: the family, the general assembly are respected and comply without 
the need for written formality. They do not all share the same language, thus 
standardizing the peasants, symbolically, but this is a source for and effective 
discourse on their behavior. 
The second characteristic is intimately related to this last matter. Unlike State law, 
which is a law created basically by specialists, in isolated processes and in 
professional language, under Andean law everybody can take part in the rule-making 
process. Assembly decisions that become norms are reached only after comuneros 
have openly debated them. Therefore, rules are accepted by most of them. This 
feature gives a particular dynamism to Andean law, permitting it to take into account 
various internal and external factors at the time the norm is created, in turn 
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strengthening these spaces of communication and communal decision. 
A third feature is the permanence of reciprocity and cooperation as essential values 
to peasants' livelihood and, consequently, as the bases of Andean law. Reciprocal ties 
are perceived as "natural" and not as legal commitments that might embody unfair 
arrangements, for which reason they maintain them even when a comunero is working 
or living outside the communal space itself, thus extending the space. However, 
sometimes these principles can be used by the most powerful members of the 
community in order to take advantage of the rest and increase their access to scarce 
resources. This, together with the introduction of values from the market economy 
into the communal space, has led to a situation in which the above mentioned 
principles have become quite relative. Yet even in large commercial communities -as 
in Huayopampa in Lima- these principles were still found to regulate family relations 
(Fuenzalina et al. 1982). 
Since a community is not a homogenous society, communal law is essentially 
complex. Thus Andean law is created and recreated at different levels. The 
individual's interaction with his/her family group gives rise to a set of legal 
engagements. Links with the rest of the community members also produce a 
constellation of rights and duties. The outcome of these different forms of peasant 
cooperation shapes the community. As is well known, Andean culture considers that 
an individual is poor when he lacks relatives (real or symbolic), because access to 
labor and land use are granted through kin relationships. The permanent activation of 
kinship and social bonds for satisfying peasants' needs creates a vast array of social 
obligations and legal agreements that are the basis of communal life. 
1.3.2 Andean Mechanisms for Resolving Conflicts 
Communal institutions are in charge of solving an array of potential and actual 
conflicts: distribution of revenues from shared enterprises, the use of water and other 
scarce resources, improper accomplishment of land rent agreements, family conflicts, 
and so on. The most frequent conflicts are produced in the family organization, 
despite the fact that the family is a very close-knit group that induces a strong sense of 
allegiance in its members. Moreover, since in the communal space the public and 
private are not isolated spheres (Wray 1987), it is possible that, in the end, a family 
conflict might involve all the members of a community. Sometimes, neither State nor 
traditional mechanisms can stop the erosion of personal or familar relationships. And 
this, in turn, threatens the whole sense of communal harmony. 
Here is where the internal mechanisms for solving conflicts have to work best. 
Their chances of success will increase if the social group shares one world view and is 
homogeneous, even if only at the ideological level. It is frequently said that communal 
decisions are based on an ideology of harmony. But such supposed harmony does not 
necessarily respect everybody's interests. Moreover, people try to act harmoniously 
because they need to in order to achieve their own ends, not only because it is an 
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ethical command. For example, despite the ideology of harmony, families and 
communities might nurture intense conflicts over the management of scarce resources 
such as water. Some traditional institutions of cooperation can be used to process the 
conflict, but it also happens that State law is brought in to handle the case. These 
conflicts might last for decades without a visible solution: peasants seem interested in 
just processing the conflict. 
In most cases, people obey communal decisions because they have a sense of 
allegiance and membership to their group. This makes the community a legitimate 
place for resolving conflicts and decision-making. However, obedience is not 
automatic. There is a space for dissidence when a peasant considers the communal 
authorities' decision unfair. This usually happens when a number of comuneros feel a 
resolution hurts them economically or politically, or goes against the common good. 
The end result might be a renegotiation of the decision, the submission to it by the 
parties involved, or the calling in of State authorities. Comuneros are not automatically 
linked to Andean law. Some of them decide to follow State procedures because they 
seem to be more effective for protecting their interests. 
Exercising 'forum shopping' is part of the legal strategies of the parties involved in 
a conflict. They will be eager to submit the case to the authorities they think will be 
prone to support their claims. However, if both parties address different forums, the 
dispute will probably not reach a solution. Needless to say, even a common forum 
might fail to reach a decision acceptable to the disputants. 
Here, direct bargaining becomes an alternative. Complex matters are reduced to 
the most relevant conflictive points and examined carefully in order to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution. If litigants are not likely to agree easily, other people -usually the 
godparents-, will intervene. They will press the parties to reach a solution. Thus, law 
is in action not only in the courts or communal assemblies but also at this face-to-face 
level. People can have access to legal decisions without the formal structures so 
typical of modern Western law. 
This absence of formality is even more evident when we observe some forms of 
social control. When a person acts against the communal interest or behaves against 
comuneros' peaceful coexistence, for instance by gossip, drunkenness, or quarrels, the 
group avoids a written decision but boycotts the offender. In this case, for example, 
he or she is not invited to any communal activity. Thus, a normative structure is 
consolidated by a non-written decision. Moreover, this norm and procedure is also 
applied to non-community members. If a foreigner acquires land inside the communal 
territory without previous diplomatic gestures, he will probably be subject to the same 
icy treatment. 
Given the value of human contact in a face-to-face society, it is understandable 
how harsh this sanction is. In such a society, indifferent and impersonal treatment 
translates group pressure into a direct sanction applied to the transgressor. And, in 
private relationships, silence is the sign that an agreement is out of reach. As has been 
pointed out, people need not only a family, but also a solid network of daily 
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relationships. These will be pivotal at school, work, or communal assemblies. 
Moreover, when the comuneros go outside their community to cities or temporary 
migrant centers, the importance of these networks becomes dramatically highlighted. 
It should be pointed out that in all these instances, there is an instrumental use of 
law. Peasants themselves can deny the value of Andean legal principles when these are 
not convenient for them. For example, this happens when a community fears a nearby 
village might become a new community. Comuneros will do their best to prevent it, 
declaring there is no evidence of common ownership or land exploitation, demanding 
all kinds of formal requisites, even though they themselves do not comply with them. 

CHAPTER II 
A Historical Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
Peru is a socially and culturally fragmented society. A high percentage of its 
population lives removed from State legality and control. The dissociation between 
official legality and real social life is due to neither "rebelliousness" nor to civil 
disobedience. To a great extent, it is caused by a limited social knowledge of State 
law and policies, and by the meagre influence both have on society as a whole. Peru's 
fragmentation becomes highlighted when studying the rural sector, especially the 
sub-sector that has a marked indigenous heritage. Despite ad hoc legislation, 
State-peasant community relations have not been easy. In fact, precisely because of 
this, peasant communities have made long-standing efforts in order to integrate 
themselves into Peru's social dynamics. 
There are two theories about the origin of peasant communities in the Andean 
region (Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador). Some scholars argue that the Andean community 
is a descendant of the pre-Inca "ayllu", a social form that still survives despite certain 
changes (see Castro Pozo 1973; Ballesteros and Marcial Rubio 1979). Others see the 
peasant community as the outcome of the change in Andean settlement patterns during 
Spanish colonialism. Indians were forced to abandon their dispersed settlements and 
live in "reduce/ones" or villages designed to resemble Spanish "commas" (Arguedas 
1968; Fuenzalida 1971). Currentiy, most scholars hold an eclectic view: the peasant 
community has both Andean and Spanish elements, besides features shaped during 
Peru's Republican period (XDC-XX centuries). 
Therefore, a historical point of view is helpful for understanding how these 
elements have been blended and worked out within communities, shaping their current 
form. It is also useful for analysing the different and conflictive relations communities 
have established with the wider political organizations of Peru's history (Inca, Spanish 
Colonial and Republican regimes). An abridged historical review of these processes is 
presented here, starting with the first settlers, continuing with the Inca and Colonial 
periods and concluding with an overview of the agrarian and communities laws of 
Independent Peru. 
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2.2 The pre-Hispanic period 
Between 5000 and 1000 B.C., a common social phenomenon was found in the 
Peruvian highlands: the ayllu, the socio-economic basis of pre-Columbian societies. 
For archaeologists, the ayllu emerged with the diffusion of agriculture in the Andean 
zones. This permitted the settlement of early hunting and food-gathering groups. 
According to Rostworowski (1979:42), there are two key concepts allied in the term 
ayllu. The first points out the conjunction of family groups or lineages related to each 
other by kin bonds. Their ancestors, known as mallqui, were worshipped by these 
kinship lines, and this reinforced their solidarity. The second concept is the common 
origin of these lineages. It was thought they had all emerged from a common pacarina 
(or huaca), and this sacred place was worshipped by the whole group. Based on these 
shared conceptions, the ayllu as a group collectively controlled and exploited land and 
pastures". 
The Andean notion of "territory" is very different from the Western one. The main 
characteristic of the ayllu territory -called suyu, in the Quechua language- is its 
discontinuity, both vertically -which provided the ayllu with resources produced at 
differeent ecological or microclimate levels- and horizontally, which responded to the 
need for reducing the risks inherent in Andean agriculture (Murra 1975; Rostworowski 
1993; Camino 1980). In this way, Andean cultures adapted their productive systems to 
their harsh environment. 
Regarding land tenure in ayllus, each family received a portion of arable land 
-"tupu". Its size varied depending on its productive capacity2'. For each son the 
couple received one more tupu, and half a tupu for each daughter. Millones (1987) 
points out that this land distribution was initially agreed upon by the family heads and 
later sanctioned by the "curaca" or chief of the ayllu. The allocation included the 
apportioning of land for the local divinities -huacas- and for the chief. These portions 
were also worked collectively. In all cases, land productivity was maintained by, 
among other means, a fallowing system. 
The land labor system was based on reciprocity and redistribution principles. On 
the one hand, kinship relationships were the basis of a chain of horizontal reciprocal 
obligations. These were expressed in the form of mutual help -ayni-, especially in 
agriculture. On the other hand, vertical links with the chief and religious leaders were 
also expressed in the form of reciprocal ties. The collective work on curaca's and 
huaca's land -called mita- had to be construed not as a sign of submission but as part 
11 While the possession of land was a main feature in highland ayllus, this was not the case in the coastal 
ones, where families anchored their solidarity on different bases. Rostworowski documents, for example, 
the existence of ayllus of fishermen and ceramists. These did not control a piece of land but certain fishing 
grounds or, in the case of the latter, shared some means of production. 
a As Del Busto states, one tupu of fertile land was smaller than one of poor land. Moreover, there was 
no unfairness in such a division because, since the fertile tupu required less work, once its possessor 
finished his work he had to help the possessor of the less fertile tupu. 
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of the reciprocity bonds between leaders and followers. Thus, the curaca had to ask 
for it in a ritual way. In turn, he had to legitimise his authority through redistribution 
mechanisms, returning part of the crop to the ayllu members through feasts and 
communal rituals (Pease 1993:21). 
Aside from these data, and due to the lack of reliable sources, little is known about 
the economic organization of pre-Inca ayllus. However, it is clear that the ayllu -also 
called villca on Peru's northern coast, and haihan in the Aymara region- was the basis 
of the different political organisations of the Andean world, such as Chavin or Huari, 
and local or regional ethnic chiefdoms were all structured around the ayllus. It was 
precisely from one of these chiefdoms that the Inca empire or Tahuantinsuyu emerged 
(XIV-XV centuries). 
2.2.1 The Inca Period 
The fast formation -in less than a century- of the Inca Empire brought about important 
changes in the Andes. The political and military expansion of the Incas began in 
Cuzco, when they conquered different quechua and puna ethnic groups (Ayarmacas, 
Canas, Canchis, Lupaqas, Collas). Later on, they expanded to other areas of the 
Andean region. At the beginning of the XVI century, the Incas ruled over a territory 
that included most of what is today Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Chile. 
Cuzco was the capital of the whole empire, where the Inca and the ruling class lived. 
Due to their expansionism, the Incas subjugated a vast array of ethnic groups. 
Their political integration was followed by the growth of an "Inca" spirit, a sense of 
national awareness in itself. As part of their imperial policies, the Incas accepted the 
previous ayllu organisation and took advantage of it. They also reshuffled Andean 
principles of reciprocity and redistribution in order to legitimise their State formation. 
Through these policies they obtained a vital element -the labor force. 
Inca hegemony did not attempt to destroy the great ethnic chiefdoms under its 
aegis, or suppress their peculiarities. On the contrary, Tahuantinsuyu's socio-economic 
structures were based on them. For the Inca it was enough to be recognized as the 
absolute ruler. The apportioning of land for the State and the official cult was part of 
his symbolic and productive power base. Moreover, his supreme position gave him 
access to the labor force necessary for his public works. 
The Incas developed a policy of tolerance and respect towards the local gods, 
authorities and institutions incorporated into their domain. They also supported and 
protected the conquered people in exchange for their obedience. However, it is 
difficult to state that the Incas did not change anything in the Andean world. Spanish 
chronicles clearly show, for example, that a profound reorganisation of the population 
took place. People started to be counted in decimal-based censuses. The aim was to 
enhance the State management of the population. The Incas also ordered massive 
compulsory migrations of ayllus or whole ethnic tribes. These mitmokuna or forced 
migrants were put to work in State projects (i.e. irrigation, construction) throughout 
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the imperial territory, thus modifying former ethnic boundaries. Moreover, the Incas 
also tried to impose their Quechua language in their domains. 
The land tenure system was also modified. A commonly held model was for land 
within each ayllu to be divided into three categories, namely, land for the Inca, for the 
State-sponsored solar cult, and for the hatun runa or commoners. However, the 
situation seems to have been more complex than that (Murra 1979; Rostworoswki 
1988). Within the portion assigned to the Inca, three different types can be identified: 
State lands, panaca or royal families' lands, and personal lands of the Inca ruler. The 
ones assigned to the solar cult included those that provided for the worship of the local 
huaca or divinity. Finally, the land given to the commoners included the family 
parcels and those allotted to the curacas. This land tenure system increased the 
collective duties of the commoners. The potentially conflictive situation was, in part, 
solved by the productive input of the mitmaquna or yanaconas -corve6-like workers-
who were in charge of the Inca and of solar lands (Rostworowski 1988:246). 
2.3 The Spanish Period 
The Andean encounter with the Spanish conquistadors in 1532 gave rise to the radical 
transformation of native societies. However, some cultural and social traits remained 
alive. Once the military struggle was over, the Spaniards established settlements and 
assumed the sovereign control of the former Inca domains based on the legal principle 
of Ius Belli. The Spanish domination, unlike the Incan, was not based on reciprocity 
and redistribution principles, particularly with regard to land exploitation. Regarding 
the impact Spanish domination had on ayllus, Rostworowski makes an interesting 
point: 
"The Spanish intrusion meant to [the Andean macroethnics and their domains] a 
very early and systematic disarticulation. In contrast, the ayllu, being a small 
unit and the basis of Andean social organization, suffered a less violent impact. 
The Spaniards did not destroy the ayllu, they took advantage of it (1993:202)." 
As many scholars stress, the destruction of Andean institutions was sometimes 
deliberate and sometimes due simply to an incapacity to understand them. A clear 
example of this was the establishment of encomiendas, the earliest form of relationship 
between colonisers and the colonised. The encomienda was not, as some authors say, 
simply a grant of land to a conqueror or colonist. It was the grant of chiefdoms 
-curacazgos- by the Spanish crown, to privileged vassals who were supposed to be in 
charge of protecting and promoting the Catholic indoctrination of their subordinates 
(Basadre 1977:275). 
This royal concession gave the beneficiary the right to collect taxes (in kind, 
money or labor) from the group assigned to him (Trelles 1985). The work force at his 
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disposal was used for several enterprises such as agriculture, mining, and weaving 
workshops. To this end, the mediating role of the local or regional ethnic chiefs was 
crucial. They validated their role as brokers using the symbolic and material 
reciprocity bonds established with their subjects. In this way, ethnic chiefs provided 
encomenderos with the human energy necessary for their early enterprises. Generally, 
curacas were not prone to leave their roles as cultural, political and economic brokers 
between the Spaniards and the Andean population. In some noteworthy cases this 
worsened the position of their subordinates. Beyond the ideological legitimising of this 
institution, the encomienda became a system of Indian exploitation because the Crown 
was unable to enforce its protective laws and had no effective mechanisms to control 
the power of the encomenderos. 
The system got out of control and the Spanish rulers decided to put an end to it. 
The main reason was the erosion of royal power in the Indies and the encomenderos' 
increasing demands for political autonomy. This conflict triggered a period of wars 
between the Crown and its powerful beneficiaries. In the end, the latter were defeated, 
and this meant the gradual abolition of the institution. While in 1561 there had been 
1,300 encomenderos, in 1584 only 360 of them remained (Burga 1976:69-70). 
However, the exploitation of the Indians continued, but in different forms. 
2.3.1 The Spanish Reducciones 
In 1569, under the government of Viceroy Toledo, a period of administrative 
reorganization started. He tried to consolidate Colonial State power, increase the 
profits obtained from the Indian population, and establish a colonial society framed by 
Hispanic structures. 
As part of his plan, reducciones or Indian villages were created. These offered a 
colonial legal and spatial framework for the Andean ayllus. The indigenous population 
was lumped together in more than six hundred of them. In doing this, the 
administration pursued three objectives. The first was economic. By concentrating the 
Indian population, access to the labor force necessary for Colonial enterprises was 
secured. Moreover, tax collection was optimized and State revenues increased. The 
second was political, aimed at exercising closer social control over the Indians 
concentrated in these spatial spheres. The third objective was ideological, seeking to 
facilitate the spread of Iberian values (especially cultural and religious ones). 
In fact, reducciones dealt a hard blow to Andean concepts regarding control of 
space and territory, kinship relations, and socio-political bonds such as reciprocity and 
redistribution. In those new social and spatial settings, Andean institutions were 
severely altered, but also kept alive. Another consequence was the erosion of the 
curacas'' power base. Their support of Spanish Colonial authorities, and the rise of 
newly State-sponsored local authorities, such as alcaldes de indios (Indian mayors) or 
governors, caused the decline of most of them (Pease 1993). 
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The concentration of Indians in reducciones, and the demographic collapse caused 
by epidemics and colonial exploitation, unleashed one more process: the depopulation 
of vast areas of arable land. This land stock was appropriated by the emerging 
landowners -hacendados and estancieros. However, it must be stressed that the 
colonial administration set apart a land reserve for the indigenous population to secure 
its reproduction. 
To protect this and other rights, Toledo's policies included the reform of the 
judicial system. His objective was to make Indians' rights enforceable by Colonial 
judges. Among other means, he used laws already in effect. The Decree of 1549, for 
example, regulated the election of Magistrates, Aldermen, Constables, Bailiffs and 
Scribes in villages in which, "according to their ways and traditions, [they] were to 
administrate justice and settle minor disputes" (Levene 1927:97). This new legal 
and political structure was the basis for the "República de Indios". This one was 
legally different from the "República de Españoles". Each one had its own institutions, 
its own laws, and its own justice. However, this legal fiction embodied exploitation by 
the former, which was suffered by the latter. 
2.3.2 The Chaotic Colonial Property System 
If the pre-Conquest Andean space seems chaotic due to its fragmentation, the Colonial 
property system appears as even more confusing due to its different forms of land 
appropriation and exploitation. In the XVII Century, one of the main forms of rural 
property was the estancia. According to the type of land, different activities were 
practised. The central features of the estancia were a large or medium extension of 
land, cattle raising predominating over agricultural farming, low productivity, and the 
intensive exploitation of the labor force. 
The expansion of estancias took place at the expense of the ayllu lands, once the 
policy of reducciones opened those spaces to private appropriation. Protective 
legislation in favour of communities -but loosely enforced-, as well as Court decisions 
favouring the pillagers made the change in ownership possible, even within 
communities. Spaniards and curacas could claim more lands, and obtain judicial 
support, by proving these lands were necessary for their livelihood. However, in some 
cases, the Indians whose lands had been appropriated or reduced managed to make the 
protective laws effective, and recovered their land; but this was the exception rather 
than the rule. 
The only way to assure an effective landholding was through the formalisation of titles 
or the acquisition of private or corporate property from the Spanish authorities. This 
process generated much litigation between Indians and Spaniards. Under Spanish law, 
it was possible to lease or sell land. This meant the destruction of the Andean 
worldview (land-man). Hence, a new form of relationship (through non-communal 
means) shattered the Indian mythical-religious thinking. 
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In order to avoid increasing lawsuits and constant land conflicts, rural property 
was organized "from above", through the legal mechanism known as composición de 
tierras (composition of lands). According to Ots Capdequi: 
The composición was [•••] a legal institution by which, in certain 
circumstances, a de facto situation -extra-legal or against the law- was 
transformed into a legal situation, through the payment of an amount of money 
to the Crown" (quoted by Burga 1976:97). 
The use of this mechanism by Colonial landowners or holders during the XVLI and 
XVm centuries usually led to the plundering of communal lands. During this period, 
estancias were subject to a slow but important transformation. The development of a 
more intensive agricultural exploitation, the incorporation of fixed capital (farming 
tools, carriages, mills, etc), and the residence of workers on the estates produced a 
new configuration of the rural landscape: the Colonial hacienda^. 
The haciendas developed specific social relations in which peasants obeyed their 
landlords. The latter created their own legal subsystems in which they made decisions 
not only on labor issues but also on Indian family disputes and other private affairs. 
The rural population outside the estates tried to survive corporately in peasant 
communities. Others were just possessors of family parcels. 
This was true at the time of Tupac Amaru's uprising, the most serious indigenous 
revolt against Spanish rule, which took place between 1780 and 1781. Even though it 
was one of the last of several rebellions against the abuses of certain authorities, it did 
not mean the end of the will for freedom from Spanish rule. After Tupac Amaru had 
been defeated, the Spaniards carried out unmerciful measures in order to weaken the 
Indian organization. Curacazgos were suppressed and replaced by varayocs or Indian 
mayors. Quechua language, Inca names and Andean traditional clothing, literature, 
theatre, and musical instruments were rigorously forbidden. Regarding land tenure, 
there is no information available about changes in the rights of indigenous people. 
Criollos and mestizos (half-breeds) who wanted independence from Spain, were at 
the same time struggling for economic and social power. The early XIX Century 
revolution against Spain ended in the replacement of the ruling elite. But this political 
change was not followed by social or economic changes. The existing latifundia 
system was not questioned. The landholding system remained the same. 
3 ) As Burga said, the difference between the estancia and the hacienda was not the extension of land or 
the type of property, but the form of agricultural exploitation (1976:109). However, these forms did not 
bring capitalist relations into the hacienda because agricultural work was carried out by Indian servants 
(mitayos). Estates with high technology and efficient productive organization only appeared in some regions 
like the Northern coast and the Central highlands. 
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2.4 The Republican Period 
The Independence process -promoted by Indian criollos and mestizos- had an 
important effect on the Indian situation. On 27 August, 1821, less than a month after 
the creation of the Peruvian Republic, General José de San Martín abolished the 
indigenous personal tax (applied to heads of family). However, since this tax was the 
main source of revenue for the newly born State, this decision could not be put into 
practice. So, the Indians' head tax was restored pretty soon (August 11, 1826). 
The new rulers' ideology favored free trade and an open market economy. 
Consequently, they opposed traditional institutions that hindered the smooth traffic of 
goods and services. On April 8, 1826, Liberator Simón Bolívar granted the Indians the 
right to alienate their land to other people. The tacit objective of this decision was to 
create a class of thriving small independent landowners, capable of developing a 
national market. However, the outcome was very different. Bolivar's decision implied 
the legal extinction of the communal organization. Many hacendados forced Indians to 
sell their lands. Indians did not own resources on a large scale. They only had a 
subsistence economy. Thus, in a market economy they became the weakest sector and, 
in a critical predicament, had no other alternative but to give up their lands. 
The effective enforcement of Bolivar's law was delayed for fifty years. However, 
there was already a crack in the wall. It divided hacienda and community, and paved 
the way for the great latifundia expansion. The new criollo and mestizo elite increased 
its political and economic power investing in technology and consolidating its 
dominant relations with the Indian labor force. In this context, peasant communities 
tried to survive as such, despite the adverse and exclusive socio-economic model of 
those times. 
Populist measures, like the definitive suppression of the Indian tax by President 
Castilla in 1854, were aimed at rallying support from the different military factions 
that competed for power. In general, there was no specific development policy for the 
peasantry. Instead, the ruling sectors promoted the immigration of European and 
Chinese coolie labor for their haciendas. 
During the XLX century, agrarian history shows an acute confrontation between 
haciendas and indigenous communities. The conflict was over the control and 
possession of the best arable lands and pastures. Estate owners, particularly from the 
southern highlands, sought the support of government officials using legal mechanisms 
and political persuasion. Even after judicial decisions, the problem between estates and 
communities reappeared, especially with regard to the legally determined limits 
between them. In these situations, peasant protests were usually defeated by the use of 
all-out violence. 
Many Indians had to live in the haciendas under a feudal regime, complying with 
the personal duties established by the landowners. Most of the highland haciendas did 
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not carry out efficient land exploitation. As a consequence, most rural regions fell 
behind, into a critical situation. 
2.4.1 Indigenist Thinking 
At the beginning of the present century, Peruvian intellectuals were particularly 
interested in analyzing the "Indian question". The main reason for this was Peru's 
resounding defeat in the war with Chile (1879-1884). This catastrophe was attributed 
to the lack of national unity. The existence of different ethnic groups and what to do 
about them became a hotly debated issue. This, in turn, paved the way for 
State-sponsored social reform. 
The indigenist movement was far from being a solid, coherent or systematic set of 
ideas and images about the Andes (Poole 1990:346). In fact, many indigenists based 
their ideas on prejudices already circulating about "the Indian" and his community, 
while others presented new interpretations of both. But all of them shared two 
features. On the one hand they denounced the exploitation and servitude under which 
Indians were living. Landowners, judges, priests and local authorities were all blamed 
for this and for taking advantage of it. On the other hand, they all agreed on a 
revaluation of the cultural and social accomplishments of the Andean people, believing 
they were fairer and more solidary than "modern" ones. 
Lima and Cuzco were the main centres for the movement, giving it an urban rather 
than rural character. With a lot of romanticism, lively indigenists expressed their ideas 
through the urban media, influencing the ruling elite. One of the aims of the 
movement was to encourage debate and promulgation of protective legislation in favor 
of peasant communities. This was achieved during the government of President 
Augusto B. Legufa (1919-1930). 
The 1920 Constitution allowed indigenous communities to possess land defined as 
inalienable. However, this Constitution did not solve the legal problem of community 
recognition and land titles. A legal vacuum was evident, and communities were forced 
to assimilate themselves to the regulations of western law. 
In this context, the 1924 Criminal Code, following a Swiss positivist conception, 
considered the socio-cultural condition of indigenous people as attenuating factors for 
enforcing sanctions. However, these attenuating factors were tied to the incorporation 
of Indians into "western civilization". Rather than respecting Andean people, this 
measure betrayed the integrationist and ethnocentric character of the legal system. 
2.4.2 The 1933 Constitution 
The 1933 Constitution, promulgated during the government of President Sanchez 
Cerro, was conditioned by the political, economic and social demands of that time. 
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APRA's4 ) founder, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, and other prestigious leftist writers 
such as José Carlos Mariâtegui, had criticized the landowning elite and denounced the 
situation of the peasantry. All across the intellectual spectrum, the agrarian question 
and its social, economic, political and legal dimensions were the topic of intense 
research and lively debate. 
As a result, the legal existence and recognition of Indigenous Communities was 
constitutionally established (Art. 207). Moreover, the State was given the duty to 
secure the integrity of communal property. In spite of this constitutional protection, 
landowners expanded their estates at the expense of community land because these 
protective measures were not enforced. Moreover, no mechanisms were created for 
promoting the modernization of the peasant economy so as to obtain profits from their 
interaction with the capitalist system. For example, community land was not 
considered as collateral for credits. Communities were relegated to a marginal role 
within the capitalist economy, and were prevented from furthering their economic and 
political position in Peru's national setting. 
The lack of a development policy for the indigenous communities had tragic 
consequences. In the forties and fifties, there were terrible famines in the highlands. 
Only when poor peasants decided to migrate massively to the coastal cities, did State 
policy-makers realise the social significance of the community. It was not only a 
question of preserving ancestral traditions, but of increasing the peasantry's chances of 
survival. 
According to the legal framework regarding property, real estate ownership was 
subject to Peruvian laws (art. 31). Thus, the main problem for indigenous 
communities was how to prove ownership of the lands they had occupied for 
centuries. An interesting case was Article 37 of the 1933 Charter. It recognized the 
exclusive State ownership of mines, land, forests, water and all natural resources, 
except "legally acquired" rights over land. This last expression led some jurists to 
consider that communities were the owners of the land in which they were settled, and 
that they also acquired a "preferential" right over the natural resources within or 
nearby them (see Basadre 1937). 
However, for State law, communities were possessors without title deeds. Some 
communities, which had acquired the property of their lands according to Colonial 
law, were deprived of them under the 1933 Constitution^. Moreover, the 
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance), Peru's main 
political party. 
" In this respect, Mateo Maya, a 1933 Constitutional Assembly representative, said "In the Province of 
Yauli, [a community] had its titles since the year 1751. However, the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation 
acquired mines under the name of "Hacienda Minerales". Later on, the corporation became the owner of 
those communal lands, alleging a right that did not exist. And all this happened during General Odria's 
government, which recognized the corporation as the owner, ignoring the group of immemorial people who 
in fact here the real landowners since time..." 
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requirements of the 1936 Civil Code made the community's legal status even more 
fragile. 
2.4.3 The 1936 Civil Code 
The 1936 Civil Code, in Book I, Section IV, defined indigenous communities as legal 
corporations. One of the reasons for giving them this status was the 1933 
constitutional recognition of their legal existence. However, in its introduction, the 
Civil Code stressed that: 
"The provisions of the preliminary draft are aimed at bringing the Indigenous 
Communities towards effective legality. Community existence, functioning, and 
possession rights will be regulated. [In this way], we shall open the way that 
will lead the members of the present communities to become tomorrow's 
private owners" (Guzman Ferrer 1983:215). 
The Civil Code was an explicit expression of Liberal thought. It facilitated the 
abolishment of communities if they were not registered. Registration was a key 
requirement for their legal existence. A Special Register was to be compiled and 
updated every five years (Art. 71)6 ). Being registered was the only way to obtain the 
rights sanctioned in the Constitution. 
The registration requirement was questionable, since most comuneros were 
illiterate. Despite this, it was weakly justified on the "possible existence of literate 
people". However, to communities, registration meant the legal recognition of then-
existence, and an enhancement of their position vis-a-vis the State, local authorities 
and landowners. 
The communities' representation was attributed to delegates elected by the adult 
and literate comuneros. This was a legal prescription established by the Civil 
Procedures Code (Article 72) but it was not necessarily in accordance with Andean 
local law. Community delegates exercised a sort of guardianship7' because indigenous 
people were considered illiterate, and in need of assistance in their civil acts. Other 
articles regarding the legal existence of communities were similar to those established 
for certain associations, especially for the trade societies regime. 
According to the Revista de los Tribunates (Journal of Jurisprudence, Lima), issue 1932: "The 
communities' legal recognition is subordinated to their registration in the respective register of the Ministry 
of Labour and Indigenous Affairs. Without completion of this requirement, community members lack legal 
representation". 
7 1 Guardianship is an institution established by the Civil Code in which the minor not under parental 
jurisdiction is referred to a guardian, who takes care of his rights and goods (Art. 50). 
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2.4.4 Later Legislation 
The insertion of communities in Peru's wider social dynamics was partially a 
consequence of their struggle -not always through legal means- to respond to the 
official requirements imposed by the Peruvian State. The fulfillment of these 
requirements was necessary for obtaining resources and protection for their base of 
resources. The dynamism this process unleashed in the rural areas had a national 
political impact during the forties. Community concerns were finally included on the 
State's agenda. 
The romantic indigenism of the twenties had shown itself to be too weak to satisfy 
the urgent political demands of the peasantry. After an unstable period, an 
integrationist and anthropological indigenism was developed in Peru. This was a 
serious attempt to influence citizens and institutions on behalf of the communities. In 
this period, the Department of Ethnology of San Marcos University and the Peruvian 
Indigenist Institute were created8'. Both carried out an extensive research and 
development programme on the assimilation of indigenous people into western 
patterns. 
For example, the Institute promoted craftsmanship, cooperatives, agriculture and 
other activities carried out in the communities. This was a major experience: although 
it focused on action, the Indigenist Institute seriously tried to study and improve the 
peasants' living standards. Approximately 250 field studies were undertaken and 
published in an important journal, "Peru Indígena". This research was also used to 
support bills in favor of the communities. The anthropological perspective was useful 
in understanding communities in terms of land rights, patterns of authority, and 
socio-economic development. After these anthropological studies, new perceptions 
evolved about community elements9'. 
In 1966 the Institute was incorporated into the Ministry of Labour. The Executive 
branch was put in charge of it for the formulation of policies targeting peasant 
communities. The Institute's functions were restricted to economic and social research, 
and to staff training. It was deprived of its political and legal functions. Instead, the 
new National Bureau for Community Development, under which it was placed, 
assumed those tasks. However, the Executive gave little support to its own Bureau and 
indigenous participation remained rather scarce. The following example is helpful in 
understanding the limitations of the official concept of the problem: 
' The Institute was officially created on 25, March 1942, after the participation of Peru in the First 
Interamerican Indigenist Congress (Patzcuaro 1940). This Congress approved the creation of the Institute 
along with its national sections. 
" A summary of the contents and impacts of these studies can be found in Dobyns (1970). Most of these 
studies were developed in the Peru-Cornell proyect, as part of an agreement between the indigenist Peruvian 
Institute and the Department of Anthropology of the University of Cornell. 
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In an Indigenous Community in Cuzco, the National Bureau for Communities 
decided to change the ancestral custom of making artistic pottery. Due to the 
economic situation, it was more profitable to produce bricks and roof tiles, than 
ceramics, so community members were forbidden to make artistic pottery, and special 
furnaces for bricks and roof tiles were built. As a result indigenous people rebelled 
and destroyed the furnaces. 
The first Indigenous Community Statute, promulgated by Supreme Decree No 11 of 2 
June 1951, was aimed at regulating all aspects of communal life, as well as the 
community's position within the official legal framework. Communities were defined 
as "legal entities subject to private law, based on the association of individuals related 
by tradition, habits and customs, or by the possession of land in common" (Art. 1). 
The key concept for promoting community development was the cooperative system. 
This was a strong trend in State policy. The State misunderstood the community's 
internal relationships. Reciprocity, links to the land, and different comunero status 
were not taken into account. Policy-makers saw only a group of people working 
together in the same field. According to some of them, communities were naturally 
prone to cooperativism. Unfortunately, peasants usually perceived such cooperative 
principles as alien impositions. 
Nevertheless, the statute included regulations authorizing the internal organization 
of community affairs based on traditional norms (see infra: minka and ayni). 
However, these principles were not necessarily applied for the exploitation of the 
shared resource base. Moreover, the profitable State intervention in the peasant 
economy was kept in place, by promoting compulsory community labor for road 
construction. 
The communal appropriation of community land was ratified, though the arable 
land could be distributed to community members under the status of "private 
usufruct"10'. In this sense, the comunero who owned land in the community (by 
family succession or community ordering) was secure in his property rights. A 
compulsory registration policy of land rights in a special Community Register was also 
established. 
The recognition of communal criminal jurisdiction over its members was an important 
accomplishment. Sanctions were enforced according to the seriousness of the offence: 
reprimands, fines or suspension of rights. Such suspension required the approval of 
the General Bureau of Indigenous Affairs. Andean law was also recognised -but 
through of the limited concept of "customary law"- in some instances, such as in 
minor family conflicts. 
"" This usufruct was implied in the legal status of the communal land possessor. This was coherent with 
the provisions that prevented community members from holding private ownership rights. However, such 
prevention was not enforced, in part due to the promotion of private ownership. 
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Another important norm was Supreme Decree No 2 of 12 June 1961. This referred 
to the official recognition of Peasant Communities. The Ministry of Labour and 
Indigenous Affairs acted along these lines as a supervisory institution. 
2.5 The Agrarian Reform Period 
The Agrarian Reform was, for Latin American countries, an important process of 
cultural, social, political and economic changes. Not only the rural areas were 
transformed. Society at large changed for the better. In the case of Peru, carrying out 
the agrarian reform was rather difficult. It required decision and political timing. It 
was a risk that most governments would rather delay, especially when confronted with 
strong pressures from influential landowners. 
In this context, despite thirty years of research on the subject and more than forty 
years of intensive communal struggle against expansive estate owners, only in 1962 
were the first Supreme Decrees and Laws regarding the agrarian reform were 
promulgated. In their struggles, communities used their old colonial land titles and 
embarked on long and painful procedures before the Judiciary and the administration 
in order to defend their land ownership or tenure. In the sixties, the decline of 
latifundism enhanced the development of communities. At the same time, the first 
State legal responses were put into effect. 
In 1960, the first agrarian reform law was proposed. Here, the question of the 
indigenous communities played an important role. Aside from this, the Commission of 
Land and Housing appointed by the Executive branch also dealt with the issue of the 
indigenous integration into the national scene through a set of bills. These stressed the 
need for promoting cooperativism, determining the individual rights of community 
members, maintaining their forced association, and sponsoring communal activities. 
They stated the possibility of individual ownership of community land, up to the point 
of regulating the potential "legal expiration" of the common regime. However, these 
proposed laws were not approved by Congress due to the Congress's opposition to the 
President and to the lobbying by powerful landowners. 
On 16 November 1962, a military government enacted the Bases of the Agrarian 
Reform Law (number 14238). This was, indeed, a declaration of objectives to be 
achieved through later specific legislation. It also insisted on promoting cooperativism 
among comuneros, without acknowledging their own forms of organization. In fact, 
the Agrarian Reform Law Bases tried to put an end to the serious peasant revolt faced 
by the government in the La Convención and Lares valleys (Cuzco). There, some 
guerrillas were engaged in "the accomplishment of a radical, and almost integral 
agrarian reform, doing what the government could not do" (Villanueva 1967:128). 
The following Agrarian Reform Law, Decree 14444, was a clearer response to the 
land question in the above mentioned valleys. This law established new landholding 
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patterns, working conditions, and production regimes in La Convención and Lares. An 
essential element of these was the definition of an "agricultural family unit" (extent of 
land). The objective was to encourage personal farm management, direct family 
exploitation, and the attainment of higher incomes. It was presented as a pilot plan for 
a future Agrarian Reform. The decree was justified, and thus accepted by the 
dominant national groups as a way of preventing further uprisings in other rural 
areas.1 1' 
2.5.1 Law Decree 15037 
In the mid sixties, Peru maintained its agro-exporting status with a weak internal 
productive structure and a strong dependence on its export sectors (agriculture, mining 
and fishing). Export-oriented corporations -usually multinationals- exploited Peru's 
comparative advantages: raw materials, scarce added-value taxation and low labor 
costs12'. They also used their economic power to greatly influence the political 
system. 
Furthermore, centralism was one of the features of Peru's development pattern. 
The main beneficiary of State policies was the city of Lima, due to its high 
concentration of industrial, political and financial activities. With a weak middle class 
and the absence of an organized popular movement, the country's administration was a 
relatively easy task for those agro-exporting sectors. 
However, a fraction of the elite that held power in 1963 considered the 
promulgation of a land reform law as of the utmost importance. They saw the 
necessity for the introduction of some social and productive changes such as the end of 
the latifundia system, the redistribution of land in favor of the peasantry, and the 
development of an internationally competitive agriculture were part of the agenda put 
forward by this faction. The end result of these claims was Law Decree 15307. 
This law was based on a diagnosis made by the Commission of Agrarian and 
Housing Reform (CRAV) at the beginning the sixties, and on the analysis made by the 
future leaders of the 1968 coup d'etat. One of its goals was to guarantee the 
indigenous communities' rights to ownership over their land and further adjudications. 
Priority was given to adjudications in favor of landless peasants, communities and 
cooperatives. Private ownership of communal lands was not allowed. Ownership was 
therefore attributed to the community as a legal entity. 
With regard to the internal community organization, the State enacted a special statute 
in which its economic regime, administration, communal services and other 
'" The accounts of this short military government (July 1962—July 1963), and on the importance of the 
legislation produced by that Junta (the Agrarian Reform in Cuzco; the creation of the National Bank etc.), 
differ from one author to another (see Villanueva 1967). 
1 2 ) This was clearly shown during the Korean war, period in which the country enjoyed the favorable 
economic consequences of the demand for its raw materials. 
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institutions were subject to official guidelines. Community-like groups, ayllus and 
parcelled groups were also treated according to these regulations. The use of water 
was also recognized as a communal right. 
However, Law 15307 did not forbid the overwhelming concentration of land in a 
few hands, under the so-called "agro-industrial export-oriented model". Overall, 
concrete property relationships between peasants and landlords did not change, 
because the latter were also part of the elite who did not want political or social 
change in the rural areas. This position generated a strong political reaction. F i n a l l y , 
the lack of a long-term national project, a frustrating political deadlock, and the justly 
born guerrilla warfare, pressed again for the rise of the Armed Forces in Peruvian 
politics. 
2.6 1969 Military Agrarian Reform 
The de facto government that took power on 3 October 1968 carried out two important 
measures in Peru's political history: the nationalization of oil companies and the 
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law, implemented by Law Decree 17716. 
As a referential framework, it should be stressed that the new administration 
applied many of the reforms devised by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA). Among other things, ECLA advised the development of infrastructure for the 
import-substitution process, considered in the seventies as the "pattern of development 
for Latin America". However, ECLA's proposal was not the only one applied by the 
military government. It also tried to implement the Yugoslavian "self-management" 
experience. 
The government implemented reforms in strategic economic sectors such as 
agriculture, industry and mining. The common feature was the State's participation in 
productive, commercial, economic and financial activities. The military project was 
completely different from previous patterns of State intervention. 
The reforms were intended to arouse critical social consequences to overcome 
Peru's long-standing failures (tightly-knit oligarchy, low political participation, 
concentration of wealth, etc.). Therefore, 1968 represented the first State-sponsored 
effort to conceive an integral development policy for Peruvian society. The country 
attempted to overcome its limitations and problems, though the theories and means 
used were not suited for these purposes. 
2.6.1 Law Decree 17716 
Within the first year of the new administration, the government decided to promulgate 
its Agrarian Reform Law (Law Decree 17716). As has been stated above, the agrarian 
reform had been a topic of research and political programs for decades. The Senior 
Military Studies Centre (CAEM) was also interested in it. At least since 1963, CAEM 
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called for the urgent reform of the latifundia system13'. The agrarian reform was the 
main point on the Government's ambitious agenda. It was considered the solution to 
one of the nation's most important problems. Law 17716 was aimed at launching 
agricultural production, integrating the rural population into the national economy, and 
making agrarian development the basis of a sustainable industrialization. 
The Agrarian Reform Law Decree, according to Bejar (1983:714), was more 
radical, swifter and advanced than what had been proposed by the Peruvian political 
parties and the peasant movement itself. This can be observed in President Juan 
Velasco's political speech announcing its promulgation: 
"From now on, the Peruvian peasant will not be a pariah. Nor will he be 
disinherited any longer. From this blissful June 24th, the Peruvian peasant will 
be in fact a free citizen. At last, the motherland recognizes the peasant's right 
to exploit the land he works as his own. She also recognizes a fair place for 
him within a society in which he no longer will be a diminished citizen, a man 
to be exploited by other men...". 
According to law 17716, the Agrarian Reform was to be carried out upon: 
1. Fallow land. 
2. Properties not exploited by their owners. 
3. Properties that exceeded the allowed limits. 
4. Properties in which there was evidence of working conditions contrary to labor 
legislation. 
The law established the procedures for valueing the rural properties to be 
expropriated. It also gave a definition of the "non-cultivated land" (by lack or excess 
of water) under public ownership. 
The agrarian reform process was carried out by administrative zonal offices, and by 
the General Director of Agrarian Reform and Rural Consolidation. A Supervising 
Committee and an Agrarian Court were also created. The latter was a jurisdictional 
organ especially in charge of solving the conflicts which had originated in the 
application of agrarian regulations. 
The law's purpose was to give land to groups of peasants organized in large 
associative companies, that could be of three types: Agrarian Production Cooperatives 
(CAPs), Agricultural Societies of Social Interest (SAIS) or Social Property Rural 
Companies (EPS). The idea of establishing large production units was due, as 
I 3 ) Hildebrando Castro Pozo, in an article published in the Military Journal of Peru, defended the 
indigenous people's communal organization, for it had a "social and moral geopolitical utility". Its 
distribution in the Andean territory, its traditional forms of ownership and administration, and the state's 
attention to its basic needs, were the key factors for the strengthening of the Inca state, as opposed to what 
happened during the colonial and republican periods. 
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Caballero indicates, to the fact that they would help towards a rapid and effective 
modernization of agriculture, as well as achieving a socialization of the property and 
production (Caballero 1990:99). 
As Martinez points out, the difference between one form and another was due 
fundamentally to the location and degree of development achieved by the haciendas 
and lands at the time of their expropriation. While the CAPs were created on 
haciendas that already had good technological and productive development -especially 
on the coast, but also in the mountains- the SAIS were created mainly on the large 
cattle haciendas in the mountains, where precapitalist production relations 
predominated (1980:107). From the legal point of view, both were considered 
self-managing companies, but with a basic difference: in the CAPs (Agrarian 
Cooperatives of Production) membership was obtained individually or on a family 
basis, while in the case of the SAIS (Agrarian Society of Social Interest) the members 
of the society were not individuals but peasant communities, cooperatives and peasant 
groups which were represented in the Administration Council. A more detailed 
definition of CAPs and SAIS comes further on in this research. 
Regarding indigenous communities, perhaps one of the most important aspects of the 
law was the shift of the communities' legal denomination. Instead of "indigenous", the 
law called them "peasants". A racial reference had been replaced by a socio-economic 
term. However, not even the State could deny the persistence of ethnic and racial 
problems. The main consequence of this legal decision was not to take into account 
cultural or ethnic features when implementing a sound rural development policy. To 
decision makers, the peasant question was considered just a matter of production, land 
distribution, income redistribution, and technology. The outcome of these biased 
assumptions became clear in the following years. 
The responsibility for community matters were transferred from the General 
Bureau for the Integration of the Indigenous Population, a Ministry of Labour agency, 
to the Ministry of Agriculture, specifically to the General Bureau for Agrarian Reform 
and Rural Consolidation. 
There was also a change in State objectives. The traditional administrative position 
had been one of just attempting to consolidate a communal self-sufficient economic 
structure. It had also acted merely as a referee when communities clashed with other 
rural social agents. The new official policy had a different objective. The goal was to 
expressly include peasant communities within the State process. This was the first 
State effort to integrate communities into the national arena. 
There was also an implicit interest in "technifying" communities and organizing them 
into cooperatives. The main criteria at the base of this associative model was to "avoid 
the fragmentation of communal lands". Thus, most of the land was adjudicated to 
cooperatives or SAIS, but the comuneros' individual possessions were also recognized. 
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However, if a comunero abandoned or did not directly exploit his parcel, an expiration 
date was set1 4 ) for his ownership (or usufruct) rights. 
Article 123 established litigation procedures regarding ownership or possession rights. 
In this regard, a substantial improvement was made because this special jurisdiction 
speeded up usually slow ordinary procedures. In fact, the Agrarian Court was one of 
the main vehicles for carrying out the Reform. It prevented expropriated landowners 
from using the legal labyrinth for delaying or avoiding the application of Law 17716 
(see Pdsara 1973). 
An important difference in the 1960 bill was that the legal framework applicable to 
the new communal lands was the Land Reform Law instead of the Civil Law 1 5 ). 
Later, Supreme Decree 240-69-AP -The By-laws of Agrarian Cooperatives-, set forth 
that arable land would be adjudicated to: 
- Productive units aimed at the entrepreneurial administration of the land. 
- Individuals. Here, the term "individual" included communities, groups of peasants 
(or recently established cooperatives), and individual peasants. 
2.6.2 The Peasant Position regarding the Agrarian Reform 
The peasants' attitude towards the agrarian reform was not as enthusiastic as expected. 
There was general scepticism about the government's offer. This suspicion made an 
immediate rapprochement between government and peasants impossible. 
For state officials, this problem was going to be solved by a "demonstration 
effect". The speedy and effective application of the Agrarian Reform Law would soon 
turn distrust into active peasant support and participation. However, this turned out to 
be wishful thinking only. It not only ignored the conflicts and the complexity of the 
relationships within the peasantry: feudatories, yanaconas, comuneros, paid workers, 
etc. It also disregarded the geographical and cultural diversity of the peasant world. 
Sometimes, cooperatives and SINAMOS16' were rejected by the peasants, especially 
on the central coast -where feudatories and paid workers predominated-, and in some 
Andean regions -where communities were more numerous17'. On the coast, a higher 
I 4 ) This norm already appeared in the I960 bill and in the 15037 law (art. 135). 
1 3 ) Other related norms that indirectly regulated the communal issue were the Supreme Decree 163-69-AP 
of August 19, 1969, which regulated the granting of land for the agrarian reform; and Supreme Decree 
236-70-AC, of August 4, 1970. 
1 4 1 SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Movilización Social), the National System of Social Mobilization was 
a state organism for promoting people's participation, and support for the military Revolution. "Sin-amos" 
also means "without masters". 
n An interesting case was that of the SAIS Marangani (Cuzco). An official emphasizes the comuneros' 
indifference: "They didn't believe us", in spite of him being a Quechua speaker, visiting house by house, 
and participating in their Assembly. "We had to threaten them with closing down their schools, cutting 
down state aid, and even nullifying the community's property titles, if they did not accept the formation of 
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level of pre-existing unionism explains such a response. 
Some peasants tried to maintain the productive practices acquired during the 
former land tenure system. This occurred especially among those who had lived in 
haciendas, in a very submissive and paternalistic relationship. The main problem was 
that they did not identify with the principles of the cooperative system. For example, 
they refused to give their livestock to the cooperatives or SAIS as a contribution to 
"their" enterprises. 
Other authors point out that peasants refrained from harvesting the biggest potatoes so 
that, at night, they could grab them for their own benefit (Thorp 1978). Likewise, 
they stole the finer cattle imported by the SAIS. Another way of damaging the new 
rural enterprises was to refuse to pay for the use of the land, assuming it was theirs. 
They did not even want to pay for the right to pasture their livestock. The most 
revealing protest action was the takeover of land. Not only land from the haciendas, 
but also that of new enterprises was suddenly occupied. In general, all these actions 
show the lack of identification with the officially sponsored model. 
With regard to comuneros, the agrarian reform was a welcome opportunity to 
claim and attempt to recover communal land. This objective usually clashed with the 
State's modernizing interests, such as sponsoring the cooperative system. Overall, the 
problem was that the SAIS and the cooperatives became conflict settings between the 
State and the communities. Moreover, only few peasant communities received real 
benefits from the land reform. Overall, in terms of concrete property relationships, 
landlords lost their landed property rights and these were adjudicated to peasants. 
2.6.3 1970 Community Statute 
The Community Statute attempted to restructure the economic, social and cultural 
dimensions of peasant communities. Its goal was to adapt them to the national 
development plans of the military government. The State attempted to "modernize" 
peasant production and living conditions through the establishment of cooperative 
associations and the implementation of high technology projects18'. 
The peasant community was defined as a "group of families which possess land 
and is identified with a specific territory. Community families are linked by social and 
cultural traits, communal work, reciprocal help and, basically, by activities associated 
with agriculture" (Article 2, Reglamento del Estatuto de Comunidades Campesinas; 
the SAIS. In a threatening and distrustful environment, they named their delegates when pressed to do so, 
and in some cases with a great deal of reluctance. I remember that a peasant woman from the Manuera 
community told us: You are going to be cut into pieces if it doesn't work" (Auroi 1986:115). 
m Ignoring even the peasants' rationality and values, the Agrarian Reform only analyzed the effects of 
human action upon the technical system. It did not take into account the economic, social, cultural and 
political rationality that inspires the peasants' decision making process. UNC-UNAC "Manual 
Silvo-Agropecuario". 
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Bylaw of the Community Statutes). 
With the same regulatory objective, there was an attempt to codify the 
community's economic and political regime, both internally and externally. 
Recognition as legal entities in private law, a status already acquired in the 1936 Civil 
Code, was legally confirmed. The administration tried to integrate communities into 
the State's dynamics, but in a strictly formal way. Thus, it maintained the requirement 
of an administrative act to obtain legal representation and protection from third party 
interests. 
To obtain recognition, the community needed an ownership title or some other 
evidence of land possession. The community also needed to prove it was a "social 
group", with solid internal ties, and that it had the approval of two thirds of its 
comuneros. However, any interested party could oppose the recognition procedure. 
The Agrarian Reform law sought to revitalize "traditional norms and values" if they 
did not clash with the government's national development project. Such revitalization 
took into account Andean mutual help and traditional cooperation19'. 
"Communal annexes", defined as peasant groups inside main communities, controlling 
and living in specific areas and with a semi-autonomous organization, were allowed to 
separate from their mother communities and obtain independent status as themselves. 
This new status meant a social and political upgrading to meet challenges such as 
population pressure and the subsequent need for more services. Moreover, this policy 
also revealed the official effort to prevent the emergence of internal conflicts. 
Requirements to be considered as a comunero were: to be a resident of the 
community, to be essentially an agricultural worker, to own no rural property within 
or outside communal lands, to have no source of income outside the community20', 
and not to be a member of another community. Assimilation, by which a foreigner 
could be integrated into the community, was also allowed. A comunero lost legal 
status by changing residence, not fulfilling communal obligations, or by acquiring 
rural property outside the community. 
The communities administrative regime was regulated by three institutions taken from 
the associative model: the General Assembly, the Executive Council, and the 
Supervisory Council. Council members carried out their functions for two years. They 
were usually not paid. Representation of comuneros who dwelled outside the 
communal nucleus was also allowed through the appointment of "delegates" to the 
Values already permeated by market forces, political competition, and the impact of Western ideological 
premises. 
2 0 1 Migration (internal or external) has been a way of social mobilization in Peru. The Statute attempted to 
restrict the privileges of comuneros only to residents and, by doing so, restrain internal migration. 
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Executive Council21'. The Statute also established the grounds for cases of dismissal 
from or vacancy in communal offices: improper disposal of communal goods, 
unlawful use of land, and improper use of power were among these. 
Special Committees were created. They had an internal structure similar to the 
Executive Council. Their functions were mainly economic, including planning, 
productive programming, technological innovation, rational exploitation of communal 
resources and designing communal activities. 
One more alien element imposed by the Statutes was the establishment of an 
Electoral Committee. It consisted of two comuneros, the oldest and the principal one 
of the Communal School. This represented the indirect presence of the State in matters 
exclusively concerning the comuneros. The vote was obligatory and secret. 
Communal property consisted of goods and rents. The former included land and 
buildings within and outside the communal territory. Land for grazing, forests, and 
their accessories, including machinery, tools, capital, furniture and goods were also 
part of the communal property. The latter included interests earned on communal 
capital, cooperative or SAIS revenues, payments for land usufruct, and "revenues 
obtained from rodeos, according to local custom". In this case, a custom thus was 
recognized for practical reasons. 
Regarding the administration of these assets, the Director of Peasant Communities was 
put in charge of supervising peasants' management22'. Again this newly created post 
was alien to peasant communities custom. 
Finally, the communities could be legally dissolved if: a) agricultural land changed 
its status to urban use; b) most community land was subject to private usufruct; or, c) 
a community did not develop its institutional life according to this regime. 
2.6.4 The Response of the Communities 
An obvious failure in this Statute was considering communities only as productive 
units. It totally disregarded their complexity as social organizations. The new system, 
then, brought about a disparity between the comuneros' expectations and the rights 
granted to them by the State. Most associative or communal forms were hard to 
implement, because of their excessive formalism. The communities responded to the 
Statute in three different ways: 
This was an attempt to encourage participation of settlers that fled the central nucleus. De Zutter 
explains the process: "...the first communities were set up on lower lands. Since land and power were 
concentrated on them, and the youngsters were jobless (without parcels), they decided to form a group and 
settle down in the highlands, where nobody dwelled. They set up their own community, some kind of 
subsidiary of the mother community, from which they slowly became independent..." (1975:80). 
2 2 1 This was an application of article 21 of the 1933 Constitution. 
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a) by changing their organization to that recently established, thus altering their own 
rationality. Such changes resulted from the urgent need for legal recognition and 
its subsequent legal support. 
b) by splitting into groups: some comuneros sought to maintain the ancestral 
organization in spite of the newly imposed legality, while others found themselves 
protected by the new organization and supported its implementation. 
No reaction could better demonstrate one of the deepest mistakes in the Statute - the 
near-sighted belief in the homogeneity of the comuneros. The Statute had not 
perceived the conflicts instigated by the diverse economic positions within the group. 
Different motivations explaining the conservative behavior of certain comuneros can 
be pointed out: cases of land monopolies, position and influence, profiting from 
membership in religious or political associations, or kin relationships with outsiders 
(especially with people living in Lima). 
c) Some communities, on a small scale, made an effort to adapt their own system to 
the regulations established by the State. For example, they adapted authority 
denominations or delegates' responsibilities, in order to keep the former 
organizational rationality23'. 
This option had only an outside chance of success: relationships with the exterior 
(market articulation, reduction of community space, literacy, mass-media) made the 
reproduction of older historical patterns quite difficult. However, some communities 
far from the urban settlements, such as in Colca Valley (Arequipa), managed to use 
this mechanism. For example, Valderrama and Escalante found that in the community 
of Yanque there exist "two communal structures for the use of water: one formal, 
fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture, and the official society, and the other -which is 
really used in the community- directed by the Yaku Mayor Vara, who is the one who 
organises the use of the hydraulic system (1988:20). 
n ) Paerregaard points out: "...This new structure of communal government replaced the former, in which 
the agent, the president and the other members of the Communal Junta were the community's main 
representatives. Under President Leguia's government, another system of communal government existed. In 
that regard, the older community members declared that the primary authority was the Mayor of the Stick 
(Alcalde de Vara). When asked what the difference between these systems was, they stated that the changes 
are only in LABELS AND NAMES since, in fact, the Community continues to be ruled according to the 
forms of government that date from Leguia's times..." (1987:66). 
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2.7 Recent Laws on Peasant Communities 
Velasco's reform changed the economic and social structures of Peru. The economy 
went from stern control by the export sector entrepreneurs to State control that 
prevented the monopolistic practices by the most powerful productive agents. In 
macroeconomic terms, the military tried to "modernize" and "unify" the management 
of both public and private economic agents. Industry also benefitted from the 
protectionist regime. External loans allowed the State to finance the increasing 
bureaucracy and carry out important projects. But this artificial bonanza was shattered, 
due to the dramatic drop in international prices for Peru's traditional exports, the 
sharp rise of the fiscal deficit, and sky-rocketing inflation. 
Thus, in spite of the favorable initial conditions of the military government, the 
Junta could not solve the structural bottlenecks of the Peruvian economy: extreme 
dependency, unfair income distribution, lack of a source of dynamism and 
self-sustained development. Furthermore, no high productivity levels were 
accomplished in the agrarian and industrial sectors. On the contrary, there was a lack 
of surplus and, therefore, the impossibility of fully financing the implemented reforms. 
In August 1975, a change in the military leadership took place. General Juan 
Velasco was replaced by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. This represented a 
total shift in economic matters and the paralysis of the reformist project. One of its 
consequences was the stagnation of the agrarian reform. However, the crisis was to 
show its deep effects only after 1977. The GDP contracted and inflation went up 
steadily. Briefly, the new military administration could not satisfy the demands and 
expectations aroused by the previous reform attempts. It faced a political crisis and 
finally, in 1978, agreed to convoke a Constitutional Assembly. 
2.7.1 The 1979 Constitution 
This Charter institutionalized many of the political, economic and social reforms 
proposed and implemented during the 1968-1975 period. At the present time, however, 
it has been abrogated and replaced by the 1993 Constitution. 
Peasant communities were dealt with in Section IIÍ -"The Economic Regime"- of 
Chapter VHI (Articles 161 to 16324)). The text was inspired by an old 
misunderstanding: communities were seen just as economic units of production, while 
their social and cultural dimensions were hardly acknowledged. 
According to the 1979 Constitution, the fundamental criterion for defining land 
ownership rights was direct management. In other words, the ownership of the land 
^ The constitutional text refers to "Peasant Communities", including the so-called "Native Communities". 
"Native" was the euphemism chosen by the government to refer to the Amazonian people. Law 20653 
recognized some of their peculiarities but forced them to settle in small villages, following peasant 
community settlement patterns. 
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was conditioned on the landowner working it directly; otherwise he could be relieved 
of it by the State. However, this never occurred in reality. Ownership could be 
exercised in individual or associative ways (i.e. cooperative, communal). A second 
criterion was the social function of property. For example, special attention was paid 
to the use of goods, disregarding the issues of profits and transfers. 
The legal existence and the representation of communities were also constitutionally 
recognized. Regarding communal land, it was established that it could only be 
transferred when in the public interest or with the agreement of two thirds of the 
comuneros. This was highly criticized by some political leaders, especially of the 
APRA and leftist political parties, who considered this measure as non protective of 
peasant communities. In spite of these fears, for at least thirteen years no communities 
have agreed to transfer their lands. 
The autonomy of peasant communities was also expanded in aspects such as land 
use, communal work, organization, economic management and internal administration. 
But communities were still kept from full-blown participation in the national economy, 
by preventing them from obtaining credits or mortgaging their lands. In terms of 
cultural autonomy, communal traditions were respected and protected. This provided 
grounds for at least acknowledging the existence of customary law, but neither State 
officials nor comuneros have interpreted this statement as a recognition of non-Statal 
forms of regulation. 
The legal representation of communities became an issue that was politically and 
theoretically debated. But the fact was that only after being recognized they could 
enjoy effective legal representation. Peasant Community Registers were based on 
principles taken from other forms of legal representation. Regarding the constitutional 
or non-constitutional status of registration, the Supreme Court issued contradictory 
rulings. Law professors such as Bernales and Rubio (1985) supported the idea that the 
Constitution did not request a foundational administrative act to recognize the 
existence of peasant communities. For them, the lack of administrative recognition did 
not inhibit the legal existence of the community. 
2.7.2 Liberal and Populist Policies 
The winning political party of the 1980 Presidential election was Accion Popular, 
headed by Fernando Belaunde Terry, the President deposed by Velasco in 1968. The 
new administration's economic policy was aimed at developing the national economy 
based on neo-liberal principles. Thus, the idea was to promote agrarian development 
through the intensive participation of private capital. 
The implementation of the government's policy led to the rise of inflation and 
recession, with serious social, political, and economic consequences. In 1980, a 
subversive Maoist group, the Shining Path, appeared in the country. Some years later, 
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the pro-socialist MRTA also started its bloody activities25'. Their actions deeply 
affected the stability of the country. Many rural areas were abandoned, because 
peasants were murdered either by terrorists or by military forces. The remaining 
communal authorities, threatened with death, were often compelled to work for the 
Shining Path. 
Given the political and social violence, and the economic failure of Belaunde's 
administration, the 1990 presidential elections were won by Alan Garcia, the APRA 
candidate, with an overwhelming majority. However, most of APRA's economic 
programme had already been carried out by Velasco's government. APRA 
implemented a "heterodox" economic policy, once again with a populist perspective. 
The agrarian sector received top priority (i.e. loans without interests). The State's 
objective was to create a wide popular base among the peasantry. One of the direct 
mechanisms it used for approaching peasants and listening to their demands were the 
so-called Rimanakuys2®. In these meetings, delegates of peasant communities 
discussed their problems and debated with different State officials, sometimes even 
with President Garcia himself. 
However, in spite of the Rimanakuys and its populist policy -the formulation of 
Laws 24656 and 24657- APRA's government was unable to obtain sustained support 
from the peasantry. 
2.7.3 Peasant Communities Law 24656 
Peasant Communities Law 24656, promulgated in 1987, was an expression of some 
government sectors interested in the peasant question. They sought a balance between 
modernization and respect for traditional communal structures. In fact, this law was 
the first one to deal with community issues without trying to impose alien models. 
Communities were considered to be democratic and autonomous institutions. 
Communal work was protected and promoted, stressing it should be regulated only by 
native uses, customs, and shared traditions. In general, any community rule was 
supposed to be respected and become part of its normative framework. 
Communities were defined as public interest organizations, consisting of families 
living in and controlling territories based on ancestral social, economic and cultural 
relationships. These relationships could be communal land ownership, communal 
work, mutual help, or democratic government. According to this law, the normative 
principles regulating community life, were: 
1. Equality of rights and obligations. 
2. Protection of the community's interests. 
3. Participation. 
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). 
From Quechua: Meetings, discussions. 
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4. Solidarity, reciprocity and mutual help. 
5. Protection of the ecological balance, expressed in the promotion of reforestation. 
Comuneros were classified in two groups: 
a) qualified comuneros, or adults who have lived for more than five years in the 
community and have never belonged to a different one; 
b) integrated comuneros, such as the spouse of a qualified one, who expressed his/her 
desire to be admitted. 
Integrated comuneros only have the right to use communal goods and services27), 
while qualified ones also had the right to vote and to manage the land. Among the 
most important decisions regarding land management, allotment of vacant parcels was 
first. The vacancy of family parcels or the lack of direct exploitation was to lead to 
the reversal of the land to the community. This decision required a qualified majority 
in the General Assembly. 
The State granted support and protection when natural resources (mines, forests, 
water) within the community's territory were to be exploited. In such cases, the 
establishment of enterprises even with third parties was allowed. Thus, the former 
"cooperative" model became modified. There were three kinds of associative systems: 
a) Communal enterprises: the communities organized themselves, generating 
productive units of communal goods and services. 
b) Multicommunal enterprises: private law legal entitiess, with limited responsibility 
and direct communal participation. Their goal was the implementation of 
productive, distributive, manufacturing, and industrial activities. These included 
the trading and consumption of goods and services required by communities. 
c) Partnership participation in both public and private sector enterprises. The idea 
was to encourage the involvement of comuneros in high-return economic activities. 
The General Assembly, as the community's supreme institution, had some new 
attributes: to organize peasant patrols (rondas campesinas), a kind of communal 
self-defense organization; to elect Municipal Agents (representatives of the State); and 
especially, to propose candidates for posts of Justice of the Peace, Governor, and Lt. 
Governor within communal jurisdiction. 
Communal work was considered a voluntary "contribution" of comuneros for the 
integral development of the community. Given its non-contractual character, labor 
legislation was not applied. Instead of wages, comuneros were supposed to receive the 
benefits of their effort in the form of collective services (health, education, technical 
advise, etc.). 
2 5 This concept is very similar to the one used in the Peruvian legislation with regard to the national origin 
and the right to be elected. 
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The expansion of the national "agricultural frontier" was fostered by public 
funding. The goal was to undertake aggressively the distribution, preservation, and 
recovery of agricultural land. Several projects for recovering terraces (andenes) and 
building irrigation systems were also implemented. Government policy included setting 
up hydroelectric units and new rural settlements. 
Improving livestock through technological support was also defined as a priority. 
Similarly, emphasis was put on the development of handicrafts. This activity was 
promoted by issuing Export Handicraft Certificates (tax refund to make products 
internationally competitive). 
As part of its efforts, the government created the National Institute for the 
Development of Peasant Communities (INDEC). It was defined as "a public, 
decentralized, and multisectorial organization under the Ministry of the Presidency". 
INDEC had legal representation, and technical and administrative autonomy under 
internal public law. One of its prerogatives was to administer the "National Fund for 
Development" (NFD), aimed at providing financial support for the communities' 
integral development. The NFD raised funds through state contributions, donations, 
legacies and international cooperation. 
2.7.4 Land Demarcation and Title Law 24657 
The Land Demarcation and Title Law 24657 was also promulgated in 1987. It 
declared the demarcation of and title to communal territory a national need and a 
matter of social interest. Under this law, the community's territory was formed by the 
original communal land, by the one acquired according to agrarian and common law, 
and the land assigned to the community during the Agrarian Reform process. A 
special legal procedure was devised and applied when the peasant community lacked 
legal title to the land in its possession. The procedure was also applied when there was 
a disparity between the community's actual possessions and the ones referred to in its 
titles. Thus, a community could request the Regional Agrarian Bureau to survey its 
territory, present conclusive maps, and add whatever means necessary to prove the 
legality of its possessions: ownership titles, certificates or rough sketches. In turn, the 
Bureau could order a survey of the whole area to determine the borders between the 
applicant community and its neighbors. 
This law is a procedural norm par excellence. It incorporates important 
accomplishments like the recognition of simple communal possession in order to avoid 
conflicts. It also acknowledges the use of any means to prove possession, a measure 
that represents a certain understanding of customary practices. 
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2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter, as well as the next one, are crucial for understanding the complexities 
and the background of Paroccan and Ccachabamba, the two communities that will be 
studied in detail. Throughout this historical overview, I have stressed that certain 
important communal elements have a pre-Hispanic origin and a colonial imprint28'. 
The structure of the Inca state was based on the ayllus, which had important family 
and religious links. Their surplus was managed by the Inca administration. In turn, the 
Spanish Colonial system settled Andean people in reducciones, in order to impose a 
closer control over their political, economic, and religious affairs. For almost two 
centuries, Indians lived a silent and permanent adaptation process. Communities 
became an institution of resistance against the expansive haciendas. 
Republican liberalism misunderstood the problems of the peasantry and tried to 
establish a market economy for the land. The outcome was that haciendas became 
even more powerful, to the detriment of the communities that were only trying to 
survive in such a hostile environment. As I have stressed, decision and law makers 
usually did not understand indigenous problems. Moreover, landowners were in close 
contact with central state officials and local authorities in order to protect and enhance 
their interests. 
During the earlier part of this century, an indigenist school tried to present and 
preserve indigenous communities as part of Peru's identity. It influenced disciplines all 
across the board, from literature to the arts, and indigenism was also taken into 
account by the 1920 and 1933 Constitutions. Under a paternalistic framework, 
communities were forbidden to sell or lease their lands. This protective regime, 
assuming that change should be avoided, was not complemented by a development 
policy. 
The 1936 Civil Code and other regulations supported the idea that communities 
were ancient institutions, that should be replaced by cooperatives or individual 
ownership. In general, their norms, as well as the intervention of many State agencies 
made the communities' recognition and title obtaining procedures even more difficult. 
The Agrarian Reform represented an important effort to integrate communities into 
the national economy, although legislators and peasants had different goals. Law 
17716 and the Community Statute tried to modify the communal structure following 
cooperative patterns. Official policies ignored or forbade autonomous social and 
cultural features. 
The 1979 Constitution and recent laws have not meant any significant change in 
this trend. The peasant communities remain between two opposite political optionsm 
liberalism and populism. Some sectors still consider that comuneros ought to receive 
protective treatment in order to preserve their traditions. Neoliberal sectors perceive 
For a comprehensive list of laws regulation the communities see appendix 1. 
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the communities as obstacles to the country's development. They would rather abolish 
them. What peasants themselves think about their development still requires in-depth 
research. 
CHAPTER 3 
The Regional Study Context: Cuzco 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to place the communities within their context, 
their ecological, geographic-administrative and socio-economic context. This raises the 
question of how to define, to delimit the regional context in a useful way. Earlier 
social scientists focused the study of the region on purely geographic factors. I suggest 
three different sets of criteria to develop this study: ecological, administrative and 
economic. This is also linked to my earlier discussion of space and spatiality in 
Chapter 1. In order to develop these ideas I start with the national level, then look at 
the regions in Peru, focussing on Cuzco, and finally concentrate on the microregional 
level in Quispicanchis, where my communities under study are located. Based on the 
historical and legal background already set out here, a study was made of the regional, 
subregional and local levels of the geographical, economic and social conditions 
relevant to Paroccan and Ccachabamba, the communities selected for my research. 
Peasant communities are the product of a changing social, political and ecological 
process, in which they have always played a subordinate role. A main feature of the 
peasant economy is the combination of diversified activities at different times and in 
different spaces. The role of agriculture is essential when assigning time or obtaining 
resources, since it is usually the family unit's main activity (Kervyn 1988: 18). The 
diversification of productive activities also supplies resources for the exchange of 
goods. This gives the integration of communal families "substance", providing the 
"objective" element for the interaction of family related comuneros. In turn, this in 
itself is the material basis for the communities' existence. 
The economies of communal families are "integrated" into the microregional level 
through "business" activities, such as the sale of Andean goods or their labor force. In 
terms of their spatial integration, peasant communities are usually linked to a large or 
small urban-axis (large or small towns) that are merging points for commercial and 
trading activities. Similarly, regions are linked through their city-axis, asserting their 
areas of influence through highways, commercial circuits, political and administrative 
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organizations, etc. 
The implementation of state policies also serves as a catalyst for communal, 
microregional and regional integration. Through economic mediation, i.e. supply and 
demand of goods and services, or through its legal and administrative demands, the 
State is also a key factor in the articulation of the different productive units at a 
regional level. 
3.1.1 Different Concepts of "Region " 
Current definitions of a "region" tend to focus on geographical factors. Only a few 
studies have used a holistic approach to the analysis of economic, political and social 
characteristics of Peru's regional spaces (see Gonzales de Olarte 1986; Kervyn 1988; 
Guillen 1989). 
In these studies we can find at least three different concepts of "region". The first 
one is geographical. "Regions" are defined in terms of their ecological features, i.e., 
climate, soil, flora, fauna. The second concept is economic. Regions are considered 
based on the existence of markets, productive forces, commercial circuits and, to a 
lesser extent, the presence of technological infrastructure. Finally, regions can also be 
politically defined, according to their administrative boundaries and to the degree of 
administrative and political autonomy they have vis-a-vis the central government. 
All these definitions must be considered in order to get a more suitable concept of 
"region". In fact, they should not be taken as exclusive of each other. The size of the 
market, for example, as well as the kind of farm or dairy products available, will be 
greatly determined by the crops and products cultivated in the region's area of 
influence. Considering the ecological, political and social dimensions, the concept of 
"economic region" acquires greater analytical potential. 
Using these criteria, it is necessary to clarify some key concepts before 
undertaking a brief analysis of Peru's "economic regionalization". First of all, the 
term "space" is for us a parameter for a sound "regional analysis" because it should be 
understood in terms of the socioeconomic relations of a given area (i.e. production, 
circulation, distribution). In this sense, it is a holistic concept that goes beyond the 
simple "geographical" connotation, incorporating time and social relations as key 
variables. Secondly, it is important to define a "region" within a given space 
according the economic, social and political relationships that unfold at a specific 
moment and place. Thus, the production and interchange of goods and services is the 
material support of regional space. 
A third concept, that of "regional delimitation", derives from those elements which 
allow the limits of a specific regional space. The main elements defining this concept 
are: 
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a) the existence of a market (where the supply and demand of goods and services is 
carried out)1'; 
b) the existence of one standard of exchange between economic protagonists; 
c) the accumulation and investment of capital in a given space; 
d) the activity of non-capitalist economic agents (assuming capitalism as the 
predominant economic system for thematic unity); and, e) the presence of the State 
as an element for the diffusion of a homogenous economic and political system. 
3.2 Ecological Regions of Peru 
Former research recognized the existence of three natural regions: the coast, the 
Andes and the jungle. The criterion used for this classification was the central 
presence of the Andean mountain range (commonly called sierra). The coast (costa) 
and the Amazon jungle (selva) were only seen as the geographical regions located on 
each side of the Andes. 
A new generation of geographers has criticized this classification and proposed 
alternative approaches. Considering a wider number of environmental factors, Javier 
Purgal Vidal defines eight geographical regions: coast, yunga, quechua, suni, puna, 
cordillera, high forest and low forest. Five of these regions are within what was 
known as the sierra: yunga, quechua, suni, puna, and cordillera (Figueroa 1987:25). 
As this classification stresses, the Andean region is not homogeneous. As Julio C. 
Tello pointed out: "the sierra grants the existence of diverse climates, which vary 
from the tropical ones -present in the valleys and plateaus- to the Arctic-like ones 
found in the Cordilleras" (in Figueroa 1987:25). Likewise, peasants also differentiate 
between the diverse "ecological levels" of their environment. The five regions 
mentioned above define the ecological areas of the sierra. Insofar as its altitude above 
sea level is concerned, the yunga region, with its warm valleys, is located at about 
2,300 meters a.s.l. The quechua one is located between 2,300 and 3,500 m.a.s.l, and 
has the most moderate climate. The suni region is cold, and is located between 3,500 
and 4,000 m.a.s.l. The puna region, or "land without trees", goes up to 4,800 meters. 
Beyond this altitude, the cordillera, due to its rigorous climate, shows no agrarian 
activity. 
Javier Purgal Vidal stresses that each region has a "limited production." That is, 
only certain crops can be cultivated at each level. In the yunga, these products are: 
sugar cane and certain fruit trees (avocado, lucumo, custard apple, guayabo, and 
citrics). In the quechua region: maize and also certain fruit trees (cherries, peaches, 
apples, quince). In the suni, the main crops are beans, oca, olluco, mashua, and 
cereals (quinua, caMhua and tarwi). Finally, the puna allows, on a limited scale, only 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (1973:155). 
The regional study context: Cuzco 51 
the cultivation of potatoes and barley (Figueroa 1987:28). The Andean ecological 
zones also restrict the possibilities of raising livestock. South American camelloids 
(llamas, alpacas) live mainly in the puna. Horses and sheep find their habitat in the 
lower regions. 
It should be noted that, at each ecological level, there exist diverse micro-climates. 
Thus, the chance of obtaining a wider range of products (either crops or livestock), 
depends on the skillful management of the land parcels located at different levels, and 
on the micro-climate factor. 
3.3 Economic Regions in Peru 
Gonzales de Olarte points out that the economic regions in Peru were historically 
formed by the unequal penetration and development of the capitalist market. During 
this process, the regional geographical delimitation made no sense other than to 
arrange the administrative organization of the country and to limit local powers 
(1985:138)2). 
Each region is differendy developed economically. In the case of Peru, there are 
two regional development features. First of all, in each region capitalist relations 
coexist with non-capitalist ones. Both are articulated by the labor and merchandise 
markets, and by monetary capital. Secondly, regional development has evolved 
differendy, depending on the economic cycle. This has no homogeneity effect upon 
the regional economies involved31. 
The State's participation in regional development is uneven, due to its strongly 
centralist character in Peru. This determines an unequal distribution of income because 
a redistribution policy, based on coherent taxation, does not even exist. Most income 
is concentrated in the capital that also has the greatest concentration of population. 
However, there is a general trend towards decentralized investment of public 
resources. 
A regional classification of the country, based on its geographical features, would 
form the following map: 
a) Coastal regions: essentially capitalist, they tend to create commercial spaces that 
permit accumulation of capital production. 
b) Highland regions: like the coast, these are also trading spaces, though with 
different accumulation rates. Their area of influence is asserted by city centres, 
2 1 Gonzales de Olarte (Ibid.) mentions that the main analytical variables for supporting his hypotheses are: 
area cultivated by rural inhabitants, per capita income, clear difference between the minimum wage in Lima 
and in each department, the consumption of electricity, and industrial specialization coefficients. 
3 ) Though it would seem somewhat contradictory, it is not at all true that regional financial resources are 
centralized in Lima. One of the causes is the existing relationship between regional production and financial 
development. 
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known as "microregions". 
c) Rain forest and high forest regions: these are recendy colonized and settled areas, 
with a high degree of ecological deterioration in some areas. 
On the other hand, Gonzales de Olarte proposes the following comparison of features 
between the "central region" which in this case is the coastal region, and the "southern 
Andean region" which Cuzco belongs to. 
Central Region 
a. This involves Lima as a central City-Centre with two different functions: leader of 
the region and centre of national development; 
b. Lima has about 30% of the nation's population and 35% of the Economically 
Active Population (EAP); 
c. It relies on its own financial resources (almost 80% of private capital originates in 
this region); 
d. It holds the highest number and rate of migrants because it is the most important 
and attractive centre for the labor force; 
e. It concentrates the highest industrial production, and its market consumes more 
than half of its own production. It also has the nation's highest accumulation rates. 
f. Its main activities are agriculture, agro-industry, industry, trade and mining. Its 
markets have different scales: agricultural production at the regional level; 
industrial output at the national and regional levels; and mining and agro-industry, 
at the national and international levels. 
The remaining cities working as regional axes are also centres of attraction for the 
rural working force. This comes, mainly, from nearby microregions, where non 
capitalist relationships predominate. 
Southern Andean Region 
a. Made up of restricted spaces ("microregions") and integrated by city-axes, these 
are, in turn, linked to several decentralized regions located on the coast. For 
example, lea (city-axis for Huancavelica and Ayacucho); Huancayo, city-axis for 
the central highlands; and Cuzco, which covers the departments of Apurimac, 
Madre de Dios and Puno4 ). These cities represent the main centres for economic 
and the public service activities (trade, banking and public administration). 
b. This region represents 31.5% of the nation's population, and 30% of the total 
Economically Active Population (EAP); 
c. The microregions involved do not have high migration rates, but provide a 
working force for the coastal regions mentioned above. 
4 ) This city, along with Juliaca, is a highland axis. Both have an important articulation with the 
international wool trade. 
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d. Their contribution to the Gross National Product (GNP) amounts to only about 
18%. Moreover, there exists no adequate coefficient between the agricultural 
economically active population (EAP) and its output. Agriculture employs 66% of 
it but yields only 33% of the total production. 
e. The most important regional activities are agriculture, animal husbandry, services, 
trade and industry. 
f. The predominance of non-capitalist relations is a distinctive feature of this region. 
This prevents an intensive accumulation process, and it implies an interaction 
between both systems - capitalist and non-capitalist. 
Andean peasant communities represent 15% of the highlands' population in this region 
and are very important in the configuration of microregions. Interaction between the 
peasant communities and the microregions works in three different ways. First, those 
communities with scant possibilities for intensive economic exploitation are compelled 
to maintain production relationships based on a non-Western rationality (i.e. an 
aversion to risk). This economic logic prevents their integration into the market. 
Secondly, the market-oriented economy allows the coexistence of capitalist and 
non-capitalist relations. This is both a contradiction (one has to absorb the other), and 
a solution (one complements the other at several levels). Thirdly, as a result, 
relationships between the market and the peasant communities are mediated by a 
whole set of social agents and institutions: merchants, carriers, labor force agents 
(enganchadores), etc. 
Although these data permit us a general concept of the southern Andean region, 
there exist some specific characteristics regarding Cuzco, which will permit us to 
analyse the role that this department plays in the region, and its economic place in the 
Andean space. Then we could analyse the micro-region of Quispicanchis, where our 
peasant groups are located. For more specific data showing the communities under 
study in their context we can see Tables 1 to 7 at the end of the present chapter. This 
data also shows the history of community recognition in the area, how the recognised 
communities relate to the ecological and economic zones, and how, in the different 
zones, the communities, peasant groups, CAPs and private properties relate to each 
other. 
3.4 Regional Economic Aspects of Cuzco 
3.4.1 Cuzco as a Commercial Space 
Cuzco was not a true "region" in itself. It was a "commercial space". Historically, the 
city of Cuzco was the most important market of all for regional production. This trend 
was disturbed during the Republican period, when the city was deprived of its 
Colonial outlands, when these areas were put under the control of the coastal cities. 
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This situation was reversed when Cuzco was incorporated into the international 
market, due to its wool and tropical products trade. 
In the Cuzco region, the more productive zones were the provinces of La 
Convencion and Lares, which gave rise to the development of important "trading 
houses" at the beginning of the present century. These trading houses centralized 
commercial mediation activities, to the point of reaching the accumulation levels 
needed for the formation of a "commercial space". Moreover, this situation was 
further consolidated by the action of other agents: 
"Production development [...] does not suppose only the participation of the 
so-called "big houses". Many of the traders were also small merchants or former 
feudatories (arrendires). After having worked for years in the valley, they opened 
small specialized businesses in the city, especially for selling products from the high 
jungle: especially coca and brandy, but also coffee and tea in small amounts ..." 
(Brissau, quoted by Ruiz Bravo and Monge 1983:67). 
The formation of Cuzco's market was the outcome of the shared action of those 
trading houses and small local agents, with the mediation of the hacienda owners. 
This market started to play the role of "consumer and redistributor of the regional 
production" (Ruiz Bravo and Monge, op. cit:69). 
The city's urban development has a complex relationship with the regional process. 
At the beginning of the century, Cuzco was a small city. Urban demands were 
supplied by the commercial and exchange links established between the city dwellers 
and their country relatives dedicated to agriculture and animal husbandry. This 
consolidated the nature and small scale of the urban economy. Thus, the development 
of the city corresponded to the socioeconomic structure of the region. 
Population growth, an expansion of the administrative agencies, and the increase of 
extra-regional trade broke the traditional dynamics of the Cuzco region. Moreover, the 
rupture of the social and economic orders produced by the Agrarian Reform is another 
process that explains the importance of peasant economies and their articulation in the 
Cuzco market. 
However, in recent years, there has been no positive correlation between the slow 
increase in the productive supply and the significant growth in the regional demand. 
Only the tropical export products have experienced a significant take-off5'. Thus, the 
major urban demand has been satisfied by extra-regional products. Despite its current 
dependence on Arequipa's agroindustrial trade, the city of Cuzco is still the main 
consumer and distributor of the regional production. 
Overall, the dynamics of a traditional small-scale trade added to closed cultural 
relationships, and to the secular patterns of shared development are the bases for a 
regional identity shared by wide groups of Cuzco's population (Ruiz Bravo and 
Data supplied by the Centro Bartolomé de las Casas (Cuzco). 
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Monge, Ibid:78). 
3.4.2 The Productive Features of Cuzco's Agrarian Economy 
Here analysis is concentrated on Cuzco's regional agrarian economy, emphasising its 
relationships with communal economies. For this purpose, other productive sectors are 
ignored. The main source for this part of the study has been Guilldn's (1989) detailed 
analysis of the economic evolution of Cuzco from 1900 to the late 80's S ). 
Between 1950 and 1980, Cuszco's agriculture has grown annually at an average of 
2.58 %. This trend can be subdivided as follows: 
a) 1950-1956: a period characterized by a constant drop in production, due to 
droughts in the southern areas. However, production increased during 1957 and 
1958, despite climatological problems. 
b) 1958-1967: a period of constant decrease in production, not even reaching the 
levels obtained during the previous period. 
c) 1968-1980: a period of sustained growth in production, reaching an average of 
4.4%. It is important to stress that this increase coincided with the beginning and 
application of the Agrarian Reform. 
3.4.2.1 Types of Products 
Regional production can be divided in two kinds of goods: 1) Andean or highland 
products (potatoes, corn, wheat, barley, lambswool and alpaca wool); and 2) tropical 
products (coffee, coca and cocoa). The output of the former has suffered a serious 
reduction (especially wheat and barley). For example, taking the 1950 output as a 
reference, at the end of 1980 only 63% of same was obtained (Guillen 1989:272). 
Generally, this trend is not unique to Cuzco. In the case of tropical products, there has 
been a constant growth in their production, and they are the region's export goods par 
excellence. The average increase in their production for the period is 7.3 %. Generally, 
when comparing the outputs of both Andean and tropical goods, it is clear that the 
former are undergoing a continuous decrease in their participation in the overall 
regional output. 
This assessment reveals an important socioeconomic problem: the producers of 
"Andean" goods are part of the traditional and most economically depressed peasant 
sector. They are undergoing a constant lessening of their participation in the regional 
production and income, and this undermines their social and economic welfare. 
His work is based on the official data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture (see 1989:265). 
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3.4.2.2 Production and Population Growth Rates 
There is a correlation between production, income and population growth. The 
comparison between the population growth rates and production should only be made 
using the growth in the output of "Andean" products because the "tropical" ones are 
not destined to satisfy the regional food demand7'. It is a fact that the rate of 
population growth was higher than the increase in production. This generated a deficit 
in the regional supply that had to be satisfied by importing food. This shows, in the 
long term, that population, production and added demand differ for tropical and 
Andean crops. 
Moreover, production is not directly related to regional income. This is due to 
both the ownership structure, and the distinct influence of market devices on 
production. In this respect, the participation of traditional (Andean) producers and 
capitalist producers (tropical export products) in regional income is highly disparate. 
Generally, between 1950 and 1980, there was an annual average increase of 0.90% in 
Cuzco's GNP per capita, compared to an annual national average of 1.93%. Likewise, 
population growth was also slow, with rates lower than the national average. 
These results are consistent with my observations: the regional demand has a 
moderate influence over the internal production because the latter is more linked to 
extraregional markets. This also impedes greater production growth in communities 
linked to these markets such as Paroccan. This holds true even when the distorting 
effect of the tropical production is taken into consideration. 
For my purpose, it is also important to study the regional demand in terms of its 
main components: population growth and income level. This permits clarification of 
three topics: the changes in the consumption patterns, the ensuing product substitution, 
and the levels of food prices. 
3.4.2.3 Consumption Patterns 
These patterns are defined by the whole set of goods and services used by the 
members of a community to satisfy their needs. They are shaped by the resources 
available and by the cultural constraints on the community. For Cuzco, a comparative 
analysis between the "consumer baskets" of 1959 and 1979 shows that the influence of 
local production on local consumption has deteriorated gready. 
For example, the increasing demand for "imported" poultry products -unknown in 
traditional patterns- shows the influence of the State's policy in promoting their 
consumption. The same occurs with fish and shellfish, and something similar occurred 
in the demand for mutton, compared to that for pork and beef. In general, "red meat" 
-a regional product- has been displaced by "imported" products. The massive presence 
This is important for avoiding false comparisons. Otherwise, those "added" rates would result in a 
higher productivity when compared to population growth. 
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of dairy products -i.e., powdered milk, yogurt- is a clear sign of these changes. Here, 
advertisement plays a crucial role because "imported" food is essentially presented as 
being "urban" and of a higher standard. 
In the case of vegetables, some new products were added to the regional diet. 
However, the consumption of tubers such as potatoes has maintained its traditional 
importance for almost 40 years. At the same time, this gives evidence of the 
producers' sluggishness (i.e. communities and peasant groups). In cereals, barley and 
wheat flours ^'chaquepa") are replaced by white wheat bread made with imported 
flour. There was also a downturn in the consumption of typical foods such as corn and 
quinoa. These were replaced by lower priced cereals. 
Several new products show the higher consumption of "imported" goods: cocoa, 
instant coffee, filtered tea, colorants and seasoners, have been substituted for the 
traditional table chocolate, ground coffee, tea leaves, natural colorants and cooking 
herbs. Another important element in the displacement of traditional products has been 
the substitution of fuels, fire wood giving way to electric energy and petroleum 
by-products. 
These changes can be understood as the result of manifold social processes: the 
growth of agroindustry, the imported food trade, the exhaustion of local domestic 
supply, commercial advertising and imitative behaviour being the main causes. In 
turn, the same basic "consumer basket" structure -that is, the participation of different 
products regarding income level- was influenced by other variables: changes in 
average income, in relative prices, and of consumers' changing tastes. 
In the long term, there has been a reduction in food expenditure. This is the 
outcome of low increases in regional income. However, this decrease in food 
expenditure -particularly for Andean goods- permitted the transfer of income 
expenditure towards other forms of consumption, such as transport and 
communications, dining out and new goods and services (such as personal hygiene and 
luxury products). This is perhaps a consequence of Cuzco's urbanization process. A 
concomitant factor in this substitution process was the lower incidence of the regional 
supply of clothes and shoes, due partially to the higher cost of locally produced items 
compared to those manufactured in other regions. 
The pathetic case of potatoes gives the clearest evidence of the changes in 
consumption patterns. These were replaced by rice, noodles and flour, among other 
foodstuffs. This shows the displacement of a traditional product by "urban 
interference". Moreover, the continued substitution of regional goods by "imported" 
ones has had a negative outcome: the deterioration in the nutritional level of Cuzco's 
population. 
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3.4.2.4 Price Levels of Peasant Products 
Regarding price levels, the food branch was the one that underwent the highest 
increase compared to the rest of the basic consumer basket8'. Three conclusions can 
be drawn from this. First of all, there was a relative contraction in the demand for 
food. Secondly, the traditional food demand was replaced by lower priced products. 
Thirdly, this generated inflationary pressure. 
To understand the agrarian situation in Cuzco, two additional facts have to be 
considered. One is the low productivity of the "traditional" sector, especially when 
compared with national and international standards. The other one is the protective 
State policy of "low priced food" for urban centers. In terms of relative prices of 
regional products, consumers purchased lower priced goods, or those having multiple 
uses. To a certain extent, this is a subjective decision based on the demonstration 
effect. 
For example, noodles displaced potatoes because of their greater versatility. 
Compared to rice, potatoes were cheaper, but due to their low productivity, they 
became more expensive. Thus, their consumption was replaced even more. A similar 
situation was experienced by wheat producers when they had to compete with 
imported rice and noodles. 
Finally, in the 1950-1980 period, real regional prices and exchange terms underwent 
the following processes: 
1. The majority of products showed negative growth rates, except for white corn, 
barley and coca; 
2. A direct relation was shown between the real and production prices' growth rates. 
Positive or negative growth rates correspond to positive or negative production 
price rates, but do not apply to coffee, alpaca wool or cocoa, in which there is an 
inverse relation; 
3. Producers had to deal with highly unfavorable terms of exchange; 
4. There were three different trends: positive (1950-1957), unstable (1958-1968), and 
unfavorable (1969-1987); 
5. The overall impact of some factors -market competition, state policies and relative 
price variations- forced peasants to increase the commercial production of goods. 
Thus, they became more vulnerable to the unfavorable terms of exchange (i.e. 
more traditional products for equal quantities of "modern" ones). Social unrest and 
climatological conditions also played an important role in this trend; 
6. Limiting factors for regional producers were: 
- The reduction in international coffee price (new producers, higher production and 
a rigid demand); 
During the period 1950-1980, the highest increase was produced in the varieties of "meat", compared to 
the lowest variation in the "potatoes" branch. 
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- A fixed monetary exchange rate and higher custom duties afforded artificial 
"protection" for national producers. This was advantageous only for those 
producers with high productivity rates; 
- The greater participation of the commercial sector in establishing prices, at the 
expense of the peasant sector9'. 
- Highland agriculture neither generated nor transferred resources to replace or 
develop its own productive structure. One of the main reasons for this is the 
subsistence economy, with low productivity and technology levels; 
- Highland producers are not strongly integrated into the market (self-consumption 
allows certain freedom when interacting with the market economy). 
3.5 The Microregional Context: Quispicanchis 
3.5.1 Description 
The most important data for placing the communities under study indicates that they 
are in a common economic and ecological area. Quispicanchis has good hydraulic 
capacity, a highly provincial population, agriculture is the main economic activity, an 
expansion of urban settlements and different use of technologies depending on the 
zone. 
The peasant communities that are the focus of this study are located in the 
Province of Quispicanchis, in the department of Cuzco, in the southern Peruvian 
Andes region. Etymologically, Quispicanchis derives from two Quechua words: 
Quespe, that means glass, and Canchis, that means place. In other words: "the place 
of glass". The province of Quispicanchi is favorably located geographically in the 
Andean mountain range that begins in Carabaya and ends on the banks of the 
Wilcamayo River. Thus, its communities have an important hydrological resource to 
enhance their farming areas. 
Quispicanchis is the juncture point for almost all of Cuzco's main provinces. The 
capital, Urcos, is the starting point of a highway that runs up to the District of 
Marcapata. It is bordered to the North by the provinces of Paucartambo and Calca, to 
the South, by the province of Canchis; to the East, by the province of Carabaya, and 
to the West by the province of Acomayo. Its geographical location is Latitude 13°25", 
and Longitude 17°5". The province of Quispicanchis has twelve districts. Among 
them are Andahuaylillas and Urcos, where Ccachabamba and Paroccan are located at 
approximately 3,054 metres above sea level. Even though Urcos and Andahuaylillas 
are not the most extensive nor densely populated districts of Quispicanchis, they are 
very important, due mainly to the fact that they are -together with Huaro- the three 
' For example, for 31 years, 20% of the gross value of the agricultural and cattle raising production was 
transferred to other sectors, enabling their accumulation process (Guillen 1989:324). 
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districts closest to the main Cuzco highway. The province of Quispicanchis represents 
9.36% of the total area of the department. It has a heterogeneous distribution in terms 
of extension and population. Within the department, Quispicanchis has a high 
population density per square kilometer that is due to its better access to social 
services and markets (based on road infrastructure). 
Economic Areas 
The province of Quispicanchis can be divided into three well-defined areas: 
a) The Inter-Andean Valley Zone, which embraces seven districts: Oropesa, Lucre, 
Andahuaylillas, Huaro, Urcos, Quiquijana and Cusipata. Together, they represent 
31% of the microregional space. This area lies between the Vilcanota and 
Huatanay river rivers, both of which determine the hydraulic capacity of the zone. 
The population is concentrated in urban settlements with social, educational and 
health services, as well as with road infrastructure (asphalt roads, a railroad, trails 
and paths). Productive activities are intensive, the main economic activity being 
agriculture, followed by livestock (mainly poultry, pork and goats). The main 
crops are maize, potatoes, barley, wheat, lima beans, fruit trees (peaches, apples, 
pears, "capulies"), vegetables, and pasture for livestock breeding. 
The Inter-Andean valley holds a large concentration of the provincial population 
(33.9% in urban areas and 66.1% in its rural areas). The zone sustains a great 
man/land pressure, and one of the results is the expansion of urban settlements 
(district capital cities). Another one is the diversification of productive activities, 
primarily the paying ones. 
The geographical structure of the Inter-Andean valley determines the location of 
peasant communities on plateaus. This is also a result of the displacement of 
peasant communities by the landlords' pressure. Communities were compelled to 
move to poorer lands. The population groups that still have access to the valley 
floor (as in the case of Ccachabamba) owe this privilege to the establishment of 
settlements during the 1969 Agrarian Reform (Ccaijo 1983:6). 
b) The High Plateau Zone, in the basin of the Mapacho river. The population is 
dispersed and its main activity is livestock breeding. Human settlements lack 
adequate public services. Education is deficient. Only two small health centres 
(postas sanitarias) exist. Communications services are also inadequate. The road 
infrastructure (i.e. Urcos-Puerto Maldonado) is very poor. This zone covers over 
60% of the province, and is mainly used for livestock breeding (cattle, sheep, 
alpaca, hogs). Crops, raised on a small scale, are mainly traditional or Andean: 
quinua, potato, olluco, mashua, tarwi and oca. 
c) The Forest and Rain Forest Zones. These occupy 36% of the microregional area. 
Dispersed settlements extend along the Araza river basin. The population is 
concentrated in areas favorable for the animal husbandry, which is basically aimed 
at self-consumption. Maize, chilis, bananas, yucca, rice and pineapples are also 
produced but on a small scale. Social services are seriously deficient. There is a 
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lack of transportation services and road infrastructure, and the area is isolated 
during the rainy season. Education and health services are very poor if provided at 
all. The area features mainly gold mining and timber extraction. These zones are 
far from dynamic regional development areas. They have scarcely any 
technological assistance and practically no incentives for agricultural and livestock 
activities. 
Production in the Inter-Andean Valleys is influenced by improved -but not 
sophisticated- technology. The use of machinery, irrigation infrastructure, inorganic 
fertilizers and health and sanitation services are becoming more common. There is 
occasional technical assistance, through private projects and agreements, provided 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, traditional tools are 
still widely used. 
In the higher arable areas, the lack of irrigation and the freezing cold nights 
impose hard conditions for producing wheat, maize and potatoes. To overcome these 
problems, peasants have developed highly resistant varieties. In the high plateau areas, 
crops depend on the rainy season. When it comes, peasants start sowing the different 
varieties they had obtained from their previous genetic experiments. 
The high plateau communities use traditional technologies and are extremely 
dependent on the annual cycle10'. The forest area communities, on the other hand, sow 
at any season of the year, obtaining higher yields in most cases. This is why the 
profitability of some of their crops is more attractive than that obtained for traditional 
Andean crops. 
A quantitative analysis shows that maize is cultivated in an area of 1,433 hectares 
(about 2,570 acres). It is produced in the higher cultivated areas under irrigation. 
Potatoes cover up to 1,283 hectares, but of non-irrigated lands. Wheat covers 607 
hectares, also of non-irrigated lands. Equally important, but on a lower scale, are the 
lands used for crops such as barley, lima beans, olluco, oca and onions. 
Overall, production shows an almost total dependence on ecological conditions. 
Another limiting factor which should also be considered is the distance between the 
provincial and departmental capitals. This is crucial regarding access to transportation 
means and to technical assistance. 
3.5.2 The Peasant Economy in Quispicanchis 
In Quispicanchis, peasants produce for self-consumption, barter and trade, the latter 
being the main method used for goods in the market. Peasants exchange their crops 
1 0 ) This traditional technology refers to the use of traditional tools, like the chaquitaclla (a kind of foot 
plough) and the oxen-pulled plough, to prepare the land. Manure is used as fertilizer. Harvesting is done 
manually, with the help of tools and animals. 
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with other peasants, and with local or outsider traders. Peasant production is a 
function of the different ecological levels controlled by each community. The main 
products of these ecological zones are: 
Zone 1: Maize, vegetables, potatoes, meat, milk, cheese and eggs. 
Zone 2: "Tarwi"n) maize and beans. 
Zone 3: Potatoes, "chufto"n\ "moraya"n\ and "oca"U); meat, wool and leather. 
Goods usually bought or bartered for by the peasants include: groceries, plastics, 
alcohol, coca, kerosene, tools, pots, clothes, bags, natural and synthetic wool, shoes 
and, recently, also radios, cassette players, sewing machines and clocks. 
Economic decisions relating to barter vary according to each ecological level. At 
the first level, production is primarily intended for trade. Most products are sold in 
the market ("mahuay", potatoes, "miska", vegetables). However, this decision-making 
process is not enough to improve production through market competition. In vegetable 
production there is a clearer market-oriented rationality, and this tends to raise 
productivity. Though it is true that the best part of the crop is saved for use as seeds 
for next season, the rest is traded. The poorest products, as is the case with some 
maize crops, are used to make chicha (a traditional alcoholic brew). 
On the other hand, peasants inhabiting the second level reluctantly have to sell 
what they should keep for self-consumption, since their harvests are poor. They are 
forced to sell their production, and are not able to save enough food for themselves. 
The situation at the third level is better than the others. As long as their potato 
crops are good, the peasants can sell them throughout the year. Moreover, while at 
the second level the production is mainly used for self-consumption, peasants at this 
level can use their crops for exchange, self-consumption, or for market trading. 
3.5.2.1 The Unequal Access to Urco's Market 
Urcos, the provincial capital of Quispicanchis, is the main market in the area. Neither 
Huaro nor Andahuaylillas have a market because they are too close to Urcos. The 
Urcos market actually dominates the whole region from Huayrapata to Pinipampa. It 
also attracts producers from Huacarpay and Sucre. 
The frequency of the peasants' trips to the Urcos market depends on their needs as 
well as on their proximity to this town. People living in Urcos have easy access to 
Cuzco, due to the highway. There is also public transportation. This enables them to 
A cereal native to the Piura highlands. Bot Lupinus Mutabilis. 
1 2 ) Quechua name for dried potatoes, used as a food. 
1 3 ) Potato submitted to a conservation process consisting of exposing it to the freeze for several days, then 
soaking it in a stream and leaving it dry in the sun. 
1 4 1 One of the oxalyidaceas, with a herbaceous stalk, upright and with branches. Its roots have yellowish 
tubercles and the taste is similar to that of baked chestnuts. 
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reach Urcos in a few minutes, taking their products whenever they need to. On the 
other hand, peasants living on other levels have to walk several hours to reach Urcos. 
They take their products on llama back, and can, therefore, only travel to Urcos 
occasionally. However, some peasants also travel to higher areas, to sell products such 
as sugar and rice. All the goods acquired in the highlands are later sold in the Urcos 
market. This is an interesting intermediate activity, which helps them increase their 
low income. 
These communities are part of a dynamic process. They are closely dependent on 
the wider society and increasing integration into the market economy. This has been 
the outcome of the monetarization of their communal economy, the use of technified 
forms of production, the provision of credit, etc. Their strategy is aimed at reaching a 
specialized production, in order to obtain greater advantages in the market. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The historical and legal background provided in the second Chapter of this study 
aimed at explaining clearly State policies and legislation, as well as the peasant 
communities' response to these. This chapter has described the regional, sub-regional 
and local geographic, economic and social conditions that are part of the Paroccan and 
Ccachabamban context. The main characteristics of Quispicanchis' communities are as 
follows: 
1. The peasant economy combines different activities at different times and places. 
Agriculture plays the most important role in the peasant economy. 
2. Peasant communities are the product of a changing social process. The State's 
intervention promotes a communal, microregional and regional integration based 
on its economic, legal and administrative policies. 
3. Communal resources, such as land parcels, located on the lower levels of the 
valleys are very integrated into the market. This is due to their proximity to the 
highways as well as to the peasants' ability in commercial farming (Malengreau 
1985:6). 
4. The second ecological level communities lie in the middle valley. Peasant 
communities located here are the poorest of all. Their organization, which follows 
ancient practice, cannot provide any improvement in their standards of living. 
Their control over the land is loosening, either because of the loss or the 
privatisation of land parcels. However, these communities manage to provide a 
diversified set of products in order to survive. But they are not able to improve 
their technical and productive processes. The communal organization is turning 
into just a formal structure. Moreover, families are increasingly faced with limited 
resources, hindering their entrance into the market. Their survival is based on 
self-consumption and job-migration. 
5. The productive structure of the peasant communities located in the higher valley 
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lands -third ecological level- is based on a diversified set of products and activities. 
They have a high level of specialization in their activities, and this gives them a 
high status in the region. These organisations show the need to make connections 
with the external market. Their communal structure has been strengthened as a 
way of securing control over their lands. Their social organisation retains a strong 
Andean character, and is legitimized in part by the performance of communal 
projects. Despite their limited resources, they have achieved a balance between 
self-consumption and market trade. The communities on this level also show an 
important technological capacity that provides them with alternatives for improving 
their productivity. 
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TABLE 1 PERU: REGIONAL ECONOMIES UP TO 1980 
Types of Region Natural Regions Departments 
(Regional City-Axis) (predominantly) 
CENTRAL REGION 
Lima Costa Lima 
DECENTRALIZED REGIONS 
Arequipa Costa/Sierra Arequipa 
Moquegua 
Tacna 
Trujillo Costa/Sierra La Libertad 
Ancash 
Chiclayo Costa/Sierra Lambayeque 
Cajamarca 
Amazonas 
Piura Costa Piura 
Tumbes 
MARGINAL SPACES 
lea Costa/Sierra lea 
Ayacucho 
Huancavelica 
Huancayo Sierra Junin 
Pasco 
Huanuco 
Cuzco Sierra Cuzco 
Apurímac 
Madre de Dios 
Puno Sierra Puno 
COLONIZED REGIONS 
Iquitos Selva Loreto 
Pucallpa Selva Ucayali 
Moyobamba Selva San Martin 
Source: Gonzales de Olarte, Efraín: Regional Economies of Peru 
Lima, LEP, 1985. pp. 236 
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TABLE 2 CUZCO: CHANGES IN CONSUMPTION PATTERNS MEASURED 
BY THE EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE 1966-1979 
Large Consumption Groups Structure Percentage 
1966 1979 
Food, drink and tobacco 59.52 55.10 
Housing and Furnishings 18.87 18.44 
Clothing and Shoes 11.87 7.69 
Health and care Maintenance 1.30 1.55 
Transport and Communications 1.30 3.83 
Entertainment, Cultural Services, 
others 3.80 5.16 
Other goods and Services 3.26 8.23 
Expenses 100.00 100.00 
Source: Gonzales de Olarte, Efraih: Regional Economies of 
Peru. Lima, IEP, 1985. pp. 285. 
TABLE 3 POPULATION DATA ON THE DEPARTMENT OF CUZCO 
(on an national level) 
National Census 
July, 2 1961 June, 4 1972 July 12, 1981 
Census Population 611,972 715,237 852,500 
Percentage of the 
National Population 6.2% 5.3% 4.9% 
Population Density 8.0% 9.4% 10.9% 
National Population 
Density 7.7% 10.5% 13.2% 
Source: Arbe, Guillermo, et al. Diagnostico General de la Zona de Trabajo del 
CCAHO, mimeo. Cuzco, April 1990. 
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TABLE 4 POPULATION DATA OF CUZCO 
(on a provincial level) 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Department 
100 100 100 100 100 
(715,237) (262,822) (452,415) (832,504) (348,396) (484,108) 
Quispicanchis 8.7 6.1 10.2 7.6 5.1 9.3 
Cuzco 20.0 50.0 2.6 25.0 55.6 3.0 
Acó mayo 4.2 5.3 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.2 
Anta 6.5 4.5 7.6 5.8 3.4 7.6 
lea 6.5 3.9 7.9 6.0 3.7 7.7 
Canchis 10.6 9.0 11.5 10.0 9.4 10.4 
Canas 4.4 1.4 6.2 4.0 1.1 6.1 
Chumbivilcas 8.1 2.2 11.6 7.6 2.1 11.6 
Espinar 5.8 2.2 7.9 5.3 2.3 7.5 
La Convención 11.8 5.4 15.5 12.8 6.1 17.6 
Paruro 4.4 4.2 4.5 3.9 2.6 4.8 
Paucartambo 4.2 1.4 5.8 4.0 1.3 5.9 
Urubamba 4.8 4.4 5.1 4.7 3.8 5.3 
Source: Arbe, Guillermo, et. al. Diagnóstico General de la Zona de Trabajo del 
CCAJJO, mimeo, Cuzco, April 1990. 
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TABLE 5 DISTRICT OF QUISPICANCHIS 
Population and Extension 
District Extension Population 
Km2 1981 
Urcos 362 8,145 
Andahuaylillas 50 3,350 
Ccarhuayo 212 2,084 
Ccatcca 292 9,928 
Cusipata 372 4,274 
Huaro 58 3,387 
Lucre 92 3,488 
Marcapata 1,532 4,115 
Occongate 1,131 8,686 
Oropesa 132 4,172 
Camanti 2,572 1,881 
Quiquijana 332 9,426 
TOTAL 7,138 62,936 
Source: Arbe, Guillermo, et al. Diagnóstico General de la Zona de Trabajo del 
CCAÜO, mimeo. Cuzco, April 1990. 
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TABLE 6 QUISPICANCHIS' SETTLEMENT POPULATIONS 
(by ecological levels) 
ZONE I 
a) Urban Settlements 
Urcos 
Andahuaylillas 
Huaro 
b) Peasant Communities 
Mollebamba 
Munapata 
Paroccan 
Senseccalla 
Urcos Pampa 
Ccachabamba 
c) Agrarian Production Cooperatives (CAP) 
Rinconada 
Pucutu 
Marabamba 
d) Peasant Groups 
Q'erohuasi 
Chupahuaro 
e) Annexes 
Pinipampa (from Sallac, Andahuaylillas) 
Urpay (from Huaro) 
f) Private Properties 
Huaylachayoc 
Yahuasi 
Marabamba 
Bravo 
Canchistabla 
Munapata 
Urcospampa 
Puyahuaylla 
g) Domestic Unit 
Q'ecchas 
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ZONE n 
a) Peasant Communities 
Churubamba 
* Horogan 
* Huancara 
* Sallac 
* Triomayo 
* Yuthu 
* Papalcalla 
b) Agrarian Production Cooperatives 
Rayallacta (Sector I CAP Wiracocha) 
c) Annexes 
Ch'eqollo (Paroccan) 
* Pukapuka (Sensencalla) 
* Khununkunka (Munapata) 
d) Parcel lots (Parcialidad) 
Ch'anka 
e) Private Properties (Haciendas) 
Mallqui-Mallqui 
ZONE III 
a) Peasant Communities 
Huarohuaro 
* Q'onamuro 
* Sullumayo 
* Qollotaro 
b) Peasant Groups 
Mancco 
* Yanacocha 
c) Annexes 
Arahuara (Urpay) 
* Tinay (Palpacalla) 
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TABLE 7 OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED PEASANT COMMUNITIES IN THE 
PROVINCE OF QUISPICANCHIS 
Ñame District Date 
Quehuar Andahuaylillas 05.21.76 
Salloc Andahuaylillas 04.24.80 
Seccosecalla Andahuaylillas 11.16.80 
Ttiomayo Andahuaylillas 07.07.64 
Atapata Ccatca 07.11.66 
Ccatca Pampa Ccatca 01.24.66 
Ccopi Ccatca 08.10.43 
Cuyuni Ccatca 10.05.77 
Chichina Ccatca 07.13.78 
Huarahuara Ccatca 07.12.29 
Kcauri Ccatca 03.29.65 
Q'espe Cruz de Ausaray Ccatca 02.28.78 
Quisinsaya Ccatca 01.28.78 
Sacayhuamán Ccatca 12.29.77 
Ulpo Ccatca 01.05.78 
Yaccacheta Ccatca 12.30.77 
Yurac Mayo Ccatca 05.15.80 
Chilühuani Cusipata 03.21.57 
Moccoraise Cusipata 02.28.65 
Pata Ccolcca Cusipata 10.03.66 
Tintico Cusipata 03.08.62 
Yaucat Cusipata 06.18.65 
Sullumayo Huaro 03.19.80 
Pucará de Ccolcaqui Lucre 01.20.81 
Collasuyo Marcapata 02.11.27 
Huarocconi Marcapata 03.15.84 
Marcapata Collana Marcapata 11.21.55 
Puyca Marcapata 08.18.56 
Sahuancay Marcapata 02.11.27 
Accocunca Ocongate 07.13.78 
Jullicunca Ocongate 12.28.76 
Lahua Lahua Chinchayhuasi Ocongate 12.30.77 
Llullucha Ocongate 07.13.78 
Palcca Ocongate 03.23.82 
Pinchimuro Ocongate 08.31.81 
Choqquepata Oropeza 03.11.27 
Huasao Oropeza 05.20.74 
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Pinagua Oropeza 07.19.65 
Accopata Quiquijana 06.16.75 
Callatiac Quiquijana 02.14.40 
Ccolcca Quiquijana 11.30.28 
Hayuni Quiquijana 11.06.84 
Huaccaytaqui Quiquijana 07.04.66 
Llampa Quiquijana 11.18.27 
Pata Qqehuar y Pampa Qqehuar Quiquijana 10.27.36 
Pata Sachac y Llacta Sachac Quiquijana 03.07.46 
Quiquijana Quiquijana 07.19.65 
Ttío Quiquijana 05.28.76 
Urinccoscco Quiquijana 11.25.42 
Usi Quiquijana 03.01.65 
Ccoñamuro Urcos 04.16.26 
Ccata Cámara Urcos 08.03.28 
Huancara Urcos 09.23.68 
Machacca Urcos 04.22.68 
Mollebamba Urcos 04.17.80 
Muñapata Urcos 05.05.78 
Pampa Cámara Urcos 07.12.29 
Pampachulla Urcos 06.15.76 
Paroccan* Urcos 03.13.74 
Sonccomarca Urcos 01.14.27 
Umuto Urcos 05.04.64 
Urcospampa Urcos 03.13.80 
Source: Díaz Gómez, Jorge. "Economía Campesina 
Cusco-Perú". Tarea, Lima, 1987, p. 155-156. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Peasant Community of Paroccan 
The Peasant Community of Paroccan is located on the banks of the Vilcanota River, 
ten kilometres from Urcos, the capital of Quispicanchi Province. Geographically, it is 
located on a plateau between the hillsides which provide Paroccan with a large 
diversity of farm lands and products, its total area being 848.75 hectares. Actually, the 
community is in a privileged location, since the road passes through the community, 
connecting it with higher communities and settlements. All this makes Paroccan an 
important meeting point for merchants and peasants who travel to the Urcos market. 
Paroccan is inhabited by 45 families and 163 registered comuneros in the Mother 
Community. Almost 50 families live in its two anexos: Ch'eqollo and Chiccani. The 
anexo is a small village near the peasant community, composed of members of the 
Mother Community, on which it is administratively and productively dependent. At 
present, the community has certain integration problems with Ch'eqollo, since some 
members of this anexo want to separate from the Mother Community. 
4.1 History 
Historically, the geographical location of Paroccan has protected it from land 
usurpation by the haciendas. According to oral history, it has existed since Colonial 
times. Therefore, the community occupied its lands before the agrarian reform" but 
was only officially recognized as a peasant community on March 13, 1974, during the 
Administration of General Juan Velasco, almost six years after the Agrarian Reform 
Law was enacted. The community finally obtained its title deeds in 1988. 
The majority of the comuneros involved in the recognition of Paroccan have their 
roots in this community. Most of the comuneros' parents were born in Paroccan. 
Hence, historical kinship relations are part of their background. 
" However, we could not find a more detailed history of the community, due to a lack of sources, so we 
have focused our attention on its recent history. 
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4.2 Infrastructure 
This community is one of the most developed in the region, having electricity and 
running water in the lower level houses. The community has had electricity for fifteen 
years. They obtained this service with the help of Electro Sur and Ccaijo2'. Electro 
Sur, a State office that provides electricity to the southern region of Peru, contributed 
the equipment and the comuneros themselves took care of installing the connections. It 
also obtained running water and drains in the sixties, thanks to the economic help of 
Cooperación Popular, a State institution established during Fernando Belaunde's 
administration, the principal function of which was to contribute to improvements in 
the peasant communities and urban settlements (Pueblos Jóvenes or Human 
Settlements), with the direct cooperation of the beneficiaries themselves. 
The comuneros have medical facilities at the hospital in Urcos, but have to walk 
about ten kilometers to see the doctor. However, they also receive periodic visits from 
medical personnel, who vaccinate the children and teach the comuneros some basic 
principles about first aid and preventive medicine. Paroccan also has some public 
buildings, like the Communal Centre (built with its own resources), which has room 
for Communal Assembly meetings as well as for social reunions and parties. 
The peasants' illiteracy level is not very high (15%). Many of the peasants have 
attended elementary school, usually up to fourth or fifth grade. At the present time, 
the community has a PRONOEI -a communal kindergarten, where all the pre-school 
age children between three and five years old are educated. It also has an elementary 
school, built in the sixties by the comuneros themselves, with the assistance of 
Cooperación Popular. Thus, children can attend school up to the fourth grade. The 
older children go to the State school in Urcos, located some twenty minutes walk from 
the community. A few young people go to college, and many others have finished 
their studies at technical schools, like the Police School, or have become agricultural 
experts. Such is the case of the present President of the "Club of Semillaristas" 
(Seeders). 
Migration is low; almost all the comuneros work and live in the community, and 
there is only temporary migration, when youngsters between fifteen and twenty years 
of age usually migrate to Cuzco, Arequipa or Lima, or go to work temporarily in the 
gold mines of Puerto Maldonado (capital of the nearby department of Madre de Dios). 
Moreover, we even heard of a few youths who migrated to a farm in the midwestern 
United States a few years ago3'. 
A Non Governmental Organization which provides agricultural help and technical training to the zone. 
3 ) This is not a singular case: Altarmirano (1992) shows that young Peruvians have migrated to the 
United States, Australia and Canada to become farm labourers. 
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4.3 Paroccan's Social Organization 
4.3.1 The Communal Organization 
The Community of Paroccan is formally organized according to the terms of Article 
16 of the General Law on Peasant Communities (Law 24656). Its organs of 
government are: the General Assembly, the Executive Council and some Specialized 
Committees: the Irrigation Committee, the Roads Committee, the Groves Committee, 
the Seeders Committee and the Mothers Club. Each anexo is organized and ruled by 
the decisions of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, some of these anexos have a sort 
of internal communal organization. 
However, the basic structure and dynamism of the legal organization are based on 
family relationships. Since the community has existed for a long time, the older 
families maintain possession of their plots of land. This, of course, strengthens the 
family position in the community, especially if the plots are of considerable size in 
terms of the community's territory. Furthermore, even when production is carried out 
on an individual basis, the exercise of each one's rights depends on the quality of 
internal relations, mainly through family alliances that might have developed. 
The importance of the original families within the communal organization is also 
strengthened by State law. The General Law on Peasant Communities establishes 
different types of comuneros who participate in the communal organization. Article 5 
of Law 24656 distinguishes three kinds of comunero: 
a) "originarios" (born in the community), 
b) children of these comuneros; and 
c) those integrated into the community. 
Only a) and b) are qualified comuneros, provided they comply with the following 
requirements: 
a) To be of adult age 
b) To have lived for a minimum of five years in the community 
c) Not to be a member of any other community 
d) To be registered in the communal landholding census ("padron comunal") 
e) To comply with the conditions set out in the communal statutes. 
Integrated comuneros are individuals who were not originally part of the community. 
They can be foreign males or females who have married -or are related- to a member 
of the community. There are also others who have applied for acceptance as 
comuneros by the General Assembly. This social differentiation is very important, 
since it determines access to land and participation in the above-mentioned communal 
organization. 
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The last legal requirement (to comply with the conditions set out in the communal 
statute) enables the community to establish more requirements and hence to control the 
incorporation of members. In Paroccan, for example, the statute establishes three 
requisites: residence in the place, direct exploitation of the plots allocated to them and 
participation in communal tasks. In this way, the organization of the peasant 
community allows the comuneros to rationalize communal production, to control 
management of resources and to have access to new ones. 
As we will see, the external relations between communities and other agencies are 
a crucial aspect of their organization. Certain community authorities play a mediator's 
role between it and external entities or political authorities. They are particularly 
important in dealing with claims of local elite groups involving irrigation water and 
unpaid labour services, and in obtaining some advantages from the local, regional or 
national agencies, such as credits, food aid, etc., which could not be obtained 
otherwise. Therefore, these authorities -such as the the President of the Community-
must comply with additional requirements, aside from those of State law, in order to 
perform their role, such as knowing how to read and write, have a high school or 
even college education, have political or union experience, etc. 
4.3.2 The General Assembly 
The General Assembly has various functions in the Peasant Community. It is the 
highest governing body, making the principal decisions affecting the life of the peasant 
community. 
The General Law on Peasant Communities, in Article 18, gives this organ the 
power of decision-making, reform and interpreting the internal By-laws; to choose and 
remove members of the Executive Council and of the Specialized Committees; to 
approve the establishment of communal enterprises; to apply for adjudication of lands; 
to authorize sales or transactions of lands and to rule as defunct the possession of 
non-exploited family parcels. Besides these, the Assembly performs other tasks, such 
as deciding on the admission of new members, the elaboration of the annual 
agricultural schedule, and the settlement of disputes between comuneros that can affect 
communal life4). The way the community's profits are distributed or used, is also 
decided at the General Assembly. 
Consideration must be given to the degree of participation of community members 
in the administrative body. Usually there is no active participation that permits them 
proper ménagement of communal resources. In the first place, it should be noted that 
according to State and local Andean law, only qualified comuneros have the authority 
to speak and vote in the decision-making process. Integrated comuneros have the right 
4 1 As a consequence, this organ also has the ability to punish those comuneros who do not fulfil (or 
execute) the communal agreements. 
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to participate but not to vote in the General Assembly. Thus, they may intervene in 
collective decision-making, but in a minor way. 
In fact, the degree of participation is rather low. Many comuneros -either qualified 
or integrated- practically do not participate in any communal activity. Most of them do 
not have enough time or interest in attending constant General Assemblies. Thus, the 
dynamics of the communal organisation are based only on certain members, mainly 
those on the Executive Council. 
4.3.3 The Executive Council 
Although formally, the General Assembly is the most important organ in the peasant 
community, we find that the Executive Council and the President of the Community 
are the ones making the significant decisions concerning daily affairs affecting the 
community's life. This is because it is not so easy to call General Assembly meetings, 
and there are always short term problems to be solved. 
In this way, the Executive Council not only has executive functions but also, and 
principally, decision-making functions. It is the entity that decides on the acquisition 
of land, the incorporation of new members, the distribution of communal tasks, the 
settlement of disputes -when appealed to- licences for comuneros who temporarily 
emigrate outside the community and management of the communal production, among 
other things. In some cases, the Council coordinates with the specialized committees 
to carry out the mentioned duties.5) 
According to Law 24656, the Executive Council comprises at least six members: 
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and four directors. The composition of the Council in 
Paroccan is according to this Article. These posts may be held for a period of two 
years, and members may be reelected for a similar period. To be elected a member of 
the Executive Council, the comuneros must comply with the following requirements: 
a) To have the right to vote; 
b) To be a qualified comunero; 
c) To be registered in the landholding census 
d) To master the community's native tongue; and 
e) To enjoy all statutory rights and obligations. 
However, there exist other factors apart from those mentioned, that are taken into 
account when electing authorities. In the first place, the qualified comuneros are the 
only ones who have access to important positions in the community. A second factor 
is their knowledge of the Spanish language, both officially and administratively. 
Sometimes, it is learned while holding a post, but in other cases some leaders have 
This role is also supported by State law: Law 24656 states, in Article 19, that the Directive 
(Executive) Council is the organ in charge of the government and administration of the community. 
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learned it thanks to previous market experience or experience with State agencies. A 
third important factor is that of contacts or influence that the elected directors have in 
these agencies, or in private entities, in order to obtain better profits than other 
communities. This prestige is achieved, among other things, by showing a great and 
willing capacity for participation in the administrative organization of the communities 
or in the political arena in the microregion. 
Moreover, in Paroccan the traditional system of "job rotation" exists. The qualified 
comuneros successively assume, throughout their lifetime, various positions on the 
Executive Council, culminating in the position of Community President. Although this 
system prevents possible power struggles, it also prevents the possible emergence of 
other leaders. 
4.3.4 Specialized Committees 
The General Law on Peasant Communities only mentions these committees briefly. 
Nevertheless, there is enough room in the law which leaves organization and 
regulation to the comuneros themselves, through the local Andean Law and its 
By-laws. In this way, the administration and distribution of communal resources, 
especially of land and water, production activities, public services (like roads) and 
other aspects of communal life are carried out through these Committees. 
For example, although water is a natural resource which constitutionally belongs to 
the State, its administration is usually carried out by the governing Irrigation 
Committees. These are community committees on water control recognized by the 
State. 
In Paroccan, the Irrigation Committee is presided by the Arbiter of Waters, a 
comunero elected by the General Assembly. He organizes the irrigation shifts, 
according to the register, and distributes the "bills of irrigation" among the 
comuneros. This distribution organizes the agreed upon shifts for each parcel. 
In other committees, like the Seeders Committee or the Mothers Club, young 
people are the leaders. This can be explained, because unlike the previous Commitee, 
where the accumulated knowledge on irrigation and production is fundamental, what is 
needed in these latter ones is the handling of new techniques such as the use of sewing 
machines or seed production. In some cases this can create certain friction or conflicts 
in the community, since the "old" comuneros are the ones who usually occupy and 
dominate the important positions in the communal power structure. But these conflicts 
are usually soon resolved. 
However, the presence of young people in these communal bodies leads to three 
important consequences: first of all, the young comuneros are far more vigorous, and, 
as a result, the community obtains better profits. In the second place, they have gained 
great experience in the management of communal affairs, which will make them more 
skillful when they finally take charge of the central bodies. And thirdly, the 
relationships between these committees and external agencies enable youths to initiate 
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bonds and alliances with authorities of private and public offices. Therefore, the 
Committees can be considered an initial phase within the community's power structure 
and job rotation system that permits youths to increase their social and political 
participation and channel their access to posts of greater responsibility within the 
community. 
4.4 The Organisation of Land and Labour 
4.4.1 The Landholding System 
At the present time, the Paroccan landholding structure contains as many elements of 
local Andean Law as of State law. The relations between both allows us to see more 
exactly the way in which the system functions in Paroccan. 
In terms of State provisions (for example, the By-laws for Peasant Communities, 
or the General Law on Peasant Communities), the community land, legally called 
territory, belongs to it as a legal entity. When the peasant community is recognized by 
the pertinent central State agency, the community is also considered as a legal entity. 
After its recognition, the Paroccan authorities could represent the community before 
the MunicipaUty, the Ministry of Agriculture offices, and political institutions, and 
even contact any other individual or agency in order to request title deeds, credit, 
State aid, etc. 
Paroccan's economic production, as in other communities in the subregion, is 
closely J inked to the type and strength of the communal organization. The degree of 
communal influence is measured through the participation of individual households in 
farming land in compliance with the rules relating to the use of communal resources. 
Land distribution, the farm calendar and the use of the communal labour force, are 
decided by Paroccan's communal authorities through the General Assembly. First of 
all, the annual distribution of land parcels is carried out according to the number of 
family heads. Some of the lands are redistributed each year, due to the quality of the 
land and in order to avoid erosion. There is a system for rotation of communal land or 
family parcels. In other communities the land is distributed each season in order to 
change those parcels which have been farmed recently and are fallow. This exchange 
of lands means they can be recovered and exploited once again. In this regard the 
community the community respects individual or family possession and in addition 
periodical redistributes part of the communal lands. 
In Paroccan we observed that the community tries to distribute land according to the 
number of comuneros and their needs. When distribution is made, the location and 
features of the plots are taken into account. The community tries to provide each 
comunero with enough land to farm more than one product, women exercising the 
same holding rights over the land, although most plots are still held by men. Most 
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families kept the same plots, their size was respected, but in some cases families were 
given new rotating plots. 
Under State law, the comuneros do not have ownership as individuals of the plot 
they hold, because it is a communal one. In this sense, each comunero has only 
holding and usufruct of a plot of the peasant community's land. Therefore, they cannot 
sell or buy any plot that belongs to the community. 
However, according to local Andean law, the community's property is not an 
absolute right, because the comuneros believe that they, as individuals, own the 
property of the plot they are farming. This normative notion of Andean law is 
reinforced also by a practical aspect: the possibility that the comuneros have to decide 
the products they are to sow and how to market them, as we have seen above. The 
possession of land can be obtained in Paroccan by some Andean law institutions, 
which are recognized by the peasant community. They are: 
a) Recovery. This means that if a parcel is not farmed by its usufructuary for more 
than seven years and another comunero farms it, the former loses his usufruct and the 
parcel is given to the one who cultivated it. 
b) Inheritance occurs when a comunero's possessions are inherited by his children. 
As people in Paroccana said: "When a comunero dies, his land is distributed among 
his children, who have all the rights that pertained to their parent...". Inheritance is 
carried out on a family basis and the community authorities respect these decisions. 
For inheritance purposes families are integrated by husband and wife and children. 
Widows and widowers have preferential rights over children. 
c) Assignment. The General Assembly can assign lands to a non-land owning 
comunero who requests a parcel of land. As people in Paroccan said: "In the case of 
young comuneros who have no land we try to give them a small parcel here or at the 
annexos; "it is difficult for us to give land to youngsters, since what we have is 
scarce, so we try to recover lost parcels (those that are unused) to be farmed by the 
young"; "we do not have enough land to distribute among the youngsters. It is 
common for a plot to be farmed by two or more brothers...". 
The question of the sale of parcels clearly shows the content of communal ideology 
regarding ownership of the land. At the present time, the sale of land is the most 
important way of transmitting land in Paroccan. Since the comunero believes that he 
has the right to transfer his plot, he can contract and sell his plot to another comunero. 
In this case he usually informs the communal authorities about the contract. He knows 
about and is influenced by the official law. Nevertheless, regarding ownership rights 
they do not necessarily consider the law official in their legal transactions. 
In the past these transfers were made orally, since spoken language was the basis 
for local Andean law. In those times what was said was more important than what was 
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written. However, the progressive introduction of the written word as a new way of 
transfer -sale of lands- changed the meaning of oral forms, and sales were carried out 
in the form of written contracts. 
In this process, we can find different responses from the different protagonists. On 
one hand, as a general rule, the peasant community authorities and members consider 
these contracts as legal, but only when both persons involved in the contract are 
comuneros of the same community. If the buyer is not a comunero, the community 
does not recognize the contract, unless there are certain pre-existing conditions 
regarding his integration into the community. These conditions are: 
a) To have lived five or more years in the community and have participated in the 
community's work; or 
b) To be married to a woman who is part of the community. 
In a case where neither of these conditions was fulfilled, the community tried to 
recover the plot, and the buyer, to defend his "property". The matter was referred to 
the State Court, which handed down its decision that the buyer was not recognized as 
the owner, but would have the right to "hold" the plot. In other cases, the State Court 
decision is based on a different interpretation of State law which does not recognize 
the buyer as having any rights at all. In such case the transaction is not recognized as 
valid. 
Again we observe contradictory behaviour on the part of the State agency as 
follows. Legally, the State agencies should consider this contract void, that is without 
legal effect, since the transferred plot did not belong to the comunero, but to the 
peasant community. Officially, the State and state law are supposed to protect the 
community, and avoid the accumulation of communal property through power 
concentrations. To sum up, the validity of sales in the community depended upon each 
particular case: whether the parties were members or not of the community, their 
social and economic position in the community and their prestige, etc. 
The State courts, the Notary Public and the Justice of the Peace, in some cases 
legalize or recognize the contracts, in others they do not. Ambiguities in ideas and 
cases did not give us a clear conclusion about the behaviour of State Courts and the 
Notary Public. Although they have to take State law into consideration, in some cases 
they also legalize or recognise these private contracts in cases of controversy. 
4.5 Production 
Even though each comunero decides, according to his own needs, the product or 
products he needs to farm, the community establishes the farming calendar and the 
turn in which each parcel is meant to be farmed, taking into account, too, the turns for 
distribution of water. Each comunero is bound to help in the sowing and harvesting of 
each parcel, but the products of each one will belong to the comunero who benefits 
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from it. Not all the comuneros help all the others, but it might be so in Paroccan; but 
generally there are two processes: on one hand each comunero calls on his relations or 
neighbors to cultivate his lands -mutual aid or ayni- and on the other hand everyone 
participates when dealing with communal lands or tasks which correspond to 
everyone, such as cleaning the irrigation channels. Comuneros in Paroccan produce 
Andean products like potatoes, corn, wheat, beans, green peas, barley and lambs 
wool. They cultivate all these products on a family or a communal basis. 
The community also decides the distribution of the labour force, in order to make 
sure each plot is farmed adequately and properly. Most of the peasants participate with 
their labour, in either the sowing or harvesting seasons, but during the rest of the 
agricultural period each comunero has to farm his own plot by himself. Cooperation in 
the farming process is an important aspect of the "community-effect"6', which is 
explained by Gonzales de Olarte: 
"...the "work group" has a series of advantages over individual work, in terms 
of production results and in facing the more difficult stages of the production 
process" (Gonzalez de Olarte 1986:227). 
As Long and Roberts argue, the persistence of these ways is best explained, not 
because they represent remnants of "traditional" behaviour, or of primitive 
communism, but because they are some of the basic means for ensuring continuity and 
survival of the peasant household system (1978: 308). 
An example of this mode of cooperation is found in the communal garden. This 
garden is a parcel, property of the peasant community, which is farmed by all the 
comuneros and the products of which are divided equally among them, or sold to 
obtain resources for the community's needs (i.e. to build a communal school, to get 
public services, etc.). This land is farmed by all the male comuneros -and in some 
cases, by widows- who have to cooperate with this labour each week, usually on 
Saturdays. Comuneros who lack parcels also have to cooperate with the communal 
work; these comuneros are called "collaborators": "Once a week each compañero 
(companion) has to help with labour in the communal garden, in order to raise more 
resources for the community...". "Work in the communal garden is performed by all 
the male comuneros. Only in certain cases does a widow have to carry out the work 
which corresponded to her husband...". 
The total production of all Paroccan members is distributed in three different ways: 
a large part is destined for self-consumption, and another part to barter for other 
products from nearby communities. In this case the comunero exchanges some 
products (tarwi, barley and maize) with nearby communities. Some of them travel to 
8 Gonzales de Olarte defines the "community-effect" as the total of the higher economic profits (whether 
productive, income or welfare) that the peasant families can obtain by communal work, in contrast of 
working individually (1986:19). 
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the higher communities taking some products, such as sugar, rice, clothes and shoes, 
in order to exchange them for other products, that are not found in the lower lands. 
Only approximately 20 percent of the total production is sold at the Urcos market. 
Here, marketing may be on an individual or communal basis, but the communal 
garden produce will be sold by the social organization. In the first case, the income 
goes directly to the comunero and his family. The comuneros travel once a week to 
Urcos with a few arrobas sacks7', which they carry on mule or llama back. This 
production is sold to merchants from Sicuani and Juliaca8'. The comuneros also sell 
their products at the annual Urcos Fair, which takes place in early February. The 
community products sold at the market provide some income towards the community 
budget. Most of the communal garden produce is sold to obtain financial resources for 
the community, but should not all the production be sold, it is distributed equally 
among the poorest comuneros. 
4.6 Paroccan's Recognition and Titling Procedures 
4.6.1 The Recognition Procedure 
At the time Paroccan initiated its application for recognition, a transition was actually 
taking place between the former Statute approved in 1966, during the first 
Administration of Fernando Belaunde (Supreme Decree 011-A) and that enacted in 
1970 by the military government. 
The first Statute was, in fact, a continuation of the early procedures for community 
recognition9', incorporating additional changes. First of all, this Statute faced new 
requirements with respect to Supreme Decree No. 998. According to this, a 
community should present the following information: the community's timespan of 
existence; the original title deeds; the villages and anexos - which are part of the 
community; the total extension of the communal territory, indicating sources of water, 
lakes, ponds, springs, rivers and brooks which flow into and by it; highways, roads, 
paths and other ways of communication; types of crops cultivated (Art. 1). The new 
Statute also requires data on handicraft activities, as well as the community's natural 
Arroba: Weight of twenty-five pounds (about eleven and a half kilograms). 
8 ) Both cities are important commercial axis of the southern region. The first is located in Cuzco, and the 
second is placed in the nearby department of Puno. 
9 1 Which are: Supreme Resolution of August 28, 1925 (which created the Public Registries); Supreme 
Decree of June 24, 1938; Supreme Decree No. 008 of May 10, 1961 and Supreme Decree No. 1 of July 7, 
1964. For further details of these laws, see Costa, 1981, p. 70-75. 
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resources (Art. 8) 1 0 ) . Article 7 added to the obligation to prove possession of lands, 
the subsistence of communal work and mutual aid regimes among the comuneros. 
As stated above, the legitimacy and existence of this law was out of touch with the 
promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1969, mainly because Article 124 of this 
law established that "special By-laws would regulate the organization and functioning 
of the peasant communities, ruling their economic regime, form of government, 
common services and other institutions pertaining thereto". These new By-laws were 
promulgated on February 17, 1970. 
The peasant community of Paroccan applied to the Ministry of Labour and Peasant 
Communities for official recognition and registration on February 9, 1970, only eight 
days before the new By-laws were enacted. Therefore, at first, the application was not 
accepted, because the regional officers did not even know the terms of the newly 
enacted By-laws. 
The peasant community once more presented its application, attaching the 
following documents: 
1. A census record, certified by a Notary Public. 
2. A certified Deed of the Minutes of the General Assembly, approving the 
communal decision to require its official recognition, by the majority of the 
Assembly members. 
In this Deed, the community requested the Ministry of Labour and Peasant 
Communities for official recognition as a peasant community and appointed its 
representatives or attorneys. The attorneys played a key part in the proceedings. 
Usually, the attorney is a well-known and respected member of the community and he 
may or may not be a member of the Executive Council. He must have the people's 
trust; be literate and know how to deal with people and problems. He might have to 
travel to the State's regional authorities and even to Lima, where final decisions might 
be made. 
All these documents were prepared during an extended preliminary stage, requiring 
the participation of the community members both during the carrying out of the census 
as well as at the General Assembly. At this time, the Executive Council was 
responsible for preparing the documents proving the community's ownership of the 
lands; and the census required by Article 14 of the By-laws of Peasant Communities 
(Supreme Decree 37-7-A). 
During the communal census, a serious disagreement arose between the comuneros 
and the bureaucrats carrying out this task, about the criteria used for registration of 
1 ' According to Costa, the permanent increase in the information required "indicates the interest of the 
State in receiving more detailed information about the reality of the communities. In 1925 it asked for 
information about four issues; in 1938, about seven issues; in 1961, about ten issues and in 1966 about 
twelve issues" (1981:75). To us, the State's interest in these matters really shows a desire for more 
intervention, rather than better proposals. 
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parcel owners. There was a dispute regarding the criteria for considering a peasant as 
a registered comunero in the census. In principle, the responsible functionaries wanted 
to include in the census all those peasants who were in possession of a parcel. They 
were not always well informed of different land transsactions which had been made in 
the community. They also did not invest too much time in seeking out all the details of 
these transactions. For their part, the communal authorities alleged that they should 
adhere to the communal landowner register, which clearly set out who were 
comuneros and who were not, since in many cases the peasants had rented their 
parcels to foreign or family third parties, with the risk that the latter might be 
considered to be comuneros11'*. 
Finally, with the support of the Executive Council, these peasants were not 
considered members of the community. The Executive Council was an important 
source of information. This problem points to the fact that some conflicts also arose 
within the community. The struggle to be included in the census was important for all 
peasants, in order to acquire rights before the State authorities and to consolidate then-
status in the community. The disputes almost resulted in the failure of the process, but 
were finally solved by the local State authorities in charge of the process and the 
community's directors. 
Thus, the desire to be recognized by the regional authorities forced the peasants to 
make concessions and agree among themselves, and to redefine their strategies. In the 
first case, internal disputes were suspended for a short period in order to facilitate the 
development of the legal process. On the other hand, the influence of the State's local 
authorities on the redefinition of the local legal criteria, show us how easily this 
semi-autonomous field could be penetrated by State law. 
This need to be recognized can be better explained in the peasants' own words: "It 
started with the need to possess land, guaranteed in the face of anybody else who 
would like to take possession of our land; that is, to possess parcels without any legal 
threat or problem...1 2'. "It was not the economic factor which brought us to the 
titling of our land, but a consequence of the uncertainty over the legality of the rights 
we have to these lands...". "The need to have access to the subregional market comes 
from the competition among communities of the zone, and from our legality...We only 
'" The disagreement can be better explained in Lipsky's words: "Street level bureaucrats confront 
problems in which they must make significant decisions about people and complex situations, without being 
able fully to interrogate people or investigate the background of their claims. The assertions of other 
professionals who presumably know their jobs, and are charged with responsibility for making appropriate 
assessments in their own work, provide significant and legitimate cues to decision—making, in the absence 
of other sources of information." (1980:130-131). 
1 2 ) The belief that State officers could guarantee the process would secure the property of their land is 
based on the myth that things are done in order to help the applicant's welfare. 
"One source of the myth of service altruism is social policy reformers who utilize the discrepancy 
between reality and stated policy intentions to mobilize support for change. Virtually all policy reforms are 
advocated in the name of achieving service ideals" (Lipsky 1980:72). 
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need to be accepted by our neighbours as a community which possesses certain 
well-defined boundaries: the development of the community will be a consequence of 
this..." "the legality of our lands is a common interest, since it is fundamental for the 
peasant to live linked to the land..". 
When we asked about the political factors which influenced this decision, the 
peasants usually answered in the negative: "Politics is not seen in the countryside, it is 
marginalized: what is important to us is to develop the community without the 
intervention of politicians..." "The idea of titling our lands was not influenced by our 
customs but by the State's norms... 1 3 ). 
On April 1, 1970, the community applied to the Director of the Agrarian Zone for 
recognition of its census. This officer applied to the Sub-Director of the Agrarian 
Reform and Rural Affairs, who then applied to the Head of the Office of Peasant 
Communities in Lima. 
On April 20, 1971, the Office of Peasant Communities recognized the "communal 
attorneys", Agustin Ccarhuarupay Ttito and Claudio Huaman Toma, but advised them 
to follow the provisions of Articles 11, 13 and 14 of the By-Laws for Peasant 
Communities. The norms for State recognition were the following: 
Article 11 
Unrecognized peasant communities can carry out the procedures for their recognition 
and registration by means of an attorney authorized by the Communal General 
Assembly and legalized by a Notary Public. 
Article 13 
For recognition, the community must: 
a) Have title deeds to its land, or otherwise prove its possession; 
b) constitute a social group, according to the norms of Article 2 of the By-Laws I4 ); 
and 
c) have the approval of two-thirds of the General Assembly participants. 
Article 14 
For recognition, the peasant community should enclose with its appeal to the Office of 
Peasant Communities, the above mentioned titles, along with the following documents: 
1 Some authors, such as Luis Pasara (1982) argue that the comuneros had little information about the 
existing legislation, but they knew that the State could recognize their property if they fulfilled all the legal 
requirements for the community's recognition. 
1 4 ) This article defined the peasant community in the following terms: "The peasant community is a group 
of families which possess and are identified with a defined territory, and which are also linked by common 
social and cultural features by communal work and mutual aid; and, basically, by agricultural and related 
activities. 
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a) A census and other data, concerning its population, according to the requirements 
of this Office; 
b) a map of the communal area showing boundaries sketched by the Office of Rural 
Real Estate, of the General Agrarian Reform and Rural Settlement Office; 
Nevertheless, Paroccan's attorneys had all the documents in order to continue with the 
legal procedure. Their understanding was: "We needed to secure our boundaries; the 
existence of the community is recognized by our neighbours, but if a landowner from 
Urcos is interested in our land, he will probably win the case. That is why we 
followed all the Ministry's demands, since the legality of our property has to be 
guaranteed by a State resolution...". 
On 3 May 1971, the application of the community was rejected. However they were 
not formally notified. They heard of this decision because the "communal attorneys" 
went directly to the Office of Peasant Communities. Then they appealed. The 
community was told that its file had not been sent on to the Agrarian Reform Office in 
Lima. On 11 May, the community desperately asked President Juan Velasco for their 
recognition (Memoire No. 18581-5)15'. Directorate Resolution of 7 July 1971, 
ordered the remittance of the community's file to the Agrarian Zone Office in Cuzco 
in order to continue its processing, according to the norms of the By-laws for Peasant 
Communities (Articles 10 to 22). 
The usual procedure was that the Agrarian Administration in Cuzco was the office that 
had jurisdiction for solving Paroccan's request, before the case could have gone to 
Lima. Nevertheless the regional authorities followed specific directives from the 
central authorities in Lima in order to continue with Paroccan's processing. 
According to Article 15 of the By-laws16', the Agrarian Reform Office notified 
the neighbours Maria Jesus Widow Solmes, the owner of the Paucar Hacienda, and 
Walter Luna Venero, attorney of the peasant community of Sallac of the Recognition 
of Boundaries Procedure. On December 21, 1971, the Office reported the following 
agreements: 
1) Maria Jesus Widow Solmes did not oppose the recognition of the boundaries, 
since: 
- she recognized the long-standing existence of the community; 
- she argued that the boundaries between her property and Paroccan were clearly 
established and that there had never been any conflict regarding same. 
In this Memoire the community argues that Paroccan had all the legal documents in order to be 
recognized as a peasant community. 
l" This article ordered confirmation of the enclosed data by the Office of Peasant Communities, through a 
physical inspection of the zone, notifying the neighbouring owners, and the Office of National Properties of 
this act. 
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2) Landholder Widow Solmes ratified the maps of official real estate delimitation, 
sketched by the Agrarian Reform Office, which established the boundaries between 
both properties; 
3) The peasant community of Sallac recognized the boundaries between them and 
Paroccan, as well as the maps of the official real estate records. 
The Act of Recognition of Boundaries between Paroccan and the peasant communities 
of Conamuro and Munapata was signed on December 10, 1971. These communities 
also confirmed the legal recognition of Paroccan, and accepted their boundaries. The 
Acts of Delimitation of Boundaries between Paroccan and the Pre-Cooperative Santa 
Rita de Sallac, the peasant communities of Senceccalla, Conamuro and Munapata and 
the Paucar Hacienda, were later signed in different sessions. 
Recognition of Paroccan by the nearby communities can be explained not only by 
its "long-standing existence" in the zone but rather by the economic relations it had 
with the other higher communities. This relation is understandable, when we observe 
that the road that joins these communities goes right through Paroccan, making this 
community the center of the zone's economic activity. 
It is necessary to point out that, regarding Sallac, there were certain problems, since 
their boundaries were not well defined. This problem is not mentioned in the file, 
since it was solved by both communities privately, according to custom. As a peasant 
said: 
"We had a problem with Sallac, but we did not apply to any State official or 
magistrate; we solved it by ourselves, according to our ancient custom...". 
On the basis of these Deeds, ORAMS VII, the bureaucratic office in charge of this 
legal procedure finally recognized the peasant community of Paroccan and ordered its 
registration in the National Peasant Communities Registry. 
4.6.2 The Social Significance of State Recognition 
The legal procedure briefly described above permits us to analyze the relationships 
and practices existing among the social protagonists involved. Technically the 
recognition is a legal process in which a community has administrative existence for 
the State authorities. It is very important to the comuneros because official recognition 
gives access to important resources such as bank credits or State aid, and helps to 
achieve communal expectations such as being legally sure of their lands and a new 
status. For the State agencies, it is also advisable because, from the point of view of 
their administrative obligations it is easier to deal with a recognized or formal peasant 
community. The recognition of Paroccan was a significant step in the development of 
the social identity of this peasant community. They were paid more attention by State 
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authorities and their neighbours. For example, they began as a community to be 
considered in the State's social programs, or the peasants had greater expectations as 
individuals when they asked for credit. 
Although the process took into account the boundaries of Paroccan, it did not imply 
the titling of the peasant community after it was legally recognized and entered in the 
National Peasant Communities Registry. The title deeds procedure could not be 
initiated until 1987. Nevertheless, the recognition and registration process was not just 
symbolic. The regional and central authorities began to give more importance to 
Paroccan's demands, because within the context of the agrarian reform, political, 
national and regional authorities were interested in the peasants' political support. 
But we cannot find direct political or legal intervention practices by the State in 
Paroccan17), since the comuneros are the ones who apply directly for recognition to 
the agrarian administration, and not the other way around. This can be explained 
partly because the State was more interested in the formation of cooperative 
enterprises than in recognizing peasant communities, whose social and cultural 
organization was not really understood by urban law makers. 
But a type of intervention can be found, which we could call a "directive" -in 
Long and Winders' terms18', since it is the State that establishes and enforces the 
requirements and procedures for the community's recognition. As we have shown, 
these requirements increase as time passes, and therefore they are increasingly difficult 
for the communities to comply with. The only space they had any possibility of 
negotiating was agreement with their neighbours on boundaries. 
Regarding the behaviour of the State regional officers in charge of the legal 
procedure, we observed that they behaved eminently legalistic, that is, they only took 
care of the norms established by the By-laws for Peasant Communities, showing a 
bureaucratic position, without looking for the legal basis which supported the 
community's assertion. This behavior explains why they delayed the procedure on 
several occasions, both at the beginning as well as during the different stages of the 
legal process. 
In the first phase, the regional officers had limited and unilateral information for 
processing the application, since the By-Laws had recently been promulgated. From 
my personal experience as a central State officer, I conclude that the way in which 
n "Intervention" is seen in existing models as a discreet set of activities that take place within a defined 
time—space setting involving the interaction between so-called "intervening" parties and "target" or 
"recipient" groups. Such an image isolates intervention from the continuous flow of social life and the 
ongoing relations evolving among the various social protagonists (Long and Winder 1975:226-228). 
1 8 ) "Directive" change is characterized by centralized control and administration pattern, through which the 
objectives and implementation means are determined by government or international agencies. While this 
does not exclude the possibility of the beneficiaries or settlers participating in some decisions...all major 
decisions and the overall framework remain firmly in the hands of State officials..." (1981:82). 
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decisions are made by the Ministry of Agriculture is that the regional authorities 
usually expect internal directives or memoranda from the Central Government, after a 
general law is enacted.19' 
Thus, Paroccan's peasants were confronted with regional versions of State law. One 
was the regional authorities' version, while another came from Lima. Thus, we can 
argue that within State law there are different versions or ways of interpreting the 
legal norm, due to either political, geographical or economic reasons. There might 
also be difficulties in understanding or transmitting them within the zone. These 
problems worsen when the norms are recent or might have important consequences on 
the social and political way of life. In such cases, the National Agrarian Reform 
authorities were especially interested in the recognition of the peasant communities. In 
1971, the year Paroccan was recognized, this Reform was attacked by most of the 
political parties. 
It should be noted that, in the second phase, when Paroccan appealed the first 
decision concerning its recognition, there was not in principle a clear decision as to 
which administrative level had to admit Paroccan's appeal. The community's two 
attorneys were sent from one agency to another without receiving any specific reply. 
This situation considerably increased the cost of the process, because authorities and 
members of the community had to travel back and forth to Urcos, Cuzco and Lima, 
inquiring about their legal procedure without getting any reasonable answers. 
The recognition process turned into a political affair, since the community used 
different resources to pressure the central government such as some local and national 
authorities and other communities. The unified criteria and common interests of 
Paroccan, in this case helped persuade the new progressive central authorities to make 
the final decision, and order the regional administration to continue with the 
administrative process. 
Another feature observed in regional State officers is that they did not inform the 
community of the real procedural conditions. We can understand the officers' explicit 
interest in deliberately delaying the process. However, it can be explained better as a 
sign of the "routinization" of the procedure, the same treatment being offered at all 
steps. Regional bureaucrats did not even know whether they had to enforce the new 
By-laws for Peasant Communities or not, or how to do so. This behavior might be 
better understood when considering Lipsky, who explains: 
"Street-level practices ration service, organize the client's passage through 
bureaucracy and keep scarce organizational and personal resources...cases that 
deviate from routine proceedings are not exempt from "routinization", 
' Hence, recognition of a peasant community is a political and economic process, in which general 
statements are expected from the Ministry or the President, as well as a specific budget in order to start the 
new process. 
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however. Instead, street level bureaucracies call on additional practices to 
manage first-round cost of processing people in routine ways. These practices 
function to absorb dissatisfaction with common procedures, thereby permitting 
agencies to continue processing most of the cases routinely" (1980:133). 
After some cases have been solved, the State regional officers get used to enforcing a 
specific law, or giving them specific meanings and creating certain legal repertoires 
according to the regulations, memoranda and directives, the background of 
bureaucratic practices, the type of client they have, the difficulties of the application, 
etc. As a result, a local version of the State law is created. As F. von Benda-Beck-
mann states: 
"Villagers are thus confronted with local versions of State, which often have 
nothing to do with the original version. Their reaction to the local bureaucrats' 
demands or decisions depends on how they interpret the local and not the 
original version..." (1989:135). 
This local version is primarily based on the "routinization" of proceedings by the 
regional officers, but also on other factors. In the same way, the routinization might 
have been based on other motivations such as opposition of local elite groups to 
recognizing the legal capacity of the peasant communities and their organizations, 
since it gave them legal support in controlling the land. The central government's lack 
of interest in this recognition may be an additional factor explaining the 
"routinization" process at the regional level. Finally, we must say that the recognition 
process is not only a relationship between the community and the different levels of 
State administration. It is a socio-legal and political process although it is merely 
defined by State law as a technical procedure. The recognition process also requires a 
different type of agreement between the community and its neighbours, which may, in 
a legal, social and political way, previously recognize the community. 
4.6.3 The Titling Procedure 
Paroccan and other communities had to wait for more than fifteen years to gain access 
to titling of their lands. (As mentioned previously, this was promulgated in 1987). It 
must be noted that the 1970 By-Laws of Peasant Communities did not resolve this 
issue. Therefore the new law considered as its main goal the titling of peasant 
communities. 
On 12 April 1988, Paroccan's attorneys applied to the Officer of the 20th Agrarian 
Reform Zone of Cuzco for the titling to their lands. According to Article 5 of Law 
24657, the official publication of this application appeared in the official newspaper 
"El Peruano" and in the most important national daily in the zone, and adjacent 
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peasants were notified that the Map of the Community and the boundary limits would 
be sketched between February 23 and March 4 of the same year. 
The reason for accelerating the titling of the community lands was to guarantee 
their property, to achieve certain autonomy from the State and to ensure strong 
integration of its members in communal life. As people in Paroccan said: "The titling 
procedure was promoted, since we needed to have the assurance that nobody could 
take away our lands, that is, to have "unthreatened" lands...". "Our rights over these 
lands were inherited by our parents...". "Communal life is similar to the "ayllus", but 
our comuneros need to be grouped into an institution that can solve their problems, 
with the collaboration of its members; the legality of our property of the land is a 
communal interest, since the comunero lives in harmony with his land..." 2 0 ) 
"Politicians never take into account the peasants' needs and desires: We are always 
marginalized by the people who come from the city: all we need is to improve our 
standard of living, without depending on State politics...". 
This procedure was carried out under Law 24657, the Law on Demarcation and 
Titling, enacted by the Administration of Alan Garcia. The main characteristic of this 
norm is that it recognizes the long-standing possession of communal lands2". The 
delimitation of their area had to be proved by its titles or, when these did not exist, by 
sketching the community's map and the delimitation of its boundaries. 
The State's proposal concerning communal titles was to apply the legal principle of 
celerity to the proceedings. This principle implies that the administrative officers 
facilitate the formal requirements in order that the client continue a legal procedure 
and to reduce its costs. There was a limited fund for the titling process which had to 
be paid early otherwise the costs of processing might be raised and therefore never 
terminated. However, the application of the celerity principle has been very difficult, 
since State officers, as we have seen previously, tend to delay the execution of this 
process, with their constant penchant for "bureaucratising" and "routinizing" all the 
processes that come before them. 
It should be pointed out that State officers recognize Andean laws ruling the 
possession of land in these communities. The peasant community's organization was 
the main basis permitting recognition of the communal existence by the State; the 
Land constitutes, for the peasant societies, and particularly the Andean world, an element with a strong 
symbolic power and the essential support of the social identity; the role given to land is to secure the 
economic and social reproduction of the individual peasants, the family and the community faced with the 
insecurity of nature and of the relationships with the external world (Malengreau 1985:1). 
2 1 ) Article 2 states: "The communal territory is integrated by the community's original lands, those 
acquired according to civil and agrarian laws and those adjudicated to the communities by the Agrarian 
Reform. The original lands are those which are possessed by the community including the uncultivated lands 
and those recorded in their Titles...". 
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titling of its lands was apparently a secondary issue, since the community only wanted 
to secure its boundaries. 
The boundaries between Paroccan and the peasant communities of Conamuro, 
Santa Cruz de Sallac and Munapata were recognized by all these communities. The 
only problem was with the community of Munapata, since in the zone between 
Cisilliyoc and Paroccan there was some overlapping of the usufruct and possession of 
lands by the comuneros of the anexos of Kunucunca and Ch'eqollo, which formed part 
of Munapata and Paroccan, respectively. But finally, both communities agreed that 
this overlapping usufruct would be respected, according to both communities' ancient 
customs. Once the respective agreements and delimitation of boundaries were made, 
the pictorial map was approved on June 6, 1988, ratifying the community's 
boundaries. 
An important question is whether the titling procedure is really automatic as declared 
in Law 24657. This leads us to examine the problems of successful titling and how 
these problems could be overcome. One important aspect was that there had to be a 
specific budget to start the procedure in a certain area. There were political reasons 
for assigning the budget, depending on how many communities were requesting this 
process, how many peasants would benefit, what the electoral population was in each 
area, what economic effects from the State's point of view would there be in the 
microregion, among others. To the communities, these requirements made clear how 
strong they were in the political arena, and whether they had the necessary contacts 
with the political elite at the local, regional or national levels. Consequently, most of 
the communities were unable to initiate their titling process with State funds, but had 
to rely on their own. Since the budgets were not enough to initiate a national titling 
programme, only a few communities were titled, such as in the case of Paroccan. 
State funds could be very significant, since this was a legal procedure run by the 
regional authorities, who appointed low level bureaucrats with influence in the titling 
decision. However, as in the case of recognition, the bureaucratic and routine 
behavior of the regional officers inhibited the titling law's expected effectiveness. On 
the other hand, having the agreement of the adjacent neighbours, either individuals, 
cooperatives, peasant groups or other communities, was a necessary step for obtaining 
title deeds. This involved a prior formal or informal process of recognizing each 
others boundaries, through negotiation or conciliation. 
The reason for this is that, in the titling case, a clear delimitation of the communal 
boundaries was a more significant issue than in the official recognition case. In the 
latter, the boundary question was secondary, since the law permitted the comuneros to 
be recognized without a final demarcation of their territory. In Paroccan's case, it was 
facilitated thanks to its previous experience with its neighbours. Since the law has not 
been revoked, and there is no decision to stop the titling process, we feel that this 
legal procedure can be carried out on a peasant community basis: This means that 
each community will have to pay an expert to sketch the different maps, which then 
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have to be approved by another civil engineer, a regional administration functionary. 
Then, an official will go to the community and ask for the title deeds and will 
recognize the boundaries and confirm that there is an agreement between the 
community and its neighbours. This officer will have to be paid travel and lodging 
expenses and some fees. This is somewhat informal, but is done on a voluntary basis 
by the community making the application, and by the bureaucrats who agree to travel 
to the community. As we have seen, this does not necessarily guarantee that if the 
official gets paid by the peasant community to evaluate the application, he will give a 
positive recommendation to the higher authorities to grant the title deeds. 
On the other hand, the possibility of bribing the official would be far too risky for 
him, should he report to his superiors on the basis of false data. Although it might be 
argued that lodgings could be provided directly in the community, the whole 
procedure, especially the technical stage which includes the elaboration of the maps, is 
very expensive for the peasant communities. Therefore, the financial issue hinders 
many of them from presenting their applications. 
To sum up, both recognition and the titling process help the peasants to gain skills in 
the use and the understanding of State law, and also to check local and regional 
bureaucrats' interpretations and misinterpretations of different legal ordinances. At the 
same time, official society and the government begin to open up more towards the 
Andean socio-legal institutions. 
Briefly, there was no automatic application of the Law of Titling and Demarcation. 
As previously explained, the law seen as a process allows us to understand the way in 
which people (peasant and bureaucrats) allocate political and social resources in the 
way they present their legal case in these administrative processes, to change or give 
content to the law or to obtain a specific goal. 
Local Andean law, in our analysis, continues to give life to the community. The 
recognition and titling procedures show the interaction between State and Andean law. 
For example, the influence of changes and crises on the national economy, and the 
growth of the State apparatus during this period makes local law more receptive to 
different aspects of State law. 
4.7 System for Resolving Conflicts 
People have different options for resolving conflicts: negotiation, godparents' 
mediation, community agents, State agencies such as Justice of the Peace, or District 
courts. The patterns for resolving conflicts described here were found before and after 
the recognition and titling period and they are complemented in Chapter 6. 
When a peasant enters a direct negotiation there is the intention to solve a problem 
quickly and privately. The godparents' mediation comes when parties have someone 
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whom they can trust. They think that they could negotiate and represent them better. 
Parties could also ask a community agent, or the community itself could intervene in 
resolving the conflict depending on the issue. But parties can also go to State agencies 
if they do not solve their problem through negotiation or mediation or if they are not 
satisfied with the community's authorities' decision. Moreover they can go directly to 
the Justice of the Peace or to the District courts. Going to the District court, however, 
increases the costs of the procedure and parties require the participation of lawyers. 
One has to take into account that the Justice of the Peace is a comunero who lives in 
the community. 
For resolving cases, the parties' choice of the forum depends on the type of conflict: 
family, debts, land or misdemeanours. Each of these forums has different procedures, 
costs and sanctions. 
Regarding the type of conflict arising within the community, those over land, 
family and debts were the most frequently found in Paroccan. An average of ten 
family conflicts are seen in one year, seven cases of land dispute and four of debt. 
Regarding land, the most frequent conflicts were: 
- Boundaries; 
- Recovery of parcel; and 
- Compensation for damages to property. 
Land problems are actually the most important problem. People in Paroccan illustrate: 
"An old widow of Ch'eqollo came to recover her parcel, which she had sold to 
another comunero; she argued that the parcel was hers, since the sale of land is 
forbidden". "Sometimes a peasant tries to steal a portion of land from his neighbour. 
When this occurs, we immediately call a General Assembly to decide what is to 
happen to the bad neighbour". "Last month, Mr. Y's cattle damaged Mrs. Z's crops. 
Therefore, she asked the President of the community to solve her problem...". 
Most conflicts over land are resolved in the community; maybe the godparents, the 
Executive Council or the General Assembly intervened in resolving the conflict. In 
this case, the amount of compensation depends on the nature of the damage. For 
example the compensation would be different if a cow ate some grass or whether it ate 
some crops. But these decisions might or might not be accepted by the parties to the 
conflict. In the latter case, a party could then present his or her claim before the State 
courts. Also, parties could go directly to the State magistrate if they prefer to choose 
this forum, without seeking the intervention of mediators or the community's 
authorities. 
In the case of conflicts over money, especially debts and damages, the money 
involved might be too significant to initiate a legal process in the State courts, besides 
not compensating for the time and money lost, since more time and money is spent on 
the proceedings than can be recovered. The comuneros know this, so they prefer to 
ask the community for a solution. In three cases of conflicts over money, lawyers 
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participated in two and not in the third, where the communero presented the case 
before the Justice of the Peace. 
In the case of family conflicts, alimony requested would be for a very small 
amount, because most peasants, even the "rich" ones, earn incomes below the regional 
minimum salary. Also in these cases the high costs of State justice makes it difficult 
for a significant number of family conflicts to appear before the State courts. Another 
reason is that kinship is very important in Paroccan. In this case, the family intervenes 
to protect children neglected by one or both parents. 
As we can see, the resolution of conflicts in Paroccan may take either of two 
approaches: 
1. In the first, the comuneros attempt an agreement; if it fails, then the godfathers 
participate, followed by the President of the community, the Executive Council, 
and finally, by the General Assembly. Most of the problems, however, are solved 
by the President. 
2. In the second approach, the comuneros might go directly to the Justice of the 
Peace22', the Lieutenant Governor23', the Police or the Ministry of Agriculture, 
according to the nature of the problem, or to the extent of the conflict. 
There was a case in which a comunero who was part of the Executive Council was 
always quarrelling with different peasants in the community, creating permanent 
conflicts and difficult conditions especially in the community working groups. This 
case was solved by the President of the Community. He had two possibilities for 
solving the problem: 
1) To ask the General Assembly for the comunero's expulsion, and then ask the 
Ministry of Agriculture to take him off the community Register; or 
2) To isolate him socially and physically. Instead of taking either of these two 
measures, and after several attempts to persuade this comunero to reform, the 
President asked the other comuneros to ignore him and nobody was to talk him 
until he changed his ways and began to reintegrate into the peasant community. 
Here the President did not apply the local legality. Nor did he ask the State to sanction 
the comunero who had done things against the General Law on Peasant Communities. 
But we can analyse this case as one where a different aspect of local legality was 
exercised, namely that different sanctions are carried out against a comunero. 
2 2 1 Although the Justices of the Peace are state authorities, nominated by the Superior Court of each 
Judicial District, they are persons who usually live in the area where they will resolve problems. It is a not 
full time job, and is not paid. It is an honorary position, which requires being a literate person, under 
Peruvian state official law. For more data, see Brandt, 1990. 
2 3 1 The Lieutenant Governor is a communal authority, whose job is to represent the Prefect in front of the 
Community. 
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Another case was that of a "rich" comunero who had six plots in the community but 
left the community to go to Lima, and neglected to cultivate the land. This was seen 
by the Executive Council. In this case, the Community did not redistribute the land to 
other comuneros, but negotiated with the comunero: he could maintain some of his 
plots if he gave two of his plots and 20 cows to the community. Here the community 
authorities changed State and local Andean law which allow redistributing the land in 
cases like the one mentioned, and preferred to look for other legal solutions. The State 
authorities were not called into this case. But they regarded the community's decision 
as valid although it was not in accordance with State law. 
The approach taken by disputants depends on the advantage that each jurisdiction 
offers the parties involved. Influence in the Executive Council or contacts in the State 
bureaucracy play an important role in choosing a jurisdiction. Therefore, peasants who 
are part of a conflict will seek the forum that is most favourable to their interests. (See 
K. von Benda Beckman 1981). The choice of the authority to solve the conflict is 
made by both parties. As people in Paroccan said: "We try to solve our problems 
ourselves. We talk and reach an agreement, but we seldom go to the General 
Assembly"; "when the comuneros have a problem they usually try to solve the conflict 
with a good deal; only when they cannot reach agreement do they apply to the 
President of the Community". 
However, it is not always possible to make a clear distinction. Perhaps, in the case 
of family disputes the predominance of local Andean law is more important. An 
imporant role in the settlement of disputes is the one given to the padrinos or 
compadres (godparents or best man at weddings). They are comuneros who can solve 
internal family conflicts and are called by parties in conflict thanks to their affinity to 
them. This arrangement is preferred by some families or peasants instead of going to 
the President of the community or to the Executive Council, which also resolve some 
types of conflict. 
A second factor to take into account is that of the cost of State justice. On many 
occasions the comuneros prefer to resort to their own courts of resolution due to the 
fact that they are less costly and closer, since in the case of choosing the second 
alternative, they would have to travel continually to Urcos, pay lawyers, and cover the 
costs of judicial proceedings, etc. 
In the case of conflicts of a penal type, the situation is somewhat different, since in 
these cases the state courts cannot be left aside. Only lesser offenses or misdemeanors 
are solved by the President of the Community, who is usually a socially well-respected 
comunero. These acts, which create or recreate an Andean legality, reinforce the 
communal organization, since the latter recognizes these organs as having an 
important function. As Paroccan people said: "The President hears cases of 
misdemeanours, such as robbery or crop damage; when a comunero causes damage to 
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someone else's property, this case is seen by the General Assembly, which after 
sentencing notifies the Police of Urcos, which carries out the punishment". 
More serious conflicts -such as robbery, assault and battery or physical abuse (as a 
consequence of fights), or those in which the resolution could affect the communal 
interests- are finally solved by the General Assembly. When this reaches a decision it 
is communicated to the Lieutenant Governor who in turn notifies the Prefect of Urcos. 
Therefore, Paroccan comuneros can interpret and change the State law with their own 
local law, but only up to a certain limit. The procedures used to end conflicts and 
even communal decisions made under previous administrations, and Paroccan law 
decisions can be considered valid under the State legal system if they are not 
considered to be against the "public order". But in cases of murder, assault and 
battery, or other crimes, the parties involved generally go before the State's criminal 
courts. Criminal law in these cases is applied by the State justice system. Comuneros 
then find themselves subordinated to the State justice system. 
Another aspect concerning the relationships between both State and local legal 
systems, is that of the "formalization" of communal decisions. As we have seen when 
dealing with land transfers, the comuneros seem more prone to use written forms than 
oral ones in their daily transactions. In the settlement of disputes, on the other hand, 
we found that in most local agreements the sanctions are made, executed and 
transmitted by word of mouth, a "gentiemen's agreement". Exceptions are certain 
conflicts which are solved before sessions of the Executive Council, and which, in 
principle, must be written up in a special book. The written form is also important in 
cases in which communal leaders are involved, like a President's rendering of 
accounts for his administration. There are other cases in which the authorities want to 
prevent people from expecting such decisions to be enforced in similar cases. In other 
words, although there is increasingly formal processing in communal decisions, the 
comuneros are still able to leave this aspect aside in certain cases. It depends on what 
type of deal is going to be made in order to know whether the peasants will go to the 
Notary Public or the Justice of the Peace. Most often, they go to the Justice of the 
Peace, who is a peasant with some bureaucratic functions, usually living in or near the 
peasant community. People are more or less obliged to go to the Notary Public or 
Justice of the Peace if they want to legalize some papers to be used before Magistrates 
at a higher level of the public administration. These papers might be photocopies of 
birth or marriage certificates, or of any public document. 
Nevertheless, it is important to conclude that local legality has a source in 
traditional or customary practices, but also, that the communal authority is a person 
who usually knows or applies State law, or at least a part of it, according to the 
particular conflict to be solved. 

CHAPTER 5 
The Peasant Community of Ccachabamba 
Ccachabamba is located in the district of Andahuaylillas, on the Vilcanota River, 
approximately thirty minutes from Urcos. The community lands lie on a prairie in the 
Vilcanota valley, surrounded by green hills, just like its neighboring communities: 
Pucutu, Marabamba, Rinconada and Rayallacta. Nevertheless, this geographical 
location has been the community's greatest affliction, for their rich farmlands and 
close access to urban settlements are constantly coveted by landowners. As will be 
seen further on, with this background we can easily understand the hardships 
undergone by the Ccachabamba peasants -through the years- in consolidating a social 
organization. 
Ccachabamba is just a village, with a population of only 85 families, engaged 
mainly in agriculture. It is a very precarious peasant group lacking the most important 
modern services. This shows not only the little attention given by the State, but also 
that the peasants' lack the will to organise and request these services. 
First of all, in Ccachabamba there is no running water or electricity. The 
community's water supply come from Pomacocha lake, and from water obtained from 
subterranean springs, each family digging its own well. 
As for road infrastructure, Ccachabamba also lacks paved roads in the village. 
Each family constructs its own paths, usually hard-packed earth. The Urcos highway 
is also a long way from the area, causing the peasants a lot of problems in 
transporting their products to the main road. 
The peasants also lack an efficient health service, since there is no medical post in 
the community. The comuneros have to walk to Andahuaylillas, to be treated by the 
only physician living in the District. As Ccachabamba people said: "When a child gets 
sick, it is difficult for us to take him to the doctor; it takes thirty minutes to walk to 
Andahuaylillas to see him." 
The illiteracy level is very high in the adult population; almost all adults being 
illiterate. Few of them have ever gone to school and those who have, only reached the 
second grade of elementary school, since they had to go to schools outside the village 
if they wanted to study at all. Today, the older children go to Andahuaylillas' State 
school. Many of them have finished high school, and half a dozen attend the Police 
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School with some other boys. As I was told: "Almost all our children have finished 
high school. Both my daughters go to the State university in Cuzco1'; we also have 
about ten boys who study at the Police School." 
The educational issue becomes relevant, when we link it to the labour emigration 
rate from Ccachabamba. In this sense, we can see that few of the youths or adults 
have access to well-paid jobs in the cities -which require high technical qualifications, 
so they have to take low and unskilled jobs, or end up as informal street vendors. 
5.1 The Hacienda De La Torre 
What today is known as Ccachabamba was, at the turn of the century, once a part of 
the Pucutu Hacienda, which has existed since Colonial times, first mentioned in the 
XVII Century, when the Spanish owner, Juan Alvarez de Maldonado, had a census 
taken of the hacienda in favor of the Cathedral of Cuzco. Later on, the hacienda 
passed through many hands until the middle of the XVIII century, when the property 
was acquired by the Ugarte family, who expanded the hacienda by occupying the 
lands of neighbouring communities. This family maintained the property until 1858 
when the proprietor was Maria Centeno (Gutierrez et al. 1984). 
In the 1950s, the lands which today form part of Ccachabamba were acquired by 
landholder Benjamin de la Torre, who bought the lands from other landholders, and 
from individual peasants the property or possession rights. Not all had title deeds. The 
peasants who sold their lands did so in order to pay or cancel certain debts owed for 
food, alcohol, coca leaves and seeds that the landholders had been supplying them. 
From that time on a group of these peasants continued working for De La Torre, in 
exchange for the right to possess and cultivate a piece of land in De la Torre's 
hacienda and the obligation to sell the products cultivated to De la Torre at cheap 
prices. 
During this same period, the following haciendas existed in Andahuaylillas: 
Name Owner 
Pucutu Benjamín De la Torre Umeres 
Yyahuasi Benjamín De la Torre Umeres 
Marabamba Enrique Rojas 
Ccompencia Enrique Rojas 
Mancco Enrique Rojas 
Qqechas V. Velez 
Yutto Olliart Bravo family 
The San Antonio Abad University. 
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Rinconada 
Qquerohuasi 
Rayallacta 
Bravo family 
H. Vallenas 
Garmendia Alvistur 
From this, we can infer that, before the Agrarian Reform, the District of 
Andahuaylillas was made up of both large and small private properties. However, 
setting up these haciendas was not an easy process. As Florence Mallon explains: 
"One of the most important, violent, and ubiquitous struggles carried on in the 
villages (during the early 1900s) was over the issue of land: whether or not it 
should be privately owned; or, who had the best right to any given territory, 
and how the boundaries between the properties should be established. Even 
though it was not an easy process, the general tendency, throughout the decade, 
was towards privatisation and more careful and scientific demarcation of 
frontiers between the communities." (Mallon 1983:277). 
Briefly, before the Wiracocha CAP period the Andahuaylillas area was covered by 
haciendas, small properties and some peasant communities, which were in constant 
conflict for possession of the best lands in the zone. 
5.2 The Wiracocha CAP 
During General Velasco Alvarado's government, landholder La Torre -foreseeing the 
imminent Agrarian Reform- sold the lands back to the peasants, all of whom 
afterwards became members of the Wiracocha (CAP) Agrarian Production 
Cooperative. Here, it is necessary to say a few words about this process within its 
historical and political background. 
The military government had proposed a "restructuring" of the peasant 
communities, forcing them to adopt the organization of cooperatives2'. This was 
governed by Law Decree 17716 and Supreme Decree 240-39-AP (Bylaws of the 
Agrarian Cooperatives), which established that farm lands would be adjudicated to: 
- Enterprises, which implied the existence of an entrepreneurial administration of the 
land by the CAPS, SAIS and Social Production Enterprises (EPS). 
- Individuals: small parcels of land were awarded to peasants who worked them 
directly. Peasant communities, peasant groups, and individuals were included in 
this aspect. 
The restructuring objectives of the reform included activating agricultural production, 
integrating the rural population into the regional and national economy, and using 
' This organization model had been proposed before by Law 15037, during the government of Fernando 
Belatinde Terry (1965-1968). 
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agricultural policy as a basis for industrial development. However, in the case of the 
peasant communities, the idealistic collectivistic vision of State legislators or scholars 
made it difficult to find an adequate legal way of doing this. Thus, one of the purposes 
of this Statute was to facilitate adoption by the communities of modern cooperative 
organizational and management forms. The Statute also had the legal objective of 
preventing certain contracts that were traditionally agreed upon between the 
"comuneros": the sale or rental of lands. Thus it was prohibited to purchase lands 
adjudicated to the community, except when Cooperatives or SAIS were the ones 
favoured by these contracts, since it would help these entrepreneurial forms to 
develop, which is what the Government wanted. The CAP (Agrarian Production 
Cooperative) can be defined as an indivisible unit in which ownership and benefit from 
all productive assets are collective. No individual production is permissible. The 
members, who all work on the collective enterprise, participate in the CAP's 
management through democratically elected bodies. The profits are only distributed 
after a series of obligatory deductions are made for reserves, investments, social 
security, education and development funds. The remainder is either distributed equally 
among members or according to the number of days worked..." (Kay 1980:20). Most 
of the cooperatives were created on the lands of the former haciendas. 
In 1974, and as an attempt to bring such process into practice, the peasants belonging 
to the haciendas of Pucutu, Rayallacta, Marabamba and La Rinconada, as well as 
Guarnición Hacienda, joined together in a new institutional form: the Wiracocha CAP 
(Dueñas 1991). 
The establishment of the Wiracocha CAP did not come up to the peasants' 
expectations for several reasons. First of all, the land was given to the CAP, not to 
the peasants nor to their families. What is more, from a strictly legal point of view, 
the State was the owner of the goods adjudicated for agrarian reform reasons to the 
CAPs, and thus retained legal dominance over them until any agrarian debts the 
affected hacienda might have were paid off (Gonzales 1985). This resulted in a serious 
ambivalence on the part of the peasants who on the one hand felt themselves to be the 
owners of the land, but on the other were told the land was the property of the State. 
Secondly, some plots of land were given to people who had not worked them 
before nor had done so during the existence of the De la Torre Hacienda. Thus, 
comuneros from other communities also became members of the cooperative. Many of 
these were interested in selling or renting the plots they possessed in the cooperative 
to other outsiders, although this was legally prohibited. Rather than supporting the 
peasant organization, the cooperative was a way of weakening it. 
Thirdly, imposing the administration committee as principal department of the 
cooperative caused a lot of internal problems and conflicts. This committee was 
mainly constituted by outside technicians and bureaucrats, who did not have any 
knowledge whatsoever about local relationships. To many peasants, these people were 
seen as new patrons or masters, just like Benjamin De la Torre had been (Anrup 
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1990:113). In turn, these outside agents assumed paternalistic attitudes towards the 
peasants since they came from regional or local elites, or from coastal urban cities, 
and actually felt superior to the peasants. This led, in certain cases, to the peasants 
believing that they would be better off with the old hacienda owner (Anrup 1990:114). 
Finally, the creation of this CAP - as in other rural areas under the Agrarian 
Reform- did not take into consideration the complex distinctions between peasants. 
Feudal tenants, comuneros, and paid workers, among others, were considered equal, 
in spite of their social and cultural differences (Huber 1990-1991). For example, each 
type of peasant had a different attitude towards the agrarian reform. The attitudes of a 
coastal yanacona (salaried worker) and of an Andean comunero, when considering the 
same political process, were very different. 
The CAP Wiracocha never achieved its goals and objectives. There remained a 
constant struggle between a central organization -the administration committee- which 
was seen as strange and deficient, and organised groups of peasants in Local 
Production Committees. There never was any associative development of the land or 
livestock. Instead of promoting cooperation and integration among its members, the 
CAP facilitated the emergence of individualistic attitudes and interests. 
Therefore, this organizational form benefited only a small group of people who 
were uninterested in any kind of productive association. The case of the President of 
this CAP, Hilario Willca Huaman, is very illustrative: Although he was one of the 
former feudal tenants, he sold a great part of the cooperative lands to outsiders, 
including members of the police force. This had a very negative result on the attitudes 
of peasants in this area. General disillusion over any collective model -including the 
community- was common among a very large number of comuneros. 
These problems were not restricted to the Wiracofha CAP, but were more or less 
common to all the cooperatives created during the Agrarian Reform period (Torre y 
Gonzales 1985). For this reason, when the General Law on Peasant Communities was 
passed by the Peruvian parliament in 1987, the State definitely abandoned the idea of 
imposing cooperatives in the rural areas. The subsequent dissolution of the Wiracocha 
CAP by the State showed that peasants had not embraced the cooperative 
organizational model. 
5.3 The Dissolution of the Wiracocha CAP: The Peasant Community of 
Ccachabamba 
On March 24, 1987, the General Office of Agrarian Reform in Lima in charge of all 
matters regarding agrarian production and lands at the national level, enacted 
Directoral Resolution 192-87-DGRA-AR, proclaiming the legal dissolution of 
Wiracocha CAP. This decision was based on the deplorable organization and 
administration of the cooperative, the endless complaints about the Local Committees 
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and the illegal sale of lands by the former President, Hilario Willca Huaman. 
Indeed, this formal act started an extended process of liquidating the cooperative 
enterprise, and reorganising ownership and possession of the land through a parcelling 
process carried out by the General Agrarian Reform Office. Part of the lands of the 
former Pucutu Hacienda were given to the Police Force to build their school. Land 
sales to the "Tupac Amaru" Association of Housing and to the Labor Union of 
Tricyclists of Urcos were similarly recognised. On the other hand, the land which had 
belonged to the Guarnición Hacienda was returned to its original owners, the Febres 
family. Ccachabamba, along with Marabamba, Rinconada and Rayallacta remained 
peasant groups and established themselves in their original territories. Some of the 
CAPs' paid workers were paid off by being given some of the Cooperative's land as 
compensation for the loss of their jobs. 
Once the dissolution of the CAPs had begun, the reorganization of the land created 
conflicts between the communities and the individual ex-members of the cooperative 
regarding possession of it. Problems arose mainly when sharing out certain 
cooperative goods, such as machinery, tools and tractors, which had been in common 
use. Another problem was the sale or transfer of lands which some ex-leaders of the 
CAP or those charged temporarily with the administration of the CAP continued to 
do. Also there was a lack of territorial definition of peasant sectors which was still 
being articulated since the restructuring of the former CAP. The process of dissolution 
of the Wiracocha CAP was followed by a procedure for recognition process initiated 
by a group of peasants in Ccachabamba which will be described later (see 5.5.5). 
5.4 The Landholding System and Production 
The Landholding System 
Within the Ccachabamba area, the property of the land is individual, since each 
peasant owns the land he possesses (by purchase or inheritance). Communal lands do 
not really exist in Ccachabamba; that is to say, there are no parcels that belong or are 
farmed by the peasants collectively3'. Parcelling was carried out at the time of the 
crisis in the cooperative. Most of the peasants have their title deeds: some of them 
since 1960, when they bought them back from Benjamin La Torre, while most recent 
owners have obtained theirs by means of the adjudication decrees, issued by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
Villagers in Ccachabamba not interested in the recognition of the community 
usually have other lands in the same province of Quispicanchis or in other areas. 
Although they could cooperate for some purposes with the pro-community group, this 
was not done with the intention of changing their landholding system. Therefore, 
' The pro-community group has a collective garden, which is managed by the Mother's Club, but which 
does not constitute a collective or communal land holding. 
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transactions are not made with the objective of having a collective territory as a 
peasant community. 
Each peasant owns small land parcels (consisting of one or two tupus (plots)); 
some peasants do not even possess a parcel. Consequently, in Ccachabamba land 
purchasing is not very frequent. Only in very difficult situations, such as when the 
male head of the peasant family is unemployed for a long period of time, are the 
peasants compelled to subscribe to a leasing contract. The way peasants acquire land 
is either by inheritance or rental among members of the same community. 
The scarcity of land and the small size of plots have also created great social 
pressure in the area, since the younger generations claim lands of their own. One way 
of diminishing this pressure consists of migration by the younger peasants, in order to 
look for a paid job in Cuzco or another town. However, as we have seen, it is merely 
an individual and temporary escape valve, because the jobs obtained in the labour 
market do not permit them to improve their standard of living, or to save enough 
money to buy a parcel of land. 
Production 
In the Andahuaylillas valley generally, to which Ccachabamba belongs, two types of 
products have been introduced and grown, and have greatly changed the previous 
agricultural situation, which had been dedicated mainly to producing corn and barley. 
These new products are vegetables and forage, the latter due to the development of 
livestock (Duenas 1991:33). 
During the time of the Wiracocha CAP, producing cattle and by-products (milk, 
butter cheese, meat, etc.) was a priority, and less attention had been paid to 
agricultural production. This change of pattern was due to the imposition the Military 
Government's agrarian policy in the area of Andahuaylillas. Today, the area's 
production is limited again to producing crops of corn and beans, due mainly to the 
present market demands, which offer a better price for these products. However, 
besides these, each peasant individually chooses other products he will grow, 
according to his family's needs. This production is aimed at self-consumption and the 
Urcos market. In this way, they obtain other products, such as tarwi, potatoes and 
cereals; the rest of their economic needs are met with the money obtained from tilling 
in Cuzco and in other villages. 
It is true that each peasant sows his own plot of land in his own way and when he 
considers it necessary, but some important forms of coordination can be found in the 
productive system. First, one form of coordination is in irrigation. Since irrigation 
channels are common to all the parcels of land, the peasants organize and coordinate a 
watering schedule, through the Board of Irrigators. Less intensive and extensive than 
in Paroccan, or in other recognized communities, we found in Ccachabamba other 
forms of cooperation which are embodied in the following contracts: 
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a. The "Ayni" consists of reciprocal help between the peasants. A comumro helps his 
neighbour farm his plot, in exchange for help with agricultural jobs. 
b. The "Minka" involves collective farming in the parcel by a peasant's neighbours. 
All the participants are obliged to help the others farm their lands. 
c. "Al Partir" (sharing) means farming a parcel by an agreement made between the 
owner of the land and another peasant, in which the former provides the land, the 
latter the seeds and labour. The produce is divided into two equal parts. This 
institution is frequently used by two brothers, who share ownership of a parcel. 
d. The "Jomal" (daily wage) consists of a peasant, who can afford to pay daily 
wages, hiring members of the group to do the work. 
These contracts or agreements -the "ayni", "minka", "al partir" or the "jornal"- are 
institutions of Andean law. In many contexts, these and similar contracts and 
agreements could strengthen the economic and social resources of the peasants, 
creating an important "communal-effect" in Ccachabamba. Therefore, these forms 
provide a reason for considering Ccachabamba as a peasant community, principally 
because these contracts are used both by pro-community peasants and other villagers 
who live in the area of Ccachabamba. These type of relations also include cooperation 
between the pro- and the anti-community group. 
To sum up, we have found two characteristics which should be emphasized in the 
relationships between the pro-community peasants and the other villagers who live in 
the area: the practice of contracts that enhance cooperation, and the common interests 
of a strong group that make it even more dynamic than well established communities. 
All this has made possible its quasi-recognition as a peasant community by the 
municipality, certain public enterprises, and some of the neighbouring communities. 
5.5 Ccachabamba's Social Organization 
5.5.1 The "Communal" Organization 
The historical process described above has had a strong effect on this village's social 
organization. For the Ministry of Agriculture, Ccachabamba is not a peasant 
community, it is a township called parcialidad or small town. For these authorities 
most of the people who live or are registered as living in Ccachabamba do not want to 
be recognized as a peasant community. But the internal organization in Ccachabamba 
is similar to that established for the peasant communities by State legislation: Thus 
formally, its main organs are the Executive Council and the Communal Assembly. 
There are also special committees, which undertake certain activities in favour of the 
whole community. But, unlike Paroccan, this organization is not the result of 
integration between its members, but rather a sort of mask that permits them to hide 
their inner conflicts from the outside, and also allows them to obtain certain benefits 
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from State agencies. 
Ccachabamba is a small village in which we find a group of peasants that wish to 
be considered a peasant community, while others do not. Both groups are residents or 
landholders in the territory. 
The pro-community group has a certain dynamism in the Executive Council and 
the Communal Assembly of the community. Nevertheless, their decisions are not 
followed by the anti-community group. 
This feature can be seen by analysing the participation level of the peasants in the 
above mentioned organs. In Ccachabamba we find two relatively well-defined groups 
of peasants: those who want to develop a communal life, and those who are opposed 
to the idea. The first group (more or less 35 heads of family) which is interested in 
being recognized as a community is influenced by the "communal-effect" of other 
neighbouring communities, or is firmly influenced by the State law concerning peasant 
communities4'. Most of them are also influenced by other peasants, NGOs and 
political authorities, who encourage the peasant organization and who want to avoid 
the concentration of land in Ccachabamba. All of them share the belief that the 
community is the "natural" organisational form for the peasantry. 
The second group (about 45 families) that refused to be part of a peasant 
community, is very heterogeneous. Some of them are peasants who have previously 
been members of similar communities; others are members of the police force, and 
most of them have other plots in nearby localities or want to start an urbanization 
process in the zone. Still other villagers feel that the previous cooperative experience 
was a very bad one, and therefore they do not hesitate to reject any associative or 
communal land administration. This group shares the feeling that they can easily sell 
their plots on an individual basis, but believe that under a communal organization it 
would be harder to sell their lands. They also share the idea that they do not want to 
have obligations towards a community, since they live most of the time outside 
Ccachabamba. Therefore, this group's most important feature is that the community 
represents to them an obstacle to social expansion and economic progress. They have 
other roots, different origins, and other land properties. 
The anti-community individuals prefer to dedicate their time and efforts to 
activities which can give them greater economic profits, rather than promoting 
communal life. They pay more attention to paid work in neighbouring cities, or at the 
brick factory which stands near Ccachabamba. The little time they spend in 
Ccachabamba is dedicated to farming their small parcels of land, which gives them 
practically no time to participate in the organization. 
However, as Kervyn says: "Changes in work relations lead to the transformation of family and 
communal relationships, like the redefining of the women's role, generational gap conflicts, etc... 
Therefore, the family and the community, from "islands" or "refugees", characterized by solidarity and 
reciprocity, become the ground for conflicts, where roles and functions are redefined "(Kervyn 1987:53). 
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On the other hand, the pro-community group is also trapped in the dilemma of 
whether to participate more fully in communal activities or to dedicate themselves to 
more economically productive activities. But in any case they always try to maintain a 
certain level of participation. This has led, for example, to the fact that within this 
group an important role is played by women. The women of Ccachabamba are the 
most active in producing and reproducing a type of communal life: they are the ones 
who seek credit and economic help from the State and private agencies, who 
participate in the different organizations created to improve their living conditions5', 
along with organizing their daily communal life and other tasks. This task 
compensates for the lack of the men's presence in the communal life, when the men 
leave home to undertake other activities. 
Briefly, we find in Ccachabamba two main problems with regard to participation in 
village organizations: the presence of two antagonistic groups: a pro- and an anti-
community group; and the family's need to survive through development of 
nonagricultural activities outside Ccachabamba's area, which leaves little time to 
participate in the social organization. However, this lack of participation is partly 
filled by the mobilization of women, who become the main central point of 
"communal life". 
Only the first group of peasants are part of the community's administrative 
agencies, and thus respect the decisions taken by them, although with some difficulty. 
The other group -or groups- show no degree of organisation, nor do they feel linked 
or obliged by the decisions taken by the first group. However, some participate in 
certain committees directed by the first group, since they carry out activities in favour 
of everyone. Therefore, it is very difficult to talk about a "communal" organization in 
Ccachabamba, just as it is difficult to talk about the community bodies. 
5.5.2 The Executive Council 
As in Paroccan, the Executive Council in Ccachabamba is actually the main body of 
the pro-community group, since it makes the most important decisions. The General 
Assembly is seldom summoned, and even the pro-community peasants only attend 
when it serves their needs or they have the spare time, as already mentioned. 
The organization of the Executive Council is formed by the President, 
Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer. The directors are usually adult peasants, 
about 35 to 40 years old, elected from the members of the General Assembly for a 
period of two years. 
Even though Ccachabamba is not officially recognized as a peasant community, 
some of its organizations, such as the Mother's Club, has a administrative or political 
recognition by some State offices and other recognized communities. But the lack of 
Like the Water and Electricity Committees, and especially the Mothers Club. 
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recognition actually prevents Ccachabamba from having access to benefits which apply 
to other juridical bodies, such as credits or economic aid, whose official beneficiaries 
are, on the other hand, individual peasants. 
In other words, the Executive Council in Ccachabamba does not have the same 
power and faculties found in the recognized communities (for example, communal job 
programming or control of land acquisition). Nevertheless, the Executive Council's 
main function seems to be a symbolic one: it serves as a point of reference for the 
peasants who want to be part of a peasant community, and also for the external 
agencies who want to help these peasants. 
5.5.3 The Specialized Committees 
Besides the mentioned administrative agencies in Ccachabamba, other organizations 
function, such as: 
a) The Pro-Electricity Committee, which is integrated by almost all the members of 
the village since it is a service that benefits all groups. This committee's objective 
is to obtain electricity, with the help of the Andahuaylillas City Hall, as well as 
Electro Sur; 
b) The Committee for Running Water and Drainage; 
c) The Association for Housing: this association works to build blocks of housing, in 
a grove near the boundary with Pucutu; 
d) The Mothers Club, which is the most dynamic organization in the community, as 
we mentioned before, has about 59 women who support the Andahuaylillas City 
Hall, in the Glass of Milk Programme6', In order to help solve the community's 
economic problems, this Club has also obtained help from Ccaijo (a Cuzco NGO), 
by purchasing or borrowing food, seeds and fertilizers, since the great freeze of 
1989. 
As we have already mentioned, even anti-community individuals participate in these 
organizations, because they are also interested in obtaining electricity, running water 
or food. Other types of people, like the young singles or married couples also 
participate quite actively in these associations. An additional factor that has helped to 
strengthen these organizations is the implicit acknowledgment they receive from 
private and State agencies, such as the Andahuaylillas municipality, Ccaijo, 
Electrosur, Sedapal, among others. This recognition makes it possible for 
Ccachabamba to be seen as a community, and not only as a peasant group. 
The Glass of Milk Programme (Programa del Vaso de Leche) was established in 1981 by the Mayor of 
Lima, Alfonso Barrantes, and its object is to help feed the poorest sectors of the national population with 
the mutual help and direct administration of each district's City Hall and the women who integrate each 
Local Committee in every neighborhood throughout the country. 
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5.5.4 System for Resolving Conflicts 
The lack of a strong organization in Ccachabamba also affects the way in which 
conflicts are resolved within the locality. This differs from other peasant communities 
-like Paroccan- where most of these conflicts are solved by or discussed in the social 
institutions. 
In the case of family conflicts, only a few are brought before the Executive 
Council by the pro-community group, and the Council's decisions will be respected 
only by this group. Relatives intervene only if they are asked to by any 
pro-community or other villager in the area, which occurs only very occasionally. If 
family conflicts arise in the other group, they are solved by the Justice of the Peace of 
Andahuaylillas, under whose jurisdiction Ccachabamba falls. 
In the case of land or neighbourhood problems, we should point out that there are 
two different types of conflict which sometimes occur in Ccachabamba: 
a) Conflicts regarding compensation; for example, when cows damage a neighbour's 
crop. 
b) Another conflict, which ocurrs frequently, is that which involves both the 
Ccachabambinos and the members of nearby communities setting boundary limits 
for the parcels. As a peasant in the zone told us: "A woman belonging to the 
peasant community of Marabamba, tried to steal a neighbour's land; she pulled 
down the land parcel's landmarks, and tried to place her own cattle and horses in 
it..." 
These conflicts are usually solved by the Justice of the Peace of Andahuaylillas, who 
in the case just mentioned helped them reach an agreement. This institution is mainly 
responsible for handling the conflicts that arise in Ccachabamba. However, as 
mentioned previously, this does not mean a clear preference for State courts, since the 
Justice of the Peace does not function according to formal criteria of the State, but is 
rather an informal court. 
5.5.5 Ccachabamba's Recognition Procedure 
In 1987, the year in which the Wiracocha CAP was finally dissclved, a significant 
number of Ccachabamba's families started a procedure to be recognized as a peasant 
community. They applied to the Regional Office of the Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Settlements. Since Ccachabamba did not have any previous title deeds, the main 
document in support of their application was a map showing the delineation of its 
boundaries. 
The need of the Ccachabambinos to be recognized can be explained by their wish 
to obtain credit from the Agrarian Bank as a community. They were also encouraged 
by other communities, NGOs and political parties, which would give them greater 
recognition as a social organization than as individuals. Furthermore, most of them 
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only had the lands they possessed and farmed as economic resources. As people in 
Ccachabamba said: "The only thing we have is our land, which has been acquired 
according to our ancient customs. Each son inherits the land his father possessed and 
left to him. Long ago, these lands were the property of the De La Torre family; then 
they became part of the Wiracocha CAP. At the present time, the land is being 
distributed among the workers of the cooperative - they are in the middle of the 
liquidation and inventory process". 
Unlike Paroccan, this procedure was started while Law 24656 -General Law of 
Peasant Communities- was in effect. This law had created a new office, LNDEC7), to 
be in charge of the official registration and recognition of peasant communities, and 
whose function was "to elaborate the National Real Estate Office for Peasant 
Communities, and keep it permanently updated" (Art. 40). Later on, the By laws of 
this institution8', stated that "while organic laws of Regional Governments are 
enacted, the Departmental Development Corporations (CDDs), assume, according to 
INDEC norms and commands, the following functions:... e) to confer recognition on 
the peasant communities, and to register them in the respective Registry". 
Moreover, the formal procedure to obtain the title deeds was also changed: all 
cases were concentrated in the hands of the CDDs, the President of each Corporation 
having the final word at the administrative level9'. However, the legal requirements 
were not changed. Thus, the main intention of this legal change was to dissolve the 
Bureau of Peasant and Native Communities -created during the military government-
and hand its functions and attributes over to a new institution10'. This new attention 
to the community's development in State policy, in contrast to the cooperative 
proposals in the previous Statute, made an institutional change necessary to permit 
carrying out the new development promotion role even better. 
However, these changes did not have any effect at the Cuzco regional level. 
Although the new law had been proclaimed a few months before, the Regional Office 
of Peasant and Native Communities of Cuzco was still in charge of carrying out the 
legal recognition procedure. 
The Ccachabamba proceeding failed since ex-members of the Wiracocha CAP, who 
lived in Pucutu, Urcos, Andahuaylillas and Huaro -but who possessed lands in 
Ccachabamba- blocked the process. Some of these peasants obtained individual title 
deeds from the Ministry of Agriculture, which actually ended up proving their 
ownership over those lands. As people in Ccachabamba said: "The community cannot 
See chapter II, page 64. 
s Supreme Decree No. 014-87-MIPRE of June 24, 1987. 
" First Transitory Provision of Supreme Decree no. 014-87-MIPRE. 
I 0 ) The legal provisions were very clear with regard to this assertion: the Sixth Transitory Provision of the 
Bylaws stated that: "furniture, equipment, documentation and respective archives of the Bureau of Peasant 
and Native Communities should be transferred to INDEC; and those corresponding to the Sub-Bureaus of 
Peasant Communities, or similar entities, should be transferred to the DDCs". 
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obtain its titles, since some members of the cooperative appear at the proceeding and 
block all our efforts. People within the community, who come from Andahuaylillas, 
Huaro and Urcos, also obstruct our land tide procedures". "Besides, our comuneros 
do not have much land, since the mlstls usually come to give us food in exchange for 
portions of our land parcels. We believe we can obtain recognition of our community, 
since we are not divided among ourselves at the present time. There were certain 
people who deceived us two years ago, because they made us believe that the 
recognition of our lands, proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture official, Marco 
Cuba, would only mean more taxes for us to pay". Thus, the pro-community group in 
Ccachabamba could not obtain legal recognition, since they did not fulfill the legal 
requirements, and due to the fact that there existed opposing interests within the 
community. 
It should be pointed out, however, that during this period a spirited discussion took 
place concerning whether or not it was necessary for the communities to be formally 
registered in order to attain legal capacity. The second position would have been more 
beneficial to the pro-community group, because this option would have permitted 
developing as a community before the outside world without the need to pass through 
a formal recognition process. 
The debate started because there existed a contradiction between the terms set out 
in Article 161 of the Constitution of 1979 and Article 135 of the Civil Code, passed in 
1984. On one hand, the Constitution gives legal representation to the communities, 
simply because they exist. However, the Civil Code stated that: "For the communities' 
existence to be legal, their official recognition is required11' aside from their 
registration in the respective real estate registries". In other words, did a community 
have legal standing since its inception, simply due to the fact that it was 
constitutionally recognized? Was it also necessary to have a State decision on this 
matter? Obviously, the second interpretation gave the State greater control over the 
communities. The other option finally appeared in Law 24656, which was considered 
to be a special law, despite the fact that it did not adapt to the constitutionally fixed 
terms. 
Some jurists, such as Figallo, maintained that only the decision of its members is 
required to act legally as a community, without requiring the acceptance of the State. 
However, this legal interpretation did not prevail at either the normative nor 
jurisprudential level. 
This means that in most cases, for the State authorities legal recognition -which is an 
administrative procedure- is indispensable to consider a peasant gioup as a 
community. 
Does this mean that the needs and expectations that were to be achieved through 
recognition were not obtained by this group? Although the Ccachabambinos achieved 
On the other hand, official recognition contradicts Article 77 of the Civil Code, which establishes that 
legal companies under private law have legal existence since their registration. 
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some advantages -such as incorporation in the Government's social support 
programmes, for example, the Glass of Milk programme, they had no success in other 
programmes such as the special credit programme that the Government granted to 
communities. In this case the peasants had to seek other sources of credit, of an 
informal nature, or seek work which in turn weakened the organization even more. 
Finally, an important development in the Ccachabamba area occurred in 1989 
when, due to the loss of the harvest because of the freeze, the Mothers' Club was 
founded, as were several social organizations at the national level. Although this 
Mothers' Club had a pro-community attitude in Ccachabamba, it worked together with 
the different peasants, including the anti-community ones, in order to obtain economic 
aid from State authorities, or seeds or milk for the area. 
5.5.6 The Lessons of Ccachabamba's Legalization Process 
Ccachabamba's experience teaches us several lessons with regard to the social 
conflicts evolving in the process of legalising a peasant community. 
The first lesson refers to the diversity and the struggle of interests concerning legal 
recognition. This struggle is expressed through formal opposition at the beginning of 
the process. As we have seen, there existed different groups of people in 
Ccachabamba: one sought a communal way of life; the other was mainly concerned 
with its own interests, and there was no control or intervention by a "community". 
Past experience with the CAP made possible the emergence and power of the second 
group. The lack of communal control over the transfer of land allowed outsiders to 
appear within a territory that was not subject to social control by the first group. 
This problem leads us to the second lesson: the importance of a strong communal 
organization to stand up against such opposition. Ccachabamba's peasants were not 
traditionally linked as a community. Before the Agrarian Reform, domination by the 
landlords prevented communal administrative bodies from functioning, because they 
had paternalistic and individual relationships with their feudal tenants. During the 
Reform, the imposition of the Executive Council prevented any real democratic 
experience inside the model cooperative. At present, the rejection of all cooperative 
models has finally prevented any possibility of associative designs. This made it 
harder for the peasants to develop the conditions needed to support a social 
organization that could successfully apply to the State for official recognition as a 
community. 
The pro-community group which failed in its legal proceedings -confronting 
poverty and difficult life conditions- has several forms of organization, like the 
Mothers Club, the Committee for Electricity and for Potable Water and Sewage, and 
the Association for Housing, and some of their proposals and activities are recognized 
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as part of the peasant community. However, we see that these entities are 
temporary12', and there is no continuity or tradition of the group as a solid 
institution13'. 
Thus, we arrive at the third lesson: whether or not one can define Ccachabamba as 
a peasant community, and what are the effects of such a definition, insofar as legal 
recognition is concerned. As mentioned above (Chapter 1), the existence of a peasant 
community does not depend on whether it has a long-standing tradition, but on the 
administration of its resources and social recognition. However, this characteristic is 
not fully met, because not all of Ccachabamba's landowners participate in the 
collective management of the social resources. The absence of an organizational group 
in which most of the peasants participate in community fashion, leads the State to 
recognize Ccachabamba only as a group of peasant families. According to an 
explanation by a State official, Ccachabamba was not a peasant community, but a 
parcelled lot that is, a locality where different types of peasants are found, but not 
having the characteristics of a real peasant community. 
The Ccachabamba example leads us to reconsider the different social concepts 
regarding the peasant community, even in the same semi-autonomous social field. The 
definition of Ccachabamba as a peasant community is determined by the perspective of 
different official entities, which may either narrow or wide. Therefore, for some State 
offices and certain NGOs, Ccachabamba is a peasant community, since they do not 
view it from a legal perspective. To other entities, such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture, however, Ccachabamba is only a peasant group, or parcelled land, 
because it has no formal recognition. However, after the dissolution of the Wiracocha 
CAP, the Ministry of Agriculture tried to consider Ccachabamba as a peasant 
community, but the office itself did not approve the legal proceedings for such 
recognition. 
Other agencies that work in the zone, like the municipality of Andahuayhilas, 
unofficially recognise certain organizations (like the Mothers Club), not as a 
community, but as a "popular organization". The aid the State grants the peasants is 
usually delivered to them individually. We also observed that, within the peasant 
group, there is no organization to solve the internal or external conflicts which usually 
tend to arise in any group of people. 
Conclusions: From "Directive" to "Non-Directive" change 
The General Law on Peasant Communities (Law No. 24656) was passed when the 
process of agrarian reform ended, and its results were questioned by peasants, political 
1 2 ) "Social relations always exist, regarding particular topics or problems. If the topic of problem 
disappears, so will the relationship" (Adams 1962:423). 
1 3 ) "These groups result from the need to cooperate at the production level, and are the basis for the 
reproduction of the group and its members, so they are not institutions which perpetuate abstract ideals of 
kindred and equality" (Golte 1987:31). 
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parties, jurists and other groups. However, Law Decree No. 17716 was officially still 
in effect until 1991, when President Fujimori's government finally revoked the Land 
Reform Law in the wave of liberalizing the Peruvian economy. 
Was the General Law on Peasant Communities necessary to replace the 1970 
Statute? One might consider that after seventeen years and the relevant changes in the 
rural social structures -including the adjudication of several ex-haciendas to 
cooperatives and peasant communities-, a new law would be necessary in order to 
recognize the new social reality. To break down this question, we should, first of all, 
consider that the main associative idea of land reform was to create big cooperative or 
agricultural society units (SAIS), the latter based on the cooperation of different 
peasant communities. Therefore, the first aim was not to develop peasant 
communities, but cooperatives or SAIS. 
Moreover, the State promoted the change of some communities into rural 
cooperatives. The By-laws of Peasant Communities did not have an anti-peasant 
community flavour, but presented the cooperative model as preferable. On the other 
hand, Law 24656 focused its attention on the peasant community itself, seeking 
integral development and greater autonomy for them. This law did not try to impose a 
specific model of entrepreneurial organization on the community (Long and Roberts 
1978). 
As observed before, the peasant communities did not reject this law, although there 
has been no explicit support. At least, it respected the social organizations and the law 
traditions of the peasant communities, and was passed by Parliament along with the 
Law on Titling and Demarcation, seen by State law as complementing one another. 
Secondly, the 1979 Constitution had created some space for legal pluralism in 
diverse legal domains, such as that of commercial, family, property and criminal law. 
Although the new peasant law was protectionist-oriented, it recognized some of the 
Andean law institutions that have been described previously. Nevertheless, the 
supposed protectionist issues are currently being criticized by some liberal politicians 
and intellectuals, who visualize the peasant communities as obsolete institutions. 
Paroccan community members, since they were already recognized, tried to follow the 
provisions imposed by law in order to obtain their title deeds. State law and the State 
legal repertoire were invoked in this case by Paroccan. 
In the case of Ccachabamba, the boundary issue and the opposition of a significant 
group of peasants and villagers blocked recognition and registration. There was no 
strategy for confronting the challenges and requirements of the new procedures. Thus, 
it is important to take into account the historical problems and the geographical 
features of the Ccachabamba zone, and especially the role of the opposing interests of 
the peasants living inside and outside the community. 
CHAPTER 6 
Paroccan and Ccachabamba: Changes and Continuities 
In this chapter, we describe and analyse the economic, social and political changes in 
the communities being studied, after all the legal processes of recognition and titling 
had finished. As we have demonstrated, the social protagonists -comuneros, peasants, 
regional and central officers, private agencies- had high expectations regarding these 
proceedings, which oriented their actions and their use of several legal and non-legal 
means in order to achieve their objectives. For the comuneros, it meant the community 
standing up against unfavourable or demanding State policies, the routinized practices 
of street-level bureaucrats and the opposition of their neighbours, and even members 
of the community itself. Finally, it also meant modifying their social and political 
organization, their internal relationships and their productive systems. 
What changes really took place? What characteristics of these communities were 
not -or only slightly modified, and why? How were the communities after the 
legalization? Which of the changes was a result of this process, or were they the 
consequences of other social processes during the same period? We attempt to answer 
these questions in this conclusion. 
6.1 Changes and Continuities in Law and Legal Life 
6.1.1 The Changing Role of State Law 
One of the factors that helped us to see how the relations between State law and 
Andean Law varied during the period under study is the State's changing attitude 
regarding the communities, which went from moderate intervention in community life 
at the beginning to recognition of certain levels of social and legal autonomy of the 
community later. Throughout this period not only did State norms referring to 
communities change but also the role they fulfilled within the State activities 
generally. Following this idea, two important sub-periods stand out in our study: 
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1) From 1970 to 1974, after the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law and the 
Statute of Peasant Communities. As has been mentioned, although these legal 
provisions were not aimed at promoting peasant communities, they allowed, in a 
limited way, the communities' demands and applications regarding their 
recognition and registration. 
There is an explanation for this: From the government's point of view the 
peasantry was a politically important social group that could support its reformist 
policies aimed at restructuring the rural system, especially the hacienda system. 
The instrument favoured by the State in carrying out these changes was precisely 
the law, both through promulgation of new legal rules as well as the creation of 
new judicial tribunals -such as the agrarian courts- for supervising and ensuring 
compliance with the new norms. It must also be borne in mind that these norms 
and institutions were legitimized through a new judicial discourse, which was 
widely disseminated, and which received general acceptance. In other words, law 
and institutions created by legal provisions were considered important instruments 
for social and political change. 
The most important effects of both laws coincided in time with Velasco's 
Administration. But after the internal coup in the military armed forces, the 
government of Morales Bermudez did not carry out the reformist policies of the 
previous government. Radical speech was no longer used, the land reform law was 
halted, and the administrative offices that had tried to control the agrarian and 
peasant changes were dissolved. Although the new government did nothing to 
return to the political conditions reigning before 1969, it developed policies that 
widened the gap between bureaucrats and peasants. 
However, this reformist experience was to have important effects within 
communal life, since -as we saw in the case of Paroccan and Ccachabamba- what 
happened during this period set the conditions for the later problems or 
achievements of these communities. However, the greater contact with State law, 
both at the local as well as institutional level, enabled the communities to form a 
better idea of the law, incorporating it in a much clearer way within their legal 
culture. 
2) The second sub-period can be considered to be between 1985 and 1987, during the 
government of Alan Garcia. A provisional expansion of the economy granted the 
government the political support of different social groups during these years. The 
situation was probably not very different from Velasco's government, but with an 
important difference: even most of the entrepreneurial groups supported the initial 
policies of Garcia's government. 
Just as in the first period, the government was interested in gaining the 
political support of the peasantry, but in this case greater importance was given to 
peasant communities. This was due as much to the bad previous experience as to 
the greater relevance given to these forms of organization within the APRA party's 
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ideology. This was done through mechanisms such as special meetings 
("Rimanakuys") between the charismatic President and the peasant communities, 
the allocation of some specific funding given direcdy to these organizations, and 
the approval of new legal provisions in Congress, such as the laws on boundaries 
and land titling. Therefore, the law was not considered the principal instrument of 
social change, but only as one of the mechanisms within a policy of support to the 
peasant and communal organization. 
It is important to state here that, in these years, the regional governments 
played an important role in applying governmental policies. But the enforcement of 
these laws did not last too long, although they were not abrogated until 1992. The 
reasons behind this are found in the economic development, since the process of 
hyperinflation and recession created strong problems in the implementation of such 
policies. 
But not only the economic crisis neutralized the application of State law. The 
regional bureaucracy could have had their relative autonomy in creating policies or 
in implementing the central State law, but there is still no tradition, on a regional 
level, to implement a general policy without Central State directives. This 
dependency impeded bureaucrats at the regional level from giving support to the 
peasant communities, even though some regional groups were interested in 
enforcing the laws. 
6.1.2 The Changing Significance of the Community and Titling Legislation 
Why was Paroccan interested in its recognition and titling procedures in 1970? Were 
there specific reasons motivating Paroccan's interest in starting legal proceedings? 
Before the Agrarian Reform Law was passed in 1969, there were some State laws 
that enabled communities to request recognition. The key difference from the previous 
period is that State policies and the political and legal discussions created an 
environment for social mobilization of certain peasant groups. 
As was shown in the historical context of this research, the land reform period was 
very controversial, and several conflicts between social groups and with the State were 
seen at different levels. These struggles were both horizontal and vertical. Moreover, 
within the State apparatus, there was a political struggle to direct the political process. 
Even in the capitalist groups, there existed contradictions as to whether to support land 
reform or not, as well as other social changes. 
During this period there existed different attitudes towards the agrarian reform 
issue. Before land reform, there were several conflicts between the social protagonists 
in regions such as Cusco. In some parts of this department (La Convencion and 
Lares), the consensus was broken by massive occupation of hacienda lands by the 
peasants while in others, such as Quispicanchis, there was no apparent conflict. 
Nevertheless, quite a few peasants benefitted from land reform. Most peasant groups 
decided to organise themselves in communities instead of in cooperatives (although we 
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do not have specific data about this point). Others, like Paroccan, which existed as a 
peasant community even before land reform, underwent different conflicts and 
struggles in order to organize their social space during different political periods. 
This space was maintained and acquired informal recognition by other communities 
and owners before land reform. Initially, before the legal proceedings, the 
expectations of recognition or titling were associated with the idea of "legal security". 
Peasants had been told -by State authorities, by their neighbours, by politicians- that 
recognition and titling would ensure and formalize their property. They had also been 
told that they could ask for loans if they were formalized. This can be considered as 
part of the official statements used by other different social protagonists, not only by 
State authorities. Another important factor to take into account is the peasants' 
previous experience with State Courts and administrative offices. Thanks to this 
experience, they knew that there are usually some disadvantages, if they do not have 
their titles or are not registered: rejection by the administration of their applications 
for processing, lack of legal capacity, or ability to benefit from the State's 
adjudications and concessions. 
In this way, the community received a handful of concepts, ideas and definitions of 
law. It was also informed of the government's policies regarding the community, and 
basically of the significance -for the central State- of recognition and titling 
procedures. This conceptual package permitted the Paroccan communal authorities 
-just like the pre-recognition group in Ccachabamba- to build and utilize, together with 
elements of their own local Andean law, a discourse favouring legalization, in order to 
obtain support of the other members of the community. 
On the other hand there were a few peasants who really were not interested in these 
proceedings, since they considered that their property rights were already sufficiently 
respected by people and institutions outside the community. Furthermore, because the 
legalization process implied specific expenses for each comunero, this group achieved 
certain support for their position, questioning the position of the communal authorities 
seeking such recognition. It also would mean a political strike against the whole 
community if the procedures would fail, because the recognition procedures involved 
the good reputation of the community, at least at a subregional level; an argument 
which was used by those opposing legalization. 
In the case of Paroccan, the legal and political discourse of the communal 
authorities was successful, permitting the initiation of the process and overcoming the 
difficulties it faced. This success strengthened the political positions of the communal 
leaders and their families, and also permitted State law to carry out a symbolic and 
integrative role, since it gave the community certain temporary tranquility in the 
normal internal conflicts usually found in a social organization. 
In the case of Ccachabamba it was seen that the idea of "legal security" had a 
totally different meaning, since some peasants already had individual title deeds to 
their lands, which also gave them the legal capacity to face administrative and legal 
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action by the State. This might explain the lack of success the legal security-discourse 
had in this particular space. In short, although these processes were not considered as 
fundamental for Paroccan's survival or its members' self-identity, they helped the 
community to consolidate their organization officially, especially in the presence of 
conservative authorities, who always asked for recognition or title deeds, in order to 
start any legal action such as a contract. 
6.1.3 Changes in the Community's Land Tenure System 
While the comuneros' principal expectations regarding the recognition and titling 
processes were linked to greater security in land holdings, it is necessary to 
understand in what measure these expectations were or were not fulfilled, or whether 
the role that they fulfilled was merely symbolic. However, the changes and 
continuities in Paroccan's landholding system are key topics to understanding the 
changes made in other aspects of its social life. In this sense, we analyse three issues 
below: the actual consolidation of communal property, the strengthening of the idea of 
private property and the opening up of a land market. 
1. The first important issue to deal with is whether or not the titles contributed to the 
existence of the communal lands. Before recognition and the titling process in 
Paroccan, there existed in the community a combination of different forms of 
landholding: communal and private. Although legal recognition did not imply the 
State's acknowledgment of the communal lands, it gave the community the legal 
ability to defend its lands. In this sense, this process reinforced the communal 
ownership of the lands. But there was an important change in 1987 regarding the 
laws of peasant communities, which recognized the above forms of landholding. 
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that the recognition process took 
place before these laws and the subsequent titling process. 
The Law on Titling Peasant Communities, passed in 1987, did not solve these 
boundary problems, but formalized the property of the communities so they could 
handle any agreement with their neighbours. Such was the case of Paroccan, which 
finally obtained titles to its land from the State. The title deeds guaranteed the 
community's property rights, and enabled Paroccan to defend its lands against 
bureaucrats or other individuals who might profit from a situation of uncertainty. 
In short, the legalization process consolidated communal property in the 
outside relations of the community, but not inside it. On the contrary, the 
tendencies to consolidate possession of individual landholdings were reinforced 
after legalization, but it did not mean the disappearance of communal or familiar 
landholding. Additionally, the fact that this private way of looking after their plots 
was accepted by more comuneros did not necessarily mean that the peasant 
considered him or herself as standing outside the community. 
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2. From interviews and conversations held with comuneros themselves, it can be 
stated that most of the time there are definite barriers differentiating between the 
communal and the private, although the titling process in Paroccan reinforced in 
some cases the idea of private property in the community. 
It is clear that, in view of the very little technology they have, productive 
tasks are always going to require the collaboration of neighbours and relations, 
which strengthens the communal nature of the productive process. But they feel 
that the parcels they possess, as well as the products that they generate, are part of 
their individual or family goods. 
However, there are times in which the comunero is identified with the 
community in transactions in which he apparently acts as a lone individual in the 
market. In the latter case, for example, Paroccan's members learned how to ask 
for loans individually. Generally speaking, loans could be requested from the 
Agrarian Bank as a comunero, and also in a communal way. Nevertheless, the 
titling process gave property rights only to the community. To grant loans to 
comuneros as individuals, the Agrarian Bank usually asked whether the comunero 
was registered as a qualified community member. 
Another consequence of the communal property's legalization in Paroccan was 
an increase in contracts for selling and leasing of plots of land -even though this 
was forbidden by the law: contracts between the community and mercantile 
intermediaries, and contracts or agreements with diverse State agencies, in order to 
obtain services for the community. Plots were sold for higher prices after the 
titling process. This is explained by the legal security effect granted by the 
community's title deeds, compared with the insecurity deriving from untitled lands. 
Briefly, the ideology of property and the diffusion of transactions -always 
within the context of a limited market- was more remarkable after the legalization 
of the communal land property. Titling and title deeds granted citizens legal 
security, and enabled them to make different kinds of transactions. People were 
able to ask for credit and offer collateral or mortgage securities, if they 
transformed their possession into property rights. Thus, the title deeds, in a context 
of semi-integration into the market, were symbols or values that somehow actually 
eased certain transactions. Persons or institutions not part of the community also 
learned about these interactions of relations and symbols and participated in them 
as well. Therefore, the legalization process stimulated the relation to the market 
and the world outside generally. 
3. The question of a land market in the communities has been closely related in Peru 
to the discussion concerning whether the State should protect the community or 
not. Mostly, as we have seen, the discussion has had radical aspects. On one hand, 
some Administrations have asked for the dissolution of the peasant communities, 
since they considered them obsolete institutions, preventing the emergence of a 
free market for land. On the other hand, the community was seen as a historical 
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institution where peasants lived, one which was in its own way integrated into the 
State and society and therefore should be protected from people and groups who 
were integrated into society (as individual citizens). This protection should 
-basically- prevent the selling and buying of communal property. 
Both policies regarding communities have been applied until the period under 
study, but have been predominantly protective. Consequently, the State did not 
recognize, in principle, the possibility of opening up the marketing of land. 
However, as we have seen before, the peasants practised unofficial ways of trying 
to open up such a market. 
These practices, however, were not the cause for starting a process of 
micro-fragmentation of land in Paroccan, because the social organization, in this 
case, applied different measures of social control in the prevention and also in the 
repression of most of the actions that could endanger the integrity of the 
community's territory. However, in other communities -before, during and after 
the legalization-, a process of micro-fragmentation began, promoted not only by 
individual comuneros but also communities themselves. 
6,1.4 Changes in the Conflict Resolution System 
Here we will describe some changes in resolving conflicts, and some changes in the 
interaction between Andean law and State law in some procedures, which occurred 
differently in Paroccan and Ccachabamba. 
One important aspect of our research concerns the role of the juridical power in 
the settlement of disputes in the communities studied, before and after the legalization 
process. From a legalistic point of view, the legalization should imply acceptance of 
the State's jurisdiction over the various conflicts existing within the community. But 
due to the previous existence of another conflict resolution system, based on local 
Andean law, what actually took place in the community was the strengthening of what 
K. von Benda-Beckmann calls "forum shopping"; which is the ability of the disputants 
to choose between several institutions to solve their conflicts (1981:117). 
Before the recognition process, there were certain family or land conflicts that 
were first solved by the President of the community, secondly by the Executive 
Council, and finally, by the General Assembly, in terms of community justice. But 
these were not obligatory or formal steps for settling a dispute, because, according to 
the nature of the problem, the President, taking into account whether or not it was a 
hot issue, could refer it to other authorities. Therefore, a higher level of authority 
eventually may have the actual jurisdiction. However, it is also important to point out 
that an agreement could be settled beforehand, by the comuneros in conflict. This 
usually did not occur when a delicate issue was involved; that is, when the case was 
beyond family control and required the intervention of a higher power. 
On the other hand, the peasants also had the right to apply to the Justice of the 
Peace. This judge was directly appointed by the Higher Court of the Judicial District, 
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and formed a part of it, but he is usually elected from among the comumros, and was 
assumed to have an excellent reputation in the community. He could deal with certain 
civil and criminal problems of lesser importance usually after, or instead of the 
community's authorities. In fact, he is part of local law, because his decisions are 
mainly much more strongly based on the community's legal repertoires than on State 
legal terms (Brandt 1990). For example land or family conflicts are decided through 
direct mediation or by the decisions made by this Justice of the Peace. 
In turn, the higher judicial courts resolve certain types of serious conflicts, such as 
murder, according to the existing hierarchy within the Judicial Power in Peru. 
In other cases, peasants could ask for the direct intervention of the civil, criminal 
or agrarian magistrates, instead of trying to solve their problem in the local communal 
way. The selection of the State way could be for various reasons, such as: a) previous 
experience of the comumros in these courts; b) the need to give the solution to the 
existing conflict a more formal nature; and c) the internal convictions and the 
strategies of the parties involved in the issue. These factors are illustrated through 
some cases which took place in Paroccan: 
First case": Conflicts over possession of land 
Pablo, who is a peasant and stranger to the community, "bought" a plot of land from a 
qualified comunero. He cultivated it for a period of time, and obtained the certificate 
of possession from the Ministry of Agriculture regional authorities. The community 
did not isolate him from its organization, but waited for a signal showing he was 
willing to integrate into the community, at least to a certain degree. 
As has been said earlier, the community only allows these contracts under certain 
conditions. They finally found out that Pablo had been doing the same thing in other 
communities, in order to sell the plots later on to other strangers to the community, 
who could pay high prices for them. In this case, the community tried to recover the 
land, and give it to a comunero who did not have any plot of land at all. 
Both Pablo and the communal authorities knew that if they went to Court, they 
would be subject to the State's laws that prevent the "sale" of communal land. The 
community did not want to reach an agreement, because it claimed that the land 
belongs to them, and that under the Political Constitution and State regulations for 
Peasant Communities, community land cannot be sold. 
On the other hand, Pablo knew that State law also favours people who work the 
land, and that the community therefore could not dispossess him. He also knew, from 
State law, that he could not sell the plot he possessed, because although he was the 
holder, the plot belonged to the community. Therefore, he did not want to discuss the 
validity of the sale before the Court. He wanted to discuss his right to continue in 
Following the anthropological tradition, all the names have been changed or altered. 
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possession of the land. In the meantime, the community advised outsiders not to buy 
the plot. 
Although none of the parties were certain about who was going to win the legal 
suit, they decided to go to Court. We must add the current "uncertainty" regarding the 
decisions of the judiciary in the Peruvian legal system, as several studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated (P^sara 1982; De Belaunde 1991; and recendy Bustamante 
1993:54-55). This feature, however, is not strange to the parties; on the contrary, it is 
sometimes, but seldom, used by one of the parties to "scare" and constrain the other 
in order to reach an agreement, even when it is non-profitable for the latter. 
An interesting point is that both parties rely on State law -and not on the local law-
to defend their claims, even though this conflict can be defined as an "internal" one. 
However, the Community will also claim that under Andean law it has the right to 
allocate and distribute land according to the resources available and the needs of each 
family. 
As indicated previously, there are two issues which are of special interest: First, the 
reasons why the parties in conflict go to Court and fail to solve their problems before 
the communal authorities. Second, why State courts, and therefore, State law, is 
chosen as the place to resolve the conflict between the parties. Law has different 
meanings, depending on the objectives and the type of conflict involved. But we 
cannot generally state that State law functions "the" weapon of each party, because in 
the meantime Andean law, political alliances or corruption will be weapons as well, to 
be used in this conflict. 
Will the courts rest on Andean law to solve the conflict? This depends on the 
magistrates' perceptions of the problem, especially on which legal repertoire they 
consider the more important one for their decision. This makes sense when we realize 
that Andean law is not monolithic, and can be interpreted accordingly by each judge. 
Besides, it is important to recall that State law itself incorporates important aspects of 
Andean law, and vice-versa. 
Although this case occurred after the recognition process, we have been told that 
similar cases occurred before it, with different and contradictory results. 
Second Case: Inter-community land conflicts 
Another case illustrates the role of the judiciary in inter-community land conflicts. In 
this case, both communities had a boundary problem and tried to present their problem 
before the Agrarian Court. One of the communities was legally recognized by the 
State and had title deeds, while the other was not. Here, the recognition issue proved 
to be very important in order for the judge to make a formal decision, and it enabled 
the recognized community to win the case concerning the boundary in dispute. 
But when a court makes the final decision, supporting the recognized community, 
and the one that has title deeds, such decision usually cannot be enforced, even if 
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there is violence. When a court decision is not accepted by one of the communities, 
the police will try not to intervene, in order to avoid violence, especially from the 
community members that have lost the case. But a more or less peaceful solution can 
be reached, usually through mutual concessions under in a formal agreement between 
the communities in dispute. 
As we have seen, the State Court decisions are not really enforced in this case. 
What is really important, is the ritual of Andean law, even if it is later formalized by 
a Notary Public, a Judge or a State officer. 
Third case: Taking domestic conflict to State courts 
The following is a case of "forum shopping", concerning the selection of the Court 
within the judicial State system. The case involves the termination of a plot-leasing 
contract between two comuneros in the period under study. 
In this case, the comunero who is the formal landholder according to the 
community's registry wants his plot back, but the lessee wants to continue using and 
exploiting the land. However, he is not a member of the community. There is a 
conflict of interests, in which the community members go to the Justice of the Peace. 
In local legal practice, the community member has the right to lease his plot to 
other community members, or to anyone else. Therefore, we can understand why the 
qualified comunero chooses to go to a "State" authority, who will surely decide in his 
favour, giving him the right to recover his plot. He does not choose the community as 
a forum, because he knows that the other party will go directly to any State judge to 
present his claim. In this way, the qualified comunero undoubtedly should win the 
case. However, the lessee presented the case before the Agrarian Magistrate. The 
community member did not go to the Justice of the Peace. As we have seen, State law 
protects the real worker and holder of the land, and it does not matter if it actually 
belongs to the community. In this way, the lessee ended up winning the case. 
What happened in this case? Formally, land conflicts are solved by the Agrarian 
Magistrate, and not by the Justice of the Peace. The lessee officially won the case, but 
since he wanted to maintain good relations with the community, he negotiated with the 
comunero, within a context in which the community intervened. Negotiation implied 
here an extension of the lease, and after one year the lessee returned the plots to the 
comunero. 
Fourth case: Conflicts over the distribution of lands: The criterion of wealth 
Social differentiation is part of the community's social organization. A case in which 
we appreciate the influence of this phenomenon is the following: A comunero -who is 
considered to be rich- wants to buy more land in the community; however, other 
members are reluctant to accept his having more land, since they think that what he 
already has is enough. 
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In this case the Executive Council disapproved of the idea of this "rich" comunero 
of acquiring more land in the community. The President of the community advised 
him not to create a negative social environment with the other comuneros. This 
intervention finally prevented him to continue with his projet. 
Usually, State law establishes, in the first place, that the community assigns -on a 
family, collective or individual basis- the community's land. But our field research 
shows that land distribution depends on several factors, such as each family's needs, 
the history of the family's good reputation and influence, among others. Therefore, 
some comuneros acquire or possess additional land, depending on their ability or 
money accumulation. Progressively, they become different from the "poor" ones, who 
have just one plot. 
A reprobation of the community, regarding this "excess" in the concentration of 
land is a commonly practised form of social control, exercised by the community, and 
is basically applied to the comunero who tries to exceed what is considered the limits 
of the appropriation of land. 
The Ccachabamba case 
In order to analyze the role of the judicial power in the conflicts that arise in 
Ccachabamba, one has to differentiate between the stages used to solve conflicts 
between the group of peasants that tried to gain recognition as a peasant community, 
and the group that did not want to participate in this experience. 
Conflicts always surfaced in both groups, but the peasants of the first group 
usually tried to reach an agreement. Even though they did not always succeed and 
often finally went to the State Courts, they always made an effort to prevent the 
Court's decisions from ending their social relations or diminishing their goals to be 
recognized as a community. 
With respect to the second group, we found very different attitudes, depending 
basically on the kind of people we were dealing with. This group consisted of 
policemen, teachers, and peasants who were members of other peasant communities, 
or just individuals who owned different plots. Policemen were more likely to go to 
Court, since they considered themselves more able to deal with the legal process. On 
the other hand, there were some peasants who tried to reach an agreement at a first 
stage before deciding to go to Court. 
Since Ccachabamba was formed basically upon the existence of plots which had 
specific owners, it did not have a boundary problem with other communities. Was the 
above situation different, when the CAP Wiracochan existed? In principle, the 
situation has changed. In the beginning the cooperative experience did not work out, 
and as internal relations cooled down, members of the cooperative went directly to 
Court when problems arose, trying at the same time to avoid any intervention by the 
cooperative's authorities. In this case, the judicial authorities were summoned for even 
small domestic problems. 
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6.1.5 Changing Interaction between State and Andean Law 
Differing interpretations of the law at the various levels of State administration, 
regarding Andean community law, mainly concern the issue of recognition of the 
community. 
Some of these agencies, at the intermediate or regional level, usually follow a 
literal or restricted interpretation of the Articles of the community recognition law. So 
they asked the applicants to prove and present all requirements, in order to be 
recognized. On the other hand, at the local administrative level, (for example, City 
Hall or the Agrarian District agency), there sometimes was a semi-official recognition 
of a group that had some of the features of a peasant community, even though they did 
not fulfill all the official legal requirements. By this continuous and good relationships 
between the community and these local institutions are built. Such is the case of 
Ccachabamba. 
These facts cannot be exclusively understood through the distant or close relation 
existing between the community and one or another State agency, or because of a 
special interest of the latter in recognising the community. The different 
interpretational attitudes that state agencies adopt also play an important role. One has 
a restricted, blind attitude towards the requirements of the legal provision; the other 
knows, by own experience, that it is difficult to fulfill all legal requirements, even in 
long-standing recognized communities. For example, the requirement to be 
"traditional" is not necessarily found in all communities, because many of them are 
not ancient or traditional organizations; they have been formed during the land reform, 
or after. There are some cooperatives or peasant groups that have transformed 
themselves into peasant communities, and then asked for recognition. Moreover, some 
of the registered communities are traditional, since they existed before the Republican 
era; but they no longer function like actual communities. They have a formal 
organization before the State authorities but not as real life organizations. On the other 
hand, Ccachabamba's recognition was denied at the intermediate level, because it was 
not a "traditional" organization, even though there is a consistent group within it that 
acts, produces and interacts as a community. 
The above paragraphs show the changes in the interactions between State law and 
Andean law at the local level during the periods studied. First of all, during the 
Agrarian Reform, the State created a new legal structure, sustained in turn by a 
radical legal discourse based on a new concept of law and of justice that sought to 
unite traditionally excluded social groups such as peasants. This discourse penetrated 
deeply into these sectors, thanks to its dissemination not only by State agencies but 
also by private ones such as NGOs. 
The process of legalization gave the community a lesson on the concept of law 
managed by street-level bureaucrats, and at the higher levels of State administration. 
The protagonists managing their own concepts and interests have learned that they will 
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have to struggle -for example, against attempts to formally block recognition of 
Paroccan- or to negotiate with others -in the case of the inscription of comuneros- in 
order to gain certain positions. In each struggle, one actor learns from another, and 
probably, in many cases, the different actors internalize part of another's language. 
This learning process helped to create a different concept of local law, in which 
values and ideas emerged from both the State and the community were combined. For 
example, legalization introduced a concept of a State property in these settings: the 
State was the one that adjudicated or recognized the community's property; it was the 
ultimate owner of the land and natural resources, not the community. 
The peasants in charge of the legalization procedure identified themselves with 
local versions of State law, and it seemed -on some extreme occasions- that the only 
law they knew was State law. This occurs, for example, when the peasants or their 
attorneys hide their legal discourses, which are really based on their values and legal 
norms, in the State's language, especially if the decision must be made by the State 
authorities. But, in our opinion, this was merely a strategy to succeed in the titling and 
recognition process. 
Therefore, Andean law remained valid throughout this period although 
incorporating some elements of State law. Thus, there were some elements of Andean 
law used by the comuneros of Paroccan in order to be recognized and gain access to 
title deeds, such as their historical existence as a peasant community, the landholding 
system, recognition by local authorities and other communities. But it would be 
one-sided to say that only Andean law permitted Paroccan to be recognized; the State 
law's regulations also qualified Paroccan to be registered. However, the permanence 
of Andean legality can be seen in certain forms of contractual agreements on property 
and availability of communal lands and in the maintenance of their own space by 
resolution of conflicts. Hence, Andean or State law are not different blocks of 
normative structures, with an isolated set of values. Thus, the period under study 
showed different features of legal pluralism, in the interactions between the various 
levels of the State and local Andean law. 
The later deactivation of the Agrarian Reform and the course of State legal policy 
of changing institutions did not change the level of interaction between both laws, but 
it did give it a new meaning. The State stopped promoting a socializing, cooperativist 
model inside the communities, in order to promote a much more liberal ideology 
based on the principles of private property and individual autonomy. This affected the 
organizational structure and landholding not only in the communities -where there was 
already a tendency in this respect due to market effects- but also in the rural world in 
general. Although during the government of Alan Garcia there was an attempt to 
protect the communities from this process, giving them greater autonomy and making 
their communal social control mechanisms more powerful, this process continued 
developing as is clearly shown in the case of Ccachabamba. 
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6.2 Changes and Continuities in Social, Economic and Political Organization 
If we address the consequences of the legalization process for the recognized peasant 
communities, we certainly can note that it has wrought changes in several aspects of 
the organization, such as in the landholding system, in the peasant community's form 
of internal and external relations, and in production and productivity. At the same 
time, however, we find certain continuities in the organization of Paroccan's social 
life, which allows us to understand and determine the real social effects that the law 
has had concerning social change. Besides, we should ask ourselves whether the 
perceived changes were actually effects of the recognition and titling procedures, or if 
they were a result of other significant social processes, among which legalization had 
only a secondary role. 
6.2.1 Changes in the Socio-PoliticaJ Organization 
A central question regarding the consequences of the legalization process is whether 
there were any changes in the social relationships within the community's 
organization. A first consideration is that although Paroccan preserved its informal 
way of organization, in principle the community had to adjust its formal organization 
to the structure established by State law. But at the same time this structure was not 
strictly followed: the important decisions were made by the President of the Board, 
secondly, by the Executive Council and finally by the General Assembly. In this way, 
the Executive Council, and especially the President of the Community, consolidated 
their position as leaders of the organization, since they were the ones who had to 
obtain the resources to try to solve the problems, or work with the social or political 
groups or contact persons that helped the community in the legal procedures. 
Power relations also changed in the community, since these leaders strengthened 
their positions and good reputation. Also the delegates elected by the community to 
start and continue the legal procedures were well respected members of the 
community. As long as they could solve some of the difficulties involved in these 
processes, they gained an even better reputation. The comuneros who had good lands 
also got better prices from them, since the formalization process had a direct effect on 
the market value of the community's territory. 
Another issue is whether the legalization meant more dedication by the comuneros 
to the community, in terms of time, energy, financial investment, work, etc., due to 
the legal security that their new legal status must have provided them. There are two 
sides to this important question: whether the comuneros invested more in themselves 
and allocated more resources in order to exploit their plots of land, or whether they 
invested more in the community's plot or duties; or, finally whether they invested 
more in both the community and their own plots? 
It is very hard to generalize in order to answer each question, because it depends 
on several variables, such as the effects of the national or regional economy on the 
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community, and whether there were good prices for their products. For example, a 
bad situation in the national or regional economy usually forced the peasants to 
migrate temporarily to the big cities, and therefore to dedicate less time to their plots 
or to communal affairs. 
There were also other factors that influenced the energy and time devoted by the 
peasants to the community, related to the family's economy: if the peasant had other 
interests, like a small business, another plot in a distant locality, or if they had a job, 
this influenced the dynamics of each comunero and his family, because in most cases 
the family is going to allocate energy and time to their own benefit, making the 
community's sake secondary. There was probably not enough time to participate in the 
community's duties. In this case, only a few families in this situation invested time 
and money to improving the community. The centre of the family was therefore its 
own economy. The comunero, his wife and children, were all involved in sustaining 
the family's economy. 
The peasants who had only their plots as a material source were more able to 
dedicate themselves to the community. Their investment of time, energy, labour and 
money in the community was significant. Their expectation was to gain access to 
another plot by adjudication or to participate in activities that created different types of 
reciprocal relations. The services to be received would solve the gaps in their 
economy. One point that has to be mentioned is that these reciprocal relations were 
carried out between rich peasants as well as poor ones. Reciprocity really created a 
system and different sub-systems of asymmetric relations, in which some peasants 
reinforced their position in the community, others did good business, and some just 
solved a specific material problem, even when they had not made a good deal. 
Thus, few peasants became wealthy thanks to their access to land and other 
resources in the community. In this situation, the peasants tried to maintain, 
consolidate and make their children reproduce their roles. They also developed other 
interests outside the community, but remained strongly linked to it. 
6.2.2 Changing Role of Women 
Another question is whether the role of women changed with or after the legalization 
process. A comparison between Paroccan and Ccachabamba shows differences in 
womens' role during this period. 
According to Casos (1987), the comunera has an important role in the production 
and reproduction of communal life, since the division of labour was limited essentially 
to the difference between sex and age. Hence, within the family she not only is 
responsible for the care and raising of the children, but also carries out a series of 
productive tasks. For example, she is the one in charge of guaranteeing the quality of 
the seed during the sowing season, of convening the families with which there are 
reciprocal relations, of organizing and feeding those who collaborate during the 
"ayni", and of helping her parents or her husband and children during the harvest 
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(1987:31-34). Casos also indicated that it is generally the women who are responsible 
for the sale or barter of the products obtained in the market, thus guaranteeing the 
family subsistence. 
Despite this, the participation of women within the communal power structure 
-General Assembly and Executive Council- has been and is still rather limited. 
Usually, the representation of the family in Assemblies is by the husband, although in 
some cases -such as when the latter are working outside the community- their wives 
replace them, their presence becoming increasingly notable. Similarly, the posts of 
authority are traditionally assumed by men, although Casos mentions the case of a 
woman, Quintina Hombre, who was Vice President of the Vigilance Council for four 
years in the neighbouring community of Munapata (1987:91). However, neither in 
Paroccan nor in Ccachabamba has a similar situation yet arisen. 
In Ccachabamba, the productive and political roles of women were more 
remarkable than in Paroccan, because the men often had to migrate temporarily to 
complement their scarce resources. Faced with a lack of men, women had an active 
role in the social organization, in production and in the daily problems of the 
community, occupying many places that traditionally were taken by men. 
In the case of Paroccan, the role of women remained more or less the same as 
before, during and after the legalization process. There were periods when the women 
played a more active role, especially when the community was in trouble, or had to 
deal with important aspects of communal life, for example in the struggle to obtain 
services from the State. But the legitimacy obtained by the male communal leaders 
after legal recognition has inhibited even more the possibility of women having access 
to posts of authority, and then had to maintain more traditional roles. On the other 
hand, this process did not change the participation of women in the transactions that 
made it possible for them to have access to land. There were relevant precedents, in 
which women and men were able to qualify as comuneros in the community, having 
equal rights and obligations. But this was not a situation without conflicts of gender. 
6.2.3 Changes in Land Tenure and Migration 
An important question relating to the changes produced by the legalization of the 
community is the migration issue. In principle, we do not have exact statistics on this 
point, but generally the migration process has various causes, such as the low 
productivity of the lands, the need for complementary income, the dynamics of the 
labour market itself, the lack of job possibilities in the zone itself or the search for a 
better future, either individually or for the family. 
In the case of Paroccan, one element that strongly motivated emigration, especially 
of the young, was the increase in the population density versus the scarcity of lands, 
and not so much the different or even opposite values or practices between 
generations, as was the case in other rural Andean regions. Young people felt 
frustrated when they did not achieve their goals, and specifically when the community 
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did not assign lands to them. 
We should distinguish here between educated and non-educated youngsters. In 
principle, formal education gave young people a good reputation, status and 
recognition, enabling them to obtain skills and knowledge that differentiated them 
from the comuneros who did not have any formal education. Nevertheless, this did not 
mean automatic access to land or to leadership positions. They had to follow the 
routine forms of land acquisition: buying, renting or inheritance. But only when they 
carried out special services for the community, using their skills and knowledge, did 
they achieve a favourable environment for receiving some of the community land by 
adjudication, or some other resources. In some cases the young people attempted to 
take over certain posts of authority in their social space, based upon their social 
accomplishments. But most of them preferred to get jobs in the cities, working for 
private enterprises or State agencies. 
On the other hand, young people who did not receive a formal education most of 
the time simply had to emigrate, unless they were adjudicated a little parcel of land by 
their parents. Due to their lack of education, this group had only very limited 
possibilities of getting good jobs in the places they migrated to, such as in the centre 
of Cuzco, some parts of Madre de Dios where gold panning is a common practice, or 
in Lima. In the case of Madre de Dios, the terrible labor conditions of gold panners 
forced the youngsters, in many cases, to return home within a few years, however 
often with the necessary capital to acquire some land. 
After the legalization process, the communal authorities tried to find ways to meet the 
demands of the young comuneros. Thus, the Executive Council, with the support of 
the NGO Ccaijo, promoted some productive projects within the community, in order 
to create conditions to expand the economy for the new generations. These projects 
consisted of the assignment of specific plots for feeding small animals like chicken, 
rabbits and others, in order to enable the young people to make some profits. They 
were also invited, and paid to participate, in the reforestation and tree protection 
project. However, these projects failed to obtain the desired results. 
Nevertheless, the initial enthusiasm triggered off by the legalization of the 
community was important. The recongnition and titling processes produced something 
like a magic charm. The legalization of the property in particular influenced the return 
of some comuneros to the community. However, problems like unemployment and 
access to land for the youngsters continued. 
6.2.4 Changes in Production and Productivity 
Initially, the recognition and the titling process was favourable for obtaining better 
results in production quality and intensity. Therefore, in this respect the legalization 
had an important role, especially the first years concerning community life. After 
some time, however, the communal production began depending on other factors, such 
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as relationships between the comuneros, weather conditions, the amount of water for 
irrigation, diseases that might affect animals or plants, among others. Nation-wide 
factors such as the economic recession, the relative prices of Andean and other 
products also influenced the increase or decrease, as well as the quality of products 
and productivity in general. 
On the other hand, after the recognition process, the consolidation of a 
micro-regional market made the peasants more active in their relationships with the 
State's apparatus, the financial circuit and the Urcos merchants. New or improved 
roads connecting the community with the highway also facilitated more intensive 
relationships with external agencies and individuals. "Market" in the context of the 
sub-region of Urcos means a specific space in which different types of transactions 
usually take place, such as informal loans, selling agricultural products and animals, 
selling and renting of plots, etc. The small scale of Paroccan's economy did not allow 
the peasants to reach out beyond the sub-regional market, but kept them bound to the 
conditions and transactions which were part of the financial and economic sub-regional 
circuit. But the sub-regional market was quite active, and attracted different types of 
commodities. Here different individuals and institutions engaged in various types of 
transactions in which State contract law as well as Andean contract law (as barter) 
constandy merged and overlapped. 
6.2.5 The Changing Material Conditions of Life 
Combining the historical and material aspects of the peasant economy and the 
communities under study, we can note that there is some evidence of an improvement 
in the material conditions of the legalized community of Paroccan. 
Generally speaking, the regional and national economic conditions - like more 
attention given by the State to the different social actors, or the economic crisis - are 
important factors for understanding the improvement of material conditions. For 
instance, specific temporary socio-economic programs implemented by the national 
government at the regional and sub-regional level improved the quality of life in the 
peasant groups under study. Another important element was the effort made by the 
community's own members to improve their material conditions before and after 
legalization. 
There are no specific studies dealing with the impact of the land reform or the 
legalization process on schooling, food, or health conditions in the area, because the 
agrarian reform has usually been studied by looking at social structure or at the 
(changing) prices, quantities or qualities of products. But generally it can be said that 
educational conditions improved for the poor during the second period (1985-1987), 
since the State was strongly interested in investing in elementary schooling. This 
period was also not bad for the development of health services; not so much because 
the government had any consistent health policy but because the economic crisis that 
began in 1987 towards the end of Alan Garcia's administration had not yet reached its 
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greatest depth. This crisis did not prevent some short periods during which the 
material conditions at the sub-regional level were improved. Better prices for the 
peasant economy's products did not depend exclusively on the national economy, but 
also on prices on the international market for specific products. The improvement of 
material conditions in the sub-region is, for example, visible from the increased 
number of children attending school, especially after 1975. There was also greater 
access to medical doctors in town. 
6.3 Conclusions 
When the different governments enacted the peasant community legislation they had 
certain expectations regarding changes or the continuities in these social institutions. In 
the different periods they wanted to integrate them into the national or regional 
market, to improve the community's production or living conditions, or merely to 
reinforce its organization in order to maintain its autonomy. 
The peasants or comuneros, on the other hand, also had their own expectations 
with regard to legalization. In some cases, such expectations were identical to those of 
the government, but in other cases, they were not. The peasant motivations with 
respect to legalization actually reacted to the conviction or belief that legalization was 
a way or mechanism for resolving certain problems significant to them and their social 
life. 
The changes and continuities registered here are therefore in part the result of the 
combination of the governments' and the peasants' expectations, but also of their 
frustrations. And we say, "in part", because, as we have clearly seen, most of the 
changes produced in these communities were finally the result of wider social 
processes, which in those years modified the structure of power and the market, at a 
regional and local level. 
In this sense, the legalization process helped to support some processes -like 
strengthening the good reputation of the community's organization, or the acquisition 
of credit, but also to block others, mainly in the non-recognized communities. 
Legalization thus was not a neutral process in the communities under study, even 
though it did not carry out the objectives or goals expected. 

CHAPTER 7 
Summary and General Conclusions 
In this final chapter we see how the legalization of the community and its lands -or the 
failure to achieve this situation- managed to push, modify or stop some social 
processes which had been taking place within the communities being studied. Some of 
these changes were expected by the comuneros while others were not. Nevertheless 
these processes should be seen from a wider point of view, to permit us to draw 
conclusions about some key questions presented in the investigation. For example, 
what, finally, is the idea of community that predominates within the State and for the 
comuneros? Is our idea of legal pluralism adequate or not to explain all these 
processes? Did socio-legal interactions between peasant and State bureaucrats end with 
the legalization, or did they assume another form? What can be expected from this 
relation achieved between communities and the State? 
Although some of these questions have already been touched upon in the previous 
chapters, we wish here to draw up a final synthesis to permit us to draw theoretical 
conclusions on the subjects of our research. To this end some important empirical 
conclusions are presented, arising from the earlier analysis, in order to go back to the 
theoretical ideas presented initially, re-elaborating them and amplifying them in some 
cases. 
7.1 The Effects of Legalization on the State and the Community 
With the Agrarian Reform process, State recognition began to be important to the 
peasants. Authors like Brandt (1987:b), Costa (1981), Del Castillo (1987), Figallo 
(1986) and Pdsara (1978 and 1988) have written about legalization earlier. But they 
see the importance of this process mainly in the sense that recognition is a legal 
resource of the communities to avoid any abuse by or conflict with haciendas or other 
elite local and regional groups. However, my study analyses legalization differendy, in 
a wider process, relating it to ideas of legal pluralism and socio-legal interactions 
between peasants and the State, among other issues. 
The liquidation of the hacienda regime began to give this possibility new meaning: 
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the legalization began to be seen also as a way to ensure a response from the State to 
a set of problems that had begun to confront the comuneros: lack of lands, migration 
to urban centres, lack of basic services, loss of authorities' legitimacy, individualism, 
etc. Hence, recognition, registration and titling of lands began to be considered as an 
important issue by the communities. 
As shown in previous chapters, the legalization process influenced several aspects 
of communal life, such as communal infrastructure, irrigation systems, financial aid, 
productivity, etc. Most of these improvements would not have been made without the 
State's intervention, which shows that, to a certain degree, the comuneros achieved 
their objective of ensuring State aid through these mechanism. However, not even this 
aid could reverse some of the processes -such as the pressure to migrate- that were 
based on more global factors. 
Secondly, to be successful in the legalization process, the comuneros had to have 
the right "spirit". This turned out to be an important factor, because it permitted 
various problems encountered during the process to be resolved. In this sense, the 
historical factor and the geographical features play an important role, because they 
permitted maintaining certain forms of integration and identity among the members of 
the community, which had been fading away due to the problems mentioned above. 
The success of legalization strengthened the communal spirit and also provided the 
communal organization with new vitality. 
Thirdly, the legalization process also played an important role in the change and 
transformation of the Andean cosmo-vision. New patterns of conduct, attitudes, beliefs 
and values are being constantly introduced, changing the shape of peasant 
communities. This influence can also differ between communities located near the 
roads going to important markets, and others located in very poor Andean zones. 
Finally, although Paroccan did not have significant problems with its neighbours 
concerning boundaries, in most of the rural zones there were constant conflicts 
between communities or with third parties over the possession of lands. This meant 
that the stages of agreements were dismissed, or that the State Court decisions did not 
end the conflict. The Law of Titling of Peasant Communities, passed in 1987, did not 
solve all these boundary problems, but only formalized the property of the 
communities that could reach agreement with their neighbours. Such was the case of 
Paroccan, which finally obtained title deeds from the State. 
However, the communal organization was not the only beneficiary of the 
legalization. The State also managed to partly reinforce its legitimacy and importance 
within legalized communal spaces, as can be seen in the case of the conflict resolution 
system. The cases presented in the preceding chapter show that the the selection of 
State courts to resolve conflicts was greatly stimulated, and it even stopped being 
foreign to the community. Nevertheless, most of the comuneros kept on choosing the 
local conflict-resolving system. Moreover, legal pluralism is weak in the cases of 
felonies or crime, unlike in other countries. For example, in penal conflicts, there is 
total subordination to State law; in land conflicts both systems prevail; in family 
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conflicts the local Andean law has priority. 
7.2 The Land Tenure System in the Communities 
The land tenure system has changed considerably within the peasant communities. 
There are several issues to take into account when explaining these changes. The first 
is to consider the geographical area in which the community is located, its 
accessibility and the type of resources that a community has, the ecological levels 
found there, etc. A second issue is formed by the common features that peasant 
communities have in a specific region or sub-region, and the relationships between 
them and with other social actors on a regional level. A third important issue is to 
understand the categories and concepts used in the description and analysis of the 
Andean land tenure system. The concepts of "individual" or "collective" are easier to 
explain in a western economy, but not in the Andean one. 
During the Inca period, the ayllus were developed within a context in which the 
concept of "property" was associated with the idea of "State". Social differentiation 
was clearly established between the Inca's family, the military, the priesthood, State 
officials and the Indian population, and it certainly existed also within the ayllu itself, 
despite its apparent homogeneity. 
The same assumptions have been made in studies about the Indian communities 
during the time of Spanish rule. The whole society was socially differentiated, because 
differences were considered inherent to humanity, and differentiation was a policy 
followed by the Spaniards. The lend tenure system changed during this period, the 
best lands being awarded to the Spaniards while, after the concentration of the 
indigenous people in reducciones, their territorial rights were recognized but this did 
not necessarily signify a collective property of the land. 
Concerning the Republican period, we recall that the criollos gained control of the 
government, Spanish rule ended and important changes in the social and political 
structure took place. Here the social and political differentiation was no longer 
primarily upheld for racial reasons, as during the Spanish rule, but rather was based 
on wealth, contacts in the different economic and political spheres, handling of 
knowledge and technology and the ability to transport goods both horizontally and 
vertically. 
In this period, the land tenure system was based on the existence of large 
landholders and owners of sugar haciendas, who controlled political power until the 
land reform of 1969. Many of these haciendas and big landholdings were formed at 
the time of the appropriation, dirough legal and extra-legal ways, of communal lands. 
Communal lands were finally reduced to the poorest and highest lands, such as 
occurred in Cuzco. The constitutional recognition of the communities as from 1921 
which granted communal lands their inalienable character, did not stop this process 
which could only finally be stopped by the Agrarian Reform. 
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In this reform, the communal organization was considered an important element in 
the landholding system. The communal domain was respected, since it had been 
decided that the communities should regain unexploited parcels. The community's 
primacy in the organization of activities dealing with agricultural production was also 
allowed. That is to say, the Agrarian Reform recognized the community as a unit of 
production. But it also recognized that other associative forms, like the cooperatives, 
could exploit farming lands, and preferred this model to the communal one in order to 
apply it to the peasants' community. Perhaps the Statute on the Peasant Communities 
contains the widest recognition of customary norms. It authorized the ruling of the 
community's regime by traditional norms, but also limited the customary rights over 
lands, pastures and waters. This meant a restriction on the operation of customary 
law, since it minimized its effectiveness and objectives. 
The land tenure system in Peru has changed significandy since the land reform. 
Most of the cooperatives and other associative forms such as SAIS have now been 
dissolved, different social types of small landowners have been created. The large 
extensions of landholdings have not been completely abandoned, however, especially 
since the economic crisis deepened in the 1980s and the presence of terrorist groups 
such as Shining Path was felt. Nevertheless, in recent decades the communities have 
shown an extraordinary capacity for survival. 
7.3 Andean Law and Conflict Resolution 
Andean law becomes manifest concretely in my research locations. Because it may 
be rather different in other Andean regions which make no part of my research, the 
following ideas refer to the notion and assumptions over possible manifestations of 
Andean law rather than a descriptive analysis. 
Andean local law does not need external enforcement. It is legitimised and 
enforced by the same social groups that enact it. People identify themselves with their 
rules, procedures, sanctions and decisions. When one of their institutions is old 
fashioned, peasants just change it. That is why Andean law is alive and continuously 
changing. 
This allegiance to their legal institutions does not mean they would not look also 
for State law support when necessary. However, the peasants deal with it in a 
contradictory way. While asserting the value and effectiveness of their own legal 
institutions, they feel also an urgency to anchor their claims and positions in official 
law. There seems to be a functional division in this regard. Peasants do not apply the 
Civil law framework to their marriages, transactions or work contracts, but they 
employ State law in emergency cases, once conflict or disagreement has developed. 
Consequently, the peasants do not ignore State law, as some scholars note, but they 
are somewhat reluctant to accept it completely. As I have observed, even in processes 
aimed at benefitting peasant communities there is resistance towards exogenously 
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originated procedures. 
Comuneros do not consider State law as a way of preventing conflicts. They 
mostly use it as an a posteriori device, probably because cultural reasons prevent them 
from incorporating State legal structures. Some scholars suggest that peasants not only 
ignore State law, but do so deliberately from ignorance. 
Peasants usually do not trust judges and State officials. Their experience when 
dealing with them has been quite distressing. State authorities, in most cases, 
supported the hacendados against the interests and possessions of the peasantry. Even 
though haciendas have disappeared, State officials have still failed to understand and 
support peasants. When there is a power or wealth differential vis-á-vis non-local 
parties, comuneros expect judges and authorities to favour the richer parties. 
Within this context, peasants are willing to submit their grievances to their own 
institutions and procedures. After all, their conflict resolution mechanisms have 
important advantages over the official ones: easy access, low expenditure, absence of 
delays, shared language and cultural code and closeness of the people involved. At the 
same time, peasants can approach their traditional authorities with less awe and 
feelings of uncertainty than state authorities. 
It is important to point out that peaceful coexistence is a permanent goal in 
peasants' interactions. In most cases, proceedings try to find the real problems behind 
the explicit demands and claims. This method allows the opponents to recognize the 
deep causes of their controversy and to seek a satisfactory agreement. If they cannot 
find it, the authority's final decision usually is to propose a compromise. The parties 
have to make concessions to each other. And both receive a partial solution to their 
claims. 
Using the same logic, peasants try to solve not only the problem sub litis, but to 
prevent new disagreements from arising. Therefore, authorities pay special attention to 
victims' situation, and to the need to compensate them for damages. Sometimes 
compensations can be just symbolic, but they express a way of solving moral or 
non-material problems. In some cases the answer is not to propose any solution, but to 
delay the decision of the authority. Peasants think this will allow the parties to 
examine the matter more carefully and less passionately in order to reach a solution 
through direct bargaining. 
When there is an action opposed to the communal interest, the sanction is aimed at 
reintegrating the trespasser into the community. Comuneros give their verdicts an 
educational purpose. Changes of attitude can be achieved by the imposition of a fine, 
by forced communal work or by a short period in the communal jail. A common 
psychological punishment is based on public humiliation that induces shame in the 
trespasser. Punishments are applied with an admonitory objective. Physical 
punishment is still present in some communities. If the transgressor does not show a 
real desire to better his conduct, he can receive the strongest sanction of all: expulsion 
from the community. In the Andean world, this is almost as serious as a death 
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sentence, because nobody can survive alone. Thus, other sanctions can be considered 
as ways of preventing the trespasser from being cast out by his social group. 
The enforcement of sanctions is not universal. Unlike occidental law, peasants do 
not set the same abstract measure of punishment for everyone. Their decisions are 
based on all they know about the subject involved, on the personal characteristics and 
individual and social background. Consequently, when the transgressor is a foreigner, 
the decision is also different. Peasants often see the foreign trespasser as an aggressor 
against communal order and the comuneros' goods and lives. 
7.4 Common Problems, Common Solutions 
We can point out several problems shared by the communities being studied, and 
which should be solved soon. These problems relate principally to the communities' 
integration into the market and their relationship with the Central State. The solutions 
necessarily have to involve a redefinition of the relationship existing between the 
Andean and the State legal systems. 
As we have seen, the communities studied have their own particular problems, but 
they share certain other problems which affect most of the peasant communities in 
Peru. Among the latter problems we can point out three of the most relevant 
quandaries: the weakening of the communal organization, the scarcity of lands and the 
great expectations of the comuneros regarding State aid. We can add a fourth, which 
derives from the above mentioned three: the absence of alternatives. 
The first problem -the continuing weakening of the communal organization- is 
caused by the lack of participation in labour and communal work groups, lack of 
interest in attending communal assemblies, tension and struggles among the different 
power groups, the migration of adults and youngsters, the generation conflict and 
growing distrust of directive authorities. As we can see, many of these factors have 
nothing to do with the internal dynamics of the community, but with external causes, 
like the rising cost of living and the lack of job opportunities within the community. 
This results in increasing hardships for communities like Paroccan that experience, 
for instance in the application of social control mechanisms over its members and theñ-
resources, a tendency towards breaking-up of the communal bond that holds the 
members of the community together. On the other hand, what really matters is the fact 
that, like in Ccachabamba, the comuneros themselves have noticed how important it is 
to obtain or keep a communal organization capable of defending themselves against 
common problems, such as the drop in market prices for the crops they cultivate, 
thereby filling a gap which the State is not interested in dealing with. 
The second problem is also shared by both the communities we have studied. This 
refers to the lack of available lands within the community. It is a problem that gets 
worse in those cases where there is great number of youngsters, poor quality land and 
the impossibility of expanding the boundaries of the communal territory. The 
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consequences, as we have seen, are increasing tensions among the comuneros (or 
peasants, in the case of Ccachabamba). These tensions are present among the rich and 
poor (criteria established regarding how much land each one holds), or between the 
younger and older comuneros. When there is a strong organization, as in the case of 
Paroccan, it can mediate in order to reduce or even stop the conflicts, but there is not 
much it can do to solve the real conflict, in which a solution can be achieved only by 
acquiring more land. 
As Hopkins (1990:17) points out, when it comes to this problem, the peasants 
usually propose that in the first place there should be a restructuring or redistribution 
of the communal lands. In the second place, they propose more intensive usage of 
agricultural lands, by means of new cultivating techniques. However, their first 
suggestion would require a restructuring parallel to the power relations within the 
community, something that is very hard to achieve without breaking the communal 
unit itself. The second suggestion, besides requiring training and infrastructure, will 
not solve the problem of land distribution. 
We feel that the above is a problem which requires even more attention than the 
scholars are giving it, mainly because we feel that it would be in touch with the 
government's objectives for incorporating communal lands into the land market. 
This leads us to the government's role in the communities' issue. In his work, 
Hopkins concludes that: 
"The peasant expects too much from the State. Many of the alternatives 
proposed depend directly on the government's actions. This is expressed in 
economic problems, and in technical and social aspects as well" (1990:19). 
Our research shows the truth behind this assertion. In this way, the peasants' quest for 
recognition and titling is just one way to secure an answer to their problems from the 
State. But we have also seen that this answer depends a great deal on the interest or 
needs which the State has in this social sector, which is why these expectations are not 
met most of the time, or when they are, in a very restricted way. 
Consequently, legalization of the community should not be the only goal. What the 
community requires is to strengthen the communal organization's mediator role in 
relation to the State, using it to demand more access to land, credits, supplies, 
technology, training, etc. This turns out to be even more necessary in a political 
context in which the State is trying to ignore its social role in the most needy sectors. 
Finally, we have the problem regarding alternatives: in other words, in what way 
can the comuneros find adequate solutions to these and other serious problems 
affecting them? Hopkins is not optimistic about this: to him, the peasants show litde 
capacity for finding solid and precise alternatives (1990:15). We have seen, however, 
that after various centuries of domination and imposition, the communities have 
always found creative and talented ways for survival. Because of this, we believe the 
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communities will finally find the way to keep their autonomy and their vitality, even 
though this seems practically impossible, considering the actual context (Bonilla 1987; 
CabaUero 1990; Figueroa 1987; Gonzales de Olarte 1986; Mallon 1983). 
7.5 Theoretical Conclusions 
7.5.1 State Bureaucracy and Peasant Communities 
In our research special attention is given to the behaviour of the different levels of 
bureaucratic offices in charge of communal demands, and to strategies developed by 
the peasants in order to achieve their objectives. 
Considering this issue, we think that the varied behaviour of the State's 
administration, on its different levels, must be more deeply analysed. There are two 
issues that deserve special attention: On the one hand the form in which the different 
levels of public administration in Peru organize and make connections; and on the 
other hand, the rationality that dominates this organization. One of the main features 
of the Peruvian State is its centralism. It is Lima -thus referring to a particular region-
where the most important decisions are made, where development models and the 
normative framework of such models are elaborated. Then, the central authorities try 
to impose these models in the different regions, through local bureaucrats, regardless 
of whether the model is adequate to that reality. In this case, what they are trying to 
do is adapt the reality to the model, not the other way round (Giesecke 1989). 
Centralism, and the supremacy given to the model over the reality, impedes 
smooth communication between the different bureaucratic levels, and between 
bureaucracy as a whole with society. Problems that can be emerge at the local level 
are not seen as deficiencies in the model, but as errors or incapacity of the officials 
charged with applying it. Depending on each particular case, this conception can have 
the consequence that the lower levels -street level bureaucrats- become more 
accessible, because they do not want their superiors to realize how incapable they are 
to carry out the established developed model; or on the contrary, namely that they, as 
in Ccachabamba, strictly adhere to the normative framework ordered from above 
without taking into account the demands of the individuals or organizations which 
should be the beneficiaries of the law. 
As we saw there is a mutual conditioning dynamism in the role law plays in 
State-peasant community relations. Andean law is influenced by the different levels at 
which State law operates, and this depends on different variables like migration, 
market relations, the history of the peasant group. Also, State law borrows some 
elements from Andean law, without openly acknowledging it. State officials are 
probably not conscious of this concession to legal pluralism, but their decisions are 
very useful for understanding the dynamics of Andean law. 
We also saw that in the case of Paroccan, the national level was more accessible at 
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one stage than the regional one. The Paroccan attorneys appealed precisely to the 
space where a decision of this type might be taken. Therefore, we can say that the 
relationships which can be established between the State and the Peasant Communities 
do not necessarily have to go through strictly following State law and the rules for the 
legalization process. On the contrary, these relations must be studied from different 
perspectives that complement each other. Perhaps the final fate of peasant 
communities in Peru is very related to the results and proposals that might result from 
these studies. 
7.5.2 The Concept of Community 
One of the most important conclusions in our study is that the term "community" 
denotes different realities, and is used by the social protagonists with several 
meanings. We cannot say that the peasant community is the homogenous, monolithic 
and romantic institution imagined and created by the indigenists at the beginning of the 
XLX century. We can find authoritarian relations and domination among the peasants, 
but also order and common values which allow them to build the idea of a 
"community" and extend it to the external world. 
Unfortunately, this diversity is not even perceived by lawyers. But it is important 
to explain the different effects and answers concerning the community's legislation, in 
each concrete case or region, together with the characteristics of the bureaucracy in 
the country. In this way, the concept of community that predominates at the level of 
power will be moulded in State norms, and this concept then will be disseminated in 
turn throughout the different levels of State bureaucracy. This concept is the one the 
communities will face when wishing to initiate their legal recognition and titling of 
lands by the State, and it will not always be equal to what the comuneros themselves 
handle and with which they identify. In turn, the comuneros will try to have their own 
idea of community recognized by the State. Therefore, the definition of the community 
is subject to a dynamic and continuous process that shows, in turn, the role played by 
law as the space for defining and redefining social roles. 
7.5.3 Law and Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Concepts 
In the introduction we gave our concept of the law, saying that it is a social product 
created by man to satisfy his need for social togetherness. But, as we could see from 
the study of Paroccan and Ccachabamba, this social "living together", commonly 
speaking, is very difficult to achieve. The problems and obstacles which will be met 
by legal institutions in order to fulfill this function are very difficult indeed to 
overcome and at times, cannot be overcome at all. Therefore, a first proposal is the 
possibility of looking at law from a conflict perspective, rather than from a balanced 
one, in order to understand the way the law will react at different social levels. 
This does not mean that our dynamic conception of law must be totally discarded: 
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at least at local level we can see in some cases, like Paroccan, that the law (Andean 
local law, to be precise) is the result or expression of shared values among the actors, 
and that it can carry out an effective social control among the comuneros. But we have 
also seen that this task is increasingly complicated for those charged with maintaining 
and reproducing this law. It is important to point out that in some difficult situations 
the appeal to common (Andean) legal values is abandoned in order to utilize direct or 
indirect coercion mechanisms that are seen as slow, costly and insecure, such as the 
threat of having recourse to State courts to resolve conflicts (Brandt 1987; 
Pena 1991 :a). In other cases, the communal authorities were forced to have recourse 
to negotiation with "infractors" in order to avoid even greater problems for the 
community and to maintain the social togetherness. This shows the existence of a 
local, Andean law based, adjustment process in Paroccan, with the objective of 
achieving a greater capacity to confront the present community's problems. 
In this sense Ccachabamba is an extreme case of local law not based on shared 
values. The effects of social processes like individualism, migration, the presence of 
urban values, a major presence of the State and integration into the market, among 
others, have destroyed this community. Thus, although Andean law governs certain 
practices of a certain social group within a certain space, for example, agricultural 
labour forms, this is permanently questioned by the other group of peasants, who 
appear to prefer the repertoires of State law to regulate their conduct. Nevertheless, 
some members of this group adopt forms such as the ayni to carry our their 
agricultural tasks, just as some peasants in the first group handle concepts and values 
corresponding principally to State law. Therefore, there remains the task of studying 
more profoundly the chances for Ccachabamba to become a community, the conditions 
for a more fluid and dynamic interaction between both laws, and also in what ways 
this interaction could facilitate certain levels of social togetherness. From this point of 
view, the mutual influences we have found between both legal systems, the Andean 
Law and State Law, have to be seen from different perspectives. The interaction 
between both systems can be beneficial, but in some cases also harmful. 
The mutual influences between both legal systems leads us to the question of 
juridical pluralism and to the relations that may be maintained by State law and 
Andean law at different levels of social organisation. In the case of our study, the 
State establishes from the beginning a legal repertoire which is going to interact with 
the community's own legal repertoire during certain small processes like the 
legalization process, but also in other social processes. The State knows that the 
decision to legalize is finally in the communities' own hands, but in turn, the 
comuneros know that they can only obtain their legalization after going through the 
State bureaucracy and its red tape. Therefore, the peasant communities incorporate 
some of the State's requirements into their local legal repertoires, and vice versa. 
Thus, the legalization process not only influences the behaviour of individuals and 
groups participating in the process, but it also puts into effect a symbolic process 
which transforms or gives new sense and significance to legal values, both for the 
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community as well as for the State, especially those related to legal security, 
registration and property values. This allows us to criticize certain classical statements 
which assume that Andean law concepts are necessarily different, isolated and 
alienated from western or State legal ones. This deterministic view clashes with our 
concept of local law in Paroccan and Ccachabamba, which describes various types of 
interrelations between State and Andean community law within the context of a 
specific social process. 
The legalization process, which brought about some important legal quandaries for the 
actors, also led to an interaction of knowledge on the part of the different actors. This 
was a difficult process in which each one learned about the other's social patterns or 
repertoires. It was certainly not a unilateral process. Perhaps, this aspect of the 
interaction has a greater significance than the material aspect of the legalization 
process. Consequently, scholars should give more attention to this aspect. Therefore, 
the legalization process brings about a link between the State and the peasant 
communities which goes deeper than the formal bond. The peasant community turns 
into a legal institution. This link may extend through time in a continuous interaction 
process, usually at a regional or local level, but also at a national one when peasants 
mobilize to demand certain profits from the State. In this case the respective legal 
repertoires change once more. 
Briefly, we can state that legal pluralism, at least from what we can conclude from 
our study, is a process of adaptability between legal systems in a complex process in 
which their boundaries are continuously redrawn. But this process of adaptability must 
be studied in a separate form on each social and spatial level, because we can find, as 
in Ccachabamba, that at the national level Andean law has more autonomy and 
recognition, while at a local level this law is being destroyed by the action of the 
State's intervention. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
The following table lists a number of laws that regulated communal life in different 
aspects: 
I) Regarding the members of the Board: 
1930 Board or a three member Committee. 
1966 The functions of the former were broadened 
1970 Election Committee was integrated into the 1930 Law. 
LT) Regarding the communal representatives' mandate: 
1941 Mandate extended to 4 years. 
1966 The secret vote was established. 
1970 Period once more restricted (to two years). 
JJJ) Regarding acknowledgement of legal representation: 
1938 Registration does not constitute rights. 
1961 The registration stands. 
TV) Regarding communal authorities: 
1938 Community authorities are legal representatives and coexist with the 
Board. 
1970 System of Cooperative Administration (Executive Council and 
Supervision, General Assembly and Specialized Committees). 
Indigenous Communities Legislation 
i) Law 1183 (Forbidding intervention of political authorities in indigenous 
workers' contracts). 
ii) Law 2285 (indigenous minimum wage) 
iii) Regional Law 605 (Forbidding the granting of free services in southern Peru). 
iv) Supreme Decree of 7.18.46 (Protection of underage indigenous domestic 
servants). 
v) Law 11061 (Excluding community land from abandoned land sanctions) 
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vi) Law 10862 (Declaring land on the shores of Lake Titicaca as communal 
property). 
vii) Law 8547 (Creating the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs) 
viii) Supreme Resolution of 7.8.35 (Creating the Higher Council of Indigenous 
Affairs). 
ix) Supreme Decree of 11.23.36 (attributes of the Higher Council of Indigenous 
Affairs). 
x) Agreement with Bolivia on indigenous peoples 9.14.36. 
xi) Law 7904 (Excluding Communities from declaring the value of uncultivated 
land). 
xii) Supreme Decree of 9.13.54 (Creating the Commission for Indigenous People). 
xiii) Supreme Decree of 11.18.61 (Creating the Subdirectorate of Indigenous 
Affairs and Conflict Settlement). 
xiv) Law 7589 (Public Attorney's pronouncement on communal patrimonial matters 
to be obligatory). 
xv) Supreme Resolution of 10.10.57 (Procedures, complaints, appeals, review, 
and reconsideration of indigenous matters). 
xvi) Legislative Resolution 13467 (Agreement on the protection of the indigenous 
population). 
xvii) Directoral Resolution of 1.21.88 (Creating Regional Divisions of Indigenous 
Affairs). 
xviii) Laws 14646, 14648 (Ruling on the expropriation of land for communities). 
xix) Supreme Decree of 12.31.63 (Law 14648). 
xx) Law 14669 (Community agents must attend the Municipal Council. 
DUTCH SUMMARY 
Deze studie behandelt de uiteenlopende, moeizame en veranderende verhoudingen 
tussen de staat en boerengemeenschappen (peasant communities) in Peru. Hierbij staat 
de overheidswetgeving betreffende de juridische erkenning van gemeenschappen en de 
uitgifte van grondenrechtstitels alsmede de gevolgen ervan centraal. De studie 
concentreert zich hierbij op de periode van 1969-1988 en richt zich speciaal op twee 
gemeenschappen in het Departement Cuzco, Paroccan en Ccachabamba. 
In genoemde periode vonden in de Peruaanse landbouw structurele veranderingen 
plaats. Deze begonnen tijdens de Agrarische Hervorming onder het militaire regime 
van Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) en van Francisco Morales Bermudez (1975-
1979). Het hervormingsproces had als voornaamste doel: 
1. het op grote haciënda's gebaseerde produktie- en grondbezitsysteem af te breken 
en 
2. nieuwe, op de beginselen van zelfhulp en georganiseerde samenwerking gebaseerde 
organisatiepatronen op te bouwen. 
De regeringen van Fernando Belaunde Terry (1980-1985) en Alan Garcia Perez (1985-
1990) implementeerden later een verschillend landbouwbeleid. Hierbij was het eerste 
meer gericht op een actieve participatie van particulier kapitaal en een geliberaliseerde 
grondmarkt. De tweede was sterker gericht op een populistisch beleid dat 
overheidsorganisaties dynamischer maakte en goedkoop krediet aan boeren verstrekte 
om hun steun te krijgen. 
Tijdens deze regeringen vonden onder intellectuelen en politici heftige ideologisch 
geladen discussies plaats over de rol, betekenis en toekomst van "inheemse" 
gemeenschappen. Deze discussies werden door twee standpunten beheerst. Eén 
stroming ging ervan uit dat rurale gemeenschappen verouderde instituties waren en 
daarom een obstakel op de weg naar een "echte" ontwikkeling van het land (de 
"disintegratieve" mening). De andere bracht naar voren dat gemeenschappen de 
bewaarders van het culturele, en sinds kort ook van het ecologische, erfgoed waren en 
zouden moeten zijn (de "beschermende" mening). 
Een belangrijk doel van dit proefschrift is om te laten zien hoe deze twee 
ideologische perspectieven de basis hebben gevormd voor voortdurend veranderende 
normatieve ideeën van de staat en zo de aard van de verhoudingen tussen staat en 
gemeenschappen in de loop der jaren hebben beïnvloed. 
Analytisch begon mijn onderzoek met de verhoudingen tussen recht, politiek en sociale 
verandering. Ik beschrijf het recht als schakel tussen de staat en de 
boerengemeenschappen, waarbij ik "recht" vanuit rechtspluralistisch oogpunt bekijk en 
de interacties van de bij deze verhouding betrokken actoren benadruk. Ofschoon deze 
analyse zich op de juridische overheidsprocedures concentreert, poog ik ook andere 
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voorstellingen van recht van de boeren in de Andes te laten zien. 
Het centrale concept in deze studie is de juridische erkenning (legalisation) van de 
boerengemeenschappen. Deze houdt in dat de gemeenschappen door de staat officieel 
als rechtspersonen erkend en geregistreerd kunnen worden en titels voor hun grond 
kunnen krijgen. De erkenningsprocedure vormt een belangrijk terrein om de 
verschillen en veranderingen in de houding van de staat tegenover 
boerengemeenschappen te analyseren, en de aard van het overheidsbeleid te bezien dat 
de staat formuleert en implementeert. 
Uit het oogpunt van de communero's, de leden van de boerengemeenschappen, is 
de erkenning tevens een mogelijkheid om van publieke en private instellingen te 
kunnen profiteren, zoals de verstrekking van financiële hulp, leningen, openbare 
diensten, als ook een verhoogde rechtszekerheid met betrekking tot hun landbezit. 
Ofschoon erkenning door de staat geen absolute voorwaarde voor het bestaan van 
boerengemeenschappen is, brengt de betekenis van erkenning de boeren er toch toe 
om verschillende hulpbronnen te mobiliseren en strategieën te ontwikkelen om deze 
erkenningsprocedures succesvol af te wikkelen. Dat maakt het mogelijk om in deze 
studie ook het door de gemeenschappen ontwikkelde organisatie-vermogen te laten 
zien, en ook de processen van herstructurering en interne verandering, die de 
aanpassing aan het door de staat geformuleerde gemeenschapsmodel met zich mee 
brengen. 
Ten derde wijst het erkenningsproces niet slechts naar de formele door 
overheidsrecht geconstitueerde procedures en naar de verwachtingen van de 
gemeenschappen daaromtrent, maar ook naar de sociaal-juridische interacties tussen 
boeren onderling, en tussen boeren en bureaucraten op de verschillende 
bestuursniveaus. 
Tenslotte laat de erkenningsprocedure de complexe verhouding tussen 
overheidsrecht en Andes-recht binnen lokale ruimtes zien. In sommige gevallen laat de 
staat ruimte voor een grotere autonomie voor de gemeenschappen en bevordert op 
deze wijze rechtspluralisme (Griffith 1986). In andere gevallen doen gemeenschappen 
zelf het uiterste om lokaal Andes-recht te laten prevaleren. Voor de analyse hiervan 
gebruik ik twee complementaire concepten: Semi-autonome velden (Moore 1978), om 
de interrelaties tussen de twee rechtsvormen tijdens de erkenningsprocedure te 
begrijpen, en "forum shopping" (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981) om de hieruit 
voortvloeiende gevolgen in het gemeenschapssysteem van conflictbehandeling te 
analyseren. 
Hoofdstuk 1 behandelt enkele centrale theoretische problemen, beginnend met het 
begrip "gemeenschap". Daarna wordt het begrip "recht" besproken en wordt op de 
problemen rondom "recht in de maatschappij" ingegaan. Afsluitend wordt het begrip 
"Andes-recht" gedefinieerd. Deze discussies gaan uit van de noodzaak om de sterk 
geïdealiseerde en eenzijdige voorstellingen over Andes-gemeenschappen te overwin-
nen. Daarom zeg ik dat een gemeenschap "bestaat" als er door een groep van boeren 
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een interne organisatie is ontwikkeld die de hulpbronnen van de groep controleert en 
administreert. Deze definitie maakt het ons mogelijk om deze twee centrale aspecten 
in het erkenningsproces te bestuderen, en het helpt ons verder om de Andes-
gemeenschap als een sociale ruimte te beschrijven die semi-autonoom is in het 
genereren en handhaven van recht. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een historisch overzicht over de ontwikkeling van de relaties tussen 
staat en boerengemeenschappen. Dat betekent echter niet dat wij de historische 
continuïteit tussen de pre-koloniale ayllu en de tegenwoordige gemeenschappen 
accepteren die door sommige antropologen en historici wordt gesuggereerd. Sinds de 
tijd van de Inca's, en vooral tijdens de koloniale periode, hebben de oude ayllu's 
ingrijpende economische, sociale, culturele en territoriale veranderingen ondergaan. 
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de regionale en micro-regionale context van de twee 
onderzochte gemeenschappen: het departement Cuzco en de provincie Quispicanchis. 
Daarbij ga ik niet van een politiek-administratieve indeling, maar eerder van een 
economische conceptualisering van "regio" uit. De keuze hiervoor heeft een 
belangrijke reden, want zij houdt rekening met een van de grootste problemen van de 
huidige boerengemeenschappen: hun ongelijke integratie in de markt. Een beschrijving 
en analyse van de samenstelling en structuur van de markt is daarom van groot 
belang. 
Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 beschrijven de belangrijkste kenmerken van de twee onderzochte 
gemeenschappen Paroccan en Ccachabamba. Ondanks het feit dat zij dicht bij elkaar 
zijn gelegen, laten zij zeer uiteenlopende historische processen zien. Paroccan heeft 
een zekere organisatorische eenheid en controle over hulpbronnen, terwijl 
Ccachabamba daarentegen geteisterd wordt door twee antagonistische sociale groepen, 
en er nauwelijks gemeenschapscontrole over hulpbronnen bestaat. Landgebruik en -
verkoop in Ccachabamba bijvoorbeeld hangt af van individuele besluitvorming en is 
derhalve aan de dynamiek van de markt onderworpen. 
De redenen voor deze verschillen liggen grotendeels in de erkenningsprocedure die 
beide gemeenschappen hebben gevolgd. Een eerste onderscheid ligt in de historische 
fase waarin de gemeenschappen met de procedure begonnen. De Paroccan 
gemeenschap begon met het proces tijdens de Landhervorming. Dat maakte het hun 
mogelijk om de door de overheid ontwikkelde management modellen af te wijzen en 
eigen controle over hun land te behouden. Ccachabamba, aan de andere kant, werd in 
de dynamiek van de staat betrokken. De tegenstrijdige belangen maakten het hen 
onmogelijk om voldoende solidariteit op te bouwen, met het gevolg dat hun 
erkenningsverzoek niet werd geaccepteerd. 
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt de veranderingen in de gemeenschappen tijdens en na de 
beschreven processen. Toen de gemeenschappen besloten de erkenningsprocedures te 
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starten, werden zij door bepaalde verwachtingen gedreven: meer rechtszekerheid met 
betrekking tot hun land, betere mogelijkheden om krediet te verkrijgen, meer toegang 
tot overheidsdiensten. Tot op welke hoogte werd aan deze verwachtingen voldaan? 
Wij behandelen hier een aantal problemen die de gemeenschappen sterk hebben 
beïnvloed: overbevolking, schaarste aan land en werkgelegenheid, lage produktiviteit 
etc. De belangrijkste conclusie is dat de erkenning, in het geval van Paroccan, vooral 
de versterking van de communale organisatie en de autoriteitsrelaties binnen de 
gemeenschap en naar buiten toe beïnvloedt. Met andere woorden, zij fungeerde als 
sociale controle en machtsbron. Zij maakte ook een soepele verhouding met 
overheidsinstellingen mogelijk, ofschoon andere gemeenschappen, zoals Ccachabamba, 
ook op informele wijze enige steun van de overheid konden verwerven. 
Hoofdstuk 7 vat de meest belangrijke conclusies van het onderzoek samen. Het gaat 
terug naar de in het begin behandelde vragen en hypothesen. Empirische conclusies en 
theoretische conclusies worden apart besproken. De uiteindelijke conclusie is dat de 
verhouding van de staat met de boerengemeenschappen op juridisch niveau opnieuw 
gedefinieerd moet worden. Om dat te bewerkstelligen zal aan drie voorwaarden 
moeten worden voldaan: a) een objectievere en diepere kennis van de verschillende 
werkelijkheden van de gemeenschappen, b) het uitgaan van een lokaal perspectief, en 
c) de vervanging van het instrumentalistische idee van recht door een pluralistisch 
perspectief op recht dat zowel het niveau van regels en beginselen omvat alsmede dat 
van rechtsprekende instellingen. 
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